Congressional Research Service

This report discusses the rationale provided for the 7(a) program; the program's borrower and lender eligibility standards and program requirements; and program statistics, including loan volume, loss rates, use of proceeds, borrower satisfaction, and borrower demographics. It also examines issues raised concerning the SBA's administration of the 7(a) program, including the oversight of 7(a) lenders and the program's lack of outcome-based performance measures. In addition, the report surveys congressional action taken during the 111th Congress to enhance small businesses' access to capital, including the providing more than $1.1 billion to temporarily subsidize the 7(a) and 504/Certified Development Companies (CDC) loan guaranty programs' fees and temporarily increase the 7(a) program's maximum loan guaranty percentage to 90% (funding was exhausted on January 3, 2011); raising the 7(a) program's gross loan limit from $2 million to $5 million; and establishing an alternative size standard for the 7(a) and 504/CDC loan programs. This report also examines legislation introduced during the 112th Congress to continue the fee waivers and increase the 7(a) program's SBAExpress and recently discontinued Patriot Express programs' maximum loan amounts. It discusses the Obama Administration's decision to waive the up-front loan guaranty fee and ongoing servicing fee for 7(a) loans of $150,000 or less approved in FY2014 and FY2015; the up-front, one-time loan guaranty fee for all veteran loans under the SBAExpress program (up to $350,000) from January 1, 2014, through the end of FY2015 (called the Veterans Advantage Program); and 50% of the up-front loan guaranty fee on all non-SBAExpress 7(a) loans to veterans exceeding $150,000 in FY2015.

This report presents issues affecting older youth as they transition from foster care into adulthood, particularly with regard to implementation of P. L. 110-351 and P. L. 113-183. Perhaps the most pressing implementation issue concerning P. L. 110-351 is the challenges states may face in extending foster care to older youth. As of FY2011, states may extend care after age 18 by authorizing partial reimbursement for the cost of that continued support.3 One possible challenge in implementing this provision is that even with assistance from the federal government, states may be hesitant to extend care because of the cost. In addition, states are required to assist youth in developing a transition plan within 90 days of exiting care that identifies the supports and services available when they transition from care. In carrying out the plan, states can take a variety of approaches, such as beginning the transition planning process well before the 90-day requirement and engaging adults who can have meaningful connections to the youth when they emancipate from care. For background information about older foster youth and the current federal policies and programs for this population, see CRS Report RL34499, Youth Transitioning from Foster Care: Background and Federal Programs, by Adrienne L. Fernandes-Alcantara.

Multiemployer defined benefit (DB) pension plans are pensions sponsored by more than one employer and maintained as part of a collective bargaining agreement. About 3.2% of all DB pension plans, covering 25% of all DB pension plan participants, are multiemployer plans. Nearly all of the remaining DB pension plans are maintained by a single employer. A few DB pension plans are maintained by more than one employer but are not maintained under a collective bargaining agreement. In DB pension plans, participants receive a monthly benefit in retirement that is based on a formula. In multiemployer DB pensions, the formula typically multiplies a dollar amount by the number of years of service the employee has worked for employers that participate in the DB plan. DB pension plans are subject to funding rules in the Internal Revenue Code (26 U. S. C. 431) to ensure they have sufficient resources from which to pay promised benefits. Because single employer and multiemployer DB pension plans have different structures, Congress has established separate funding rules for these plans. The funding rules for multiemployer DB pension plans are set to expire at the end of 2014, and Congress has been considering proposals that would alter these rules. Although most multiemployer DB pension plans have sufficient resources from which to pay their promised benefits, a few large plans are expected to become insolvent in the next 20 years. The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is a U. S. government agency that insures the benefits of participants in private-sector DB pension plans. As with the funding rules, Congress established separate PBGC programs to insure single and multiemployer DB pensions. For example, PBGC becomes the trustee of terminated single employer DB pension plans. PBGC does not become the trustee of multiemployer DB pension plans; rather, it makes loans to insolvent multiemployer DB plans so the plans may continue to pay participants' guaranteed benefits. Although PBGC has sufficient resources to make loans to smaller multiemployer DB plans, the insolvency of a large multiemployer DB pension plan would likely result in a substantial strain on PBGC's multiemployer insurance program. In the absence of increased financial resources for PBGC, participants in insolvent multiemployer DB pension plans might not receive all of the benefits guaranteed by PBGC. In a report released in June 2014, PBGC indicated that the multiemployer insurance program is highly likely to become insolvent by 2025.

The future of oil and natural gas production in Mexico is of importance for both Mexico's economic growth, as well as for U. S. energy security, a key congressional interest. Mexico is a top trade partner and crude oil supplier to the United States. Mexico's state oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (Pemex) remains an important source of government revenue even as it is struggling to counter declining oil production and reserves. Due to an inability to meet rising demand, Mexico has also significantly increased natural gas imports from the United States. Still, gas shortages have hindered the country's economic performance, including in manufacturing sectors that are highly integrated with U. S. industries. On December 20, 2013, Mexican President Enrique Pe a Nieto signed historic constitutional reforms related to Mexico's energy sector aimed at reversing oil and gas production declines. On August 11, 2014, secondary laws to implement those reforms officially opened Mexico's oil, natural gas, and power sectors to private investment. As a result, Pemex can now partner with international companies that have the experience and capital required for exploring Mexico's vast deep water and shale resources. Leftist parties and others remain opposed to the reforms, however, maintaining that the reforms cede control over Mexico's natural resources without ensuring that those resources are developed in a sustainable way that benefits the Mexican people. Opponents hope to convene a popular referendum on the reforms during the 2015 mid-term elections, but Mexico's Supreme Court may not allow it to take place. The energy reforms transform Pemex into a "productive state enterprise" with more autonomy and a lower tax burden than before, but make it subject to competition with private investors. They create different types of contracts for private companies interested in investing in Mexico, including production-sharing and licensing; allow companies to post reserves for accounting purposes; establish a sovereign wealth fund; and create new regulators. In August, Mexico's Secretariat of Energy announced the results of "Round Zero," which defines the exploratory and production areas that Pemex can retain. Pemex is likely to partner with private companies to exploit many of those areas. The first round of public bidding is expected in 2015. The U. S. Congress has legislative and oversight interests in examining the potential implications of Mexico's oil and natural gas reforms on U. S. hydrocarbons imports and exports, bilateral trade and investment, and economic conditions in Mexico. Congress approved the U. S.-Mexico Transboundary Hydrocarbons Agreement in December 2013 (P. L. 113-67, the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2013). That agreement is intended to facilitate joint development of oil and natural gas in part of the Gulf of Mexico. In June 2014 and again in September 2014, the House approved measures (H. R. 3301/H. R. 2) with provisions to ensure the continued development of infrastructure to export natural gas to Mexico. The opening of Mexico's oil and natural gas sector could expand U. S.-Mexico energy trade and provide opportunities for U. S. companies involved in the hydrocarbons sector, as well as infrastructure and other oil field services. If these reforms accelerate growth and investment in Mexico (as the government has stated) they could also benefit North American competitiveness. Industry analysts maintain that the reforms are generally well-designed, but that the way they are implemented will likely determine whether they prove to be as transformative as the Mexican government expects.