Center for Technology and National Secur

The natural tendency of people to view problems from the perspective of their home organization is widely acknowledged in Washington. The corrosive effect this has on unity of intent and unity of effort is also acknowledged, documented, and lamented. As long as the stakes are small, the costs of such parochialism are apparently endurable. Our recent frustrations in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, have elevated the problem of so-called "stove-piping" to a high profile. The proposed remedy to stove-piping is the "whole of government" approach to complex problems. Also known as the "comprehensive approach," the putative advantage of whole of government approaches is that they lift the level of analysis to a higher altitude, providing a better view of the full extent and complexity of the problem in question. The inevitable decrease in resolution, or granularity, should be more than balanced by an improved strategic perspective. Regrettably, however, the discipline of the whole of government approach has not been consistently applied, as bureaucratic inertia pushes back against proposed new practices. Despite countless testimonials of commitment to whole of government collaboration, true collaboration remains ad hoc and dependent on specific circumstances, rather than institutionally hard-wired into the practices and behaviors of departments and agencies. Although efforts are being undertaken to improve collaboration, interagency secondments remain de-incentivized and bureaucratically cumbersome, thus discouraging the growth of a cadre of whole of government professionals. Interagency collaboration also remains stunted by incompatible communications systems, operational practices, and organizational cultures.

An important challenge for the Department of Defense (DOD) science and technology (S&T) programs is to avoid technological surprise resulting from the exponential increase in the pace of discovery and change in S&T worldwide. The nature of the military threat is also changing, resulting in new military requirements, some of which can be met by technology. Proper shaping of the S&T portfolio requires predicting and matching these two factors well into the future. Some examples of technologies which have radically affected the battlefield include the Global Positioning System coupled with inexpensivehand held receivers, the microprocessor revolution which has placed the power of the Internet and satellite communications into the hands of soldiers in the field, new sensing capabilities such as night vision, the use of unmanned vehicles, and composite materials for armor and armaments. Some of these new technologies came from military S&T, some from commercial developments and still others from a synthesis of the two sectors;but all were based on advances in the underlying sciences. Clearly, leaders and planners in military S&T must keep abreast of such developments and look ahead as best they can.