Dirk A. Ballendorf

On February 1, 1975, National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger informed the Departments of Defense, Interior, and State that President Gerald R. Ford had decided that the United States "should seek agreement with Guamanian representatives on a commonwealth relationship no less favorable than that which we are negotiating with the Northern Marianas." This presidential decision was based on a year-long classified study by these agencies, which concluded that the national security and defense interests of the United States required that Guam's legitimate complaints about its political status be promptly addressed. Two years later, when President Ford left office in January 1977, this directive remained unimplemented and unknown to Guam's elected officials. This book explores the origin and fate of this important and previously undisclosed study of Guam's political status.

On February 1, 1975, National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger informed the Departments of Defense, Interior, and State that President Gerald R. Ford had decided that the United States "should seek agreement with Guamanian representatives on a commonwealth relationship no less favorable than that which we are negotiating with the Northern Marianas." This presidential decision was based on a year-long classified study by these agencies, which concluded that the national security and defense interests of the United States required that Guam's legitimate complaints about its political status be promptly addressed. Two years later, when President Ford left office in January 1977, this directive remained unimplemented and unknown to Guam's elected officials. This book explores the origin and fate of this important and previously undisclosed study of Guam's political status.