David R Frelinger

Despite its global advantages, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)'s current deterrent posture in the Baltic states is militarily weak and generally questionable. A Russian invasion there would almost surely capture some or all of those states' capital cities within a few days, presenting NATO with a fait accompli. This report examines what role nonstrategic nuclear weapons could play in deterring such an invasion.

This report describes the 2021 U. S. Air Force-sponsored Plan Blue game, which examined competition against Russia in the Arctic with a focus on the role of sensing in competition and featured robust participation from regional partners and allies. The purpose of the game was to increase understanding of the capabilities, postures, and alliance command, control, and communication relationships that may be called for in future Arctic operations.

Because of the widespread use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) for positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT), concerns have been expressed that a disruption of GPS might require a national investment in backup capabilities. The authors assess the costs associated with realistic threats to domestic, nonmilitary uses of GPS, and review possible additions to the PNT ecosystem in light of those costs.

A RAND study analyzed Chinese and U. S. military capabilities in two scenarios (Taiwan and the Spratly Islands) from 1996 to 2017, finding that trends in most, but not all, areas run strongly against the United States. While U. S. aggregate power remains greater than China s, distance and geography affect outcomes. China is capable of challenging U. S. military dominance on its immediate periphery and its reach is likely to grow in the years ahead."

Making aviation security more cost-effective is hampered by a lack of understanding of the costs and benefits of security interventions. Moreover, there will always be considerable uncertainty about terrorists' capabilities and decision making, security system performance, and the tangible and intangible costs of security measures. This volume focuses on exploring ways to use cost-benefit and other types of analysis to improve aviation security decision making in spite of such uncertainties. The authors present a set of analyses that discuss how historical data on aviation security can inform security planning; examine ways to address uncertainty about the costs of security measures; discuss the ways in which different layers of a security system interact; offer a method for incorporating deterrence into the assessment of security measures via the concept of a risk-reduction threshold, using the Federal Air Marshal Service as an example; examine tradeoffs between intended and unintended consequences of security measures, using a trusted traveler program as an example; and discuss the merits of high- versus low-resolution models of aviation terrorism for informing policy. These analyses contribute to filling some of the current gaps in the assessment of the costs, benefits, and efficiency of aviation security measures and strategies.

The U. S. military is ill-equipped to strike at extremists who hide in populations. Using deadly force against them can harm and alienate the very people whose cooperation U. S. forces are trying to earn. To solve this problem, a new RAND study proposes a "continuum of force"--a suite of capabilities that includes sound, light, lasers, cell phones, and video cameras. These technologies are available but have received insufficient attention.

Assesses the risks facing U. S. commercial remote sensing satellite firms and explores the U. S. policy and regulatory environment for these firms. American firms have begun to operate their own imaging satellite systems, aiming to become an important part of the U. S. commercial remote sensing industry. To succeed over the long run, these new U. S. commercial remote sensing satellite firms need a combination of reliable technologies, government policies that encourage U. S. industry competitiveness, a strong international presence, and sound business plans to ensure their competitiveness in both the domestic and international marketplaces. The greatest risks for the these firms come from the challenge of transforming themselves from imagery data providers to strong competitors as information age companies; the need to master the technical risks of building and operating sophisticated imaging satellite systems; and the requirement to operate effectively in a complex international business environment. In addition, the government's policymaking process has yet to achieve the degree of predictability, timeliness, and transparency that the firms need if they are expected to operate effectively in a highly competitive and rapidly changing global marketplace. The authors conclude with six recommendations that the U. S. Department of Commerce should adopt to best fulfill its responsibilities for promoting the U. S. commercial remote sensing industry and for encouraging the competitiveness of new private imaging satellite firms. (MP)

This title examines how the urban physical, social, and political environment constrains aerospace operations; identifies key operational tasks that aerospace forces can help accomplish; and discusses strategies and technologies that can improve success in urban operations.

This report summarizes research on how top-down risk analysis models could help inform the staffing, systems, and strategies for the U. S. Air Force Security Forces. Although existing security planning supports bottom-up, asset-based security planning, such processes do not fully explore the risk trade-offs, nor do they identify opportunities for SF strategies to manage multiple risks simultaneously.

The Global Force Management Data Initiative was launched to improve aggregation of unclassified force-structure data. Aggregation, though, raised concerns about classification because the system might be attractive to a potential adversary. The authors develop a framework for evaluating classification decisions to determine that, while overall classification is not indicated, the inclusion of some data will require careful consideration.

Develops approaches for assessing asymmetric attacks using cruise missiles or unmanned aerial vehicles, a novel potential threat to homeland targets, in the context of other options available to terrorist actors and for identifying the factors that might make these technologies attractive to adversaries. These approaches provide the basis for exploring defensive options.

Libicki et al. argue that information collection requirements and systems for counterinsurgency are important because the community that conducts counterinsurgency crosses national and institutional boundaries and because the indigenous population plays a large role in determining the outcome of an insurgency. They then demonstrate what this focus implies for counterinsurgency requirements, collection, networking, and systems design.

The dynamic digital economy rests on the tremendous growth of the Internet and World Wide Web, which in turn rests on information technology standards. How long can current standards keep pace with the Internet's growth? What is the role of the government? The authors examine the complex process of developing new standards for the Web. To discover whether today's standards development processes are adequate, where they are taking the industry, and whether government intervention will be required, the authors undertook five case studies covering Existing Web standards The extensible markup language, XML Digital library standards; Issues related to payments, property and privacy; Evolving electronic commerce value chains. This concise and balanced study, essential reading for technology developers and the technology policy community, makes clear recommendations on how the government, especially the National Institute for Standards and Technolog (NIST), can contribute to the future growth of the digital economy