Andrew Mason

Despite the frequency with which the term 'community' is used, it is hard to find any comprehensive exploration of the nature and value of community. This book tries to remedy this omission whilst taking seriously the idea that community can be of different kinds and can exist at different levels, and that these levels and kinds may come into conflict with one another. It focuses on the question of what kind of community is valuable at the level of the state. It then explores the limits that ideals of political community place upon cultural diversity within the state, and the limits that, in turn, ideals of global community place upon the self-determination of political communities. This book will be of interest to students of political theory, philosophy and international relations.

Despite the frequency with which the term 'community' is used, it is hard to find any comprehensive exploration of the nature and value of community. This book tries to remedy this omission whilst taking seriously the idea that community can be of different kinds and can exist at different levels, and that these levels and kinds may come into conflict with one another. It focuses on the question of what kind of community is valuable at the level of the state. It then explores the limits that ideals of political community place upon cultural diversity within the state, and the limits that, in turn, ideals of global community place upon the self-determination of political communities. This book will be of interest to students of political theory, philosophy and international relations.

This book considers a variety of explanations of why political disagreement is so extensive and persistent. The author examines variants of the ‘contestability’ and ‘imperfection’ conceptions which have dominated political theory: the idea that political disagreement is so pervasive because of its value-ladenness; that key political concepts are essentially contested; that those who occupy very different political positions fail to understand each other. He argues that we need to develop a framework which borrows elements from both schools of thought, presupposing some form of moral cognitivism, while recognising that many political disputes cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of every reasonable person. Within such a framework he shows how empirical models can be constructed which give an active role not only to the agent’s reasons for his or her beliefs, but also to other psychological and sociological considerations.