Elizabeth King

National tax authorities individually determine multinational ?rms’ country-speci?c tax liabilities by applying one or more sanctioned transfer pricing methodologies. These methodologies are founded on basic assumptions about market structure and ?rm behavior that are rarely empirically valid. Moreover, for the most part, the transfer pricing methodologies now in vogue were developed before the Internet became a dominant factor in the world economy, and hedge and private equity funds transformed ?nancial and commodities markets. For these reasons, multinational ?rms are unable to accurately anticipate their tax liabilities in individual countries, and remain at risk of double taxation. Uncertainties in corporate tax liability are extremely costly, both for individual corporations and from an economy-wide perspective. Firms pay exorbitant fees to have tax attorneys, accountants and economists prepare the documentation required by tax authorities to substantiate their intercompany pricing practices and defend their tax positions on audit. Corporate tax liabilities are also potentially much higher than they would be under a more transparent and predictable transfer pricing regime (due to the potential for double taxation and penalties), and investors’ returns are reduced accordingly. The FASB’s Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income Taxes (released on July 13, 2006), has motivated multinational ?rms to increase their reserves substantially (in many cases at the insistence of their au- tors), reducing the total funds available for productive investment. 1 The current transfer pricing regimes are embodied in the OECD Guidelines, individual OECD member countries’ interpretations thereof, the U. S.

Transfer Pricing and Valuation in Corporate Taxation analyzes the disparities between both federal statutes and regulations, and r- ulations and administrative practice, in a highly controversial area of corporate tax policy: intra-company transfer pricing for tax p- poses. It addresses issues that often mean millions of dollars to in- vidual corporations, and a significant fraction of the federal gove- ment’s revenue base. These disparities between law, regulations, and administrative practice are concerning on a number of grounds. First, they - pose considerable economic costs by inducing corporations to engage in a variety of “rent-seeking” activities designed to reduce their - pected tax liabilities, and by requiring the IRS to devote still more to enforcement efforts that are very often futile. Second, they are in- ; herently undemocratic. Administrative practice is currently ad hoc by relying on dispute resolution procedures that can and do yield very different settlements on disputed tax issues from one case to another, the IRS often ends up treating similarly situated cor- rations very differently. Moreover, to the extent that the disp- ity between statute and implementation reflects the IRS’s failure to carry out Congress’ will, the laws passed by duly elected officials are effectively being superseded by administrative procedure, developed incrementally by individuals who are not answerable to an electorate.