Adam Posen

Economic growth, inflation, and interest rates have declined in Asia, just as they have in the United States and Europe. Sustaining Economic Growth in Asia explores the relevance to several Asian economies of the diagnosis known as "secular stagnation." Leading experts on the region discuss the fiscal and monetary policy challenges of reviving growth without generating domestic financial imbalances. The essays on innovation, demographics, spillovers, and various policy proposals are accompanied by case studies focusing on Japan, South Korea, China, India, and Indonesia.

Labor productivity growth in the United States and other advanced countries has slowed dramatically since the mid-2000s, a major factor in their economic stagnation and political turmoil. Economists have been debating the causes of the slowdown and possible remedies for some years. Unaddressed in this discussion is what happens if the slowdown is not reversed. In this volume, a dozen renowned scholars analyze the impact of sustained lower productivity growth on public finances, social protection, trade, capital flows, wages, inequality, and, ultimately, politics in the advanced industrial world. They conclude that slow productivity growth could lead to unpredictable and possibly dangerous new problems, aggravating inequality and increasing concentration of market power. Facing Up to Low Productivity Growth also proposes ways that countries can cope with these consequences.

The Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 was devastating for the region, but policymakers at least believed that they gained a great deal of knowledge on how to prevent, mitigate, and resolve crises in the future. Fifteen years later, the Asian developing countries escaped the worst effects of the global crisis of 2008-10, in part because they had learned the right lessons from their own experience. In this important study, the Asian Development Bank and Peterson Institute for International Economics join forces to illuminate the contrast between Asia's performance during the more recent crisis with its performance during its own crisis and the gap between what the US and EU leaders recommended to Asia then and what they have practiced on themselves since then. The overriding lessons emerging from the essays in this volume are that countries need to prepare for crises as if they cannot be prevented, make room for stabilization policies and deploy them rapidly when crises hit, and address the need for self-insurance globally if they can, or regionally if they must.

Over the first ten years of its existence, the euro has proved to be more than a powerful symbol of collective identity. It has provided price stability to previously inflation-prone countries; it has offered a shelter against currency crises; and it has by and large been conducive to budgetary discipline. The eurozone has attracted five new members in addition to the initial eleven, and many countries in Europe wish to adopt it. The euro has also been successful internationally. Even though research presented in this volume confirms that it has not rivaled the dollar's world currency status, it has certainly become a strong regional currency in Europe and the Mediterranean region. Some countries in the region have de facto adopted it, several peg to it, and many have become at least partially euroized. However, the euro's impressive first decade is likely to be followed by a much more difficult period. The present financial crisis is posing at least two important challenges: real economic adjustment within the euro area and maintenance of fiscal and financial stability without a central government authority capable of taking appropriate financial and fiscal decisions in difficult times. The papers and remarks in this volume demonstrate that the euro has proved to be attractive as a fair weather currency for countries and investors well beyond its borders. But it remains to be seen whether it is equipped to also succeed as a stormy weather currency.

The euro is the only major currency to be created in the 20th century; it now stands on the brink of becoming one of the world's two reserve currencies in the 21st century. The euro's use and development shape the entire agenda for ever-closer union in Europe and for transatlantic relations. As the currency bearing the brunt of the US dollar's decline from its overvaluation of the late 1990s, the euro's value and management is critical to the successful adjustment of international imbalances. And as a long-run competitor and collaborator with the dollar, the euro creates the potential for a bipolar international monetary system, offering unprecedented challenges and opportunities to economic policymakers. The papers and commentaries in this book explore the euro's international role, its record thus far, and its future.

Japan is only one of many industrialized economies to suffer a financial crisis in the past 15 years, but it has suffered the most from its crisis-as measured in lost output and investment opportunities, and in the direct costs of clean-up. Comparing the response of Japanese policy in the 1990s to that of US monetary and financial policy to the American Savings and Loan Crisis of the late 1980s sheds light on the reasons for this outcome. This volume was created by bringing together several leading academics from the United States and Japan-plus former senior policymakers from both countries-to discuss the challenges to Japanese financial and monetary policy in the 1990s. The papers address in turn both the monetary and financial aspects of the crisis, and the discussants bring together broad themes across the two countries' experiences. As the papers in this Special Report demonstrate, while the Japanese government's policy response to its banking crisis in the 1990s was slow in comparison to that of the US government a decade earlier, the underlying dynamics were similar. A combination of mismanaged partial deregulation and regulatory forebearance gave rise to the crisis and allowed it to deepen, and only the closure of some banks and injection of new capital into others began the resolution. The Bank of Japan's monetary policy from the late 1980s onward, however, was increasingly out of step with US or other developed country norms. In particular, the Bank of Japan's limited response to deflation after being granted independence in 1998 stands out as a dangerous and unusual stance.

Will the Japanese government take the decisive but manageable policy actions needed to bring about economic recovery? Despite claims to the contrary, macroeconomic expansion has yet to be seriously tried in Japan. Criticism of current Japanese macroeconomic and financial policies is so widespread that the reasons for it are assumed to be self-evident. In this volume, Adam Posen explains in depth why a shift in Japanese fiscal and monetary policies, as well as financial reform, would be in Japan's own self-interest. He demonstrates that Japanese economic stagnation in the 1990s is the result of mistaken fiscal austerity and financial laissez-faire rather than any supposed structural failures of the "Japan Model." The author outlines a program for putting the country back on the path to solid economic growth-primarily through permanent tax cuts and monetary stabilization-and draws broader lessons to be learned from the recent Japanese policy actions that led to the country's continuing stagnation. The book will be a useful supplementary text for both undergraduate and postgraduate courses in macroeconomics, comparative political economy, Japan or East Asian studies, public finance, and international relations.