George W. Gawrych

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was one of the most significant political leaders of the twentieth century. He rose from obscure origins to become the founder of the new Republic of Turkey out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and go on to radically transform Turkish society. How should one understand Atatürk and his legacy? In this book, George Gawrych studies Atatürk’s career in detail, showing how Atatürk married the traits of the classic military man-of-action with those of the intellectual, theorist and pragmatist as a statesman. Gawrych places Atatürk in the context of his times to reveal how he harnessed wider forces to set Turkey on a path of secular nationalism and comprehensive modernization. His legacy can be seen everywhere in Turkey today, from the role and rights of women in society to the struggle for developing a democracy in the Republic. Gawrych addresses the costs of Atatürk’s policies, including the suppression of minorities and the imposition of a cult of personality and authoritarian rule in the name of ‘Turkification’. The book presents a nuanced analysis of a complex figure who consciously created a living legacy that still casts a shadow over Turkey’s political and intellectual discourse.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk was one of the most significant political leaders of the twentieth century. He rose from obscure origins to become the founder of the new Republic of Turkey out of the ashes of the Ottoman Empire and go on to radically transform Turkish society. How should one understand Atatürk and his legacy? In this book, George Gawrych studies Atatürk’s career in detail, showing how Atatürk married the traits of the classic military man-of-action with those of the intellectual, theorist and pragmatist as a statesman. Gawrych places Atatürk in the context of his times to reveal how he harnessed wider forces to set Turkey on a path of secular nationalism and comprehensive modernization. His legacy can be seen everywhere in Turkey today, from the role and rights of women in society to the struggle for developing a democracy in the Republic. Gawrych addresses the costs of Atatürk’s policies, including the suppression of minorities and the imposition of a cult of personality and authoritarian rule in the name of ‘Turkification’. The book presents a nuanced analysis of a complex figure who consciously created a living legacy that still casts a shadow over Turkey’s political and intellectual discourse.

The authors were able to access and examine relevant documents, interview numerous participants, and visit U. S. and NATO forces in Bosnia in order to provide readers with an analytical narrative that covers the background to the crisis in Bosnia, the largely ineffectual efforts of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to stop the civil war there between 1992 and 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 that produced a framework for ending the civil war and consolidating the peace, the frenetic planning that led to the deployment of U. S. forces as part of the NATO-led multinational force (Operation Joint Endeavor), and the transition of that Implementation Force (IFOR) to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) a year later. The authors shed light on several of the critical military lessons that have emerged from the U. S. experience in Bosnia.

"The Crescent and the Eagle" examines the awakening of Albanian national identity from the end of the 19th century to the outbreak of the First World War - a period of intense nationalism in the Balkans - from an Ottoman perspective. Drawing on Ottoman and European archival material, the book undermines the customary negative stereotypes of Ottoman rule, offering a more nuanced interpretation. Gawrych provides a critical but objective examination of the evolution of government policies toward Albanians, from attempts to mould them into an "iron barrier" to the establishment of a uniform system of administration. He argues that this was a result of a complicated set of conflicting allegiances and identities, rather than a simply adversarial struggle between government imposition of policy and Albanian resistance. The author also analyses the general problems of endemic violence and misadministration at the provincial level, and examines Albanian efforts to gain nationality rights and maintain local privileges and tribal autonomy. Weaving his analysis of these events into a chronological framework, he concludes that Albanian independence resulted from a confluence of foreign and domestic developments rather than from the design and will of the Albanians themselves. This stimulating study offers many fresh insights into the dynamics of power within the Ottoman Empire and contributes a new perspective to the study of the development of Albanian nationalism.

In 1967, the Israeli Defense Forces defeated the combined armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria in a mere six days. This remarkable military accomplishment would, however, have the ultimate effect of creating an albatross around the neck of the Israeli Army, as Israelis would now expect the next conventional war with the Arabs to achieve similar results: a quick, decisive victory with relatively few casualties. Although Egyptian forces were militarily inferior to those of Israel, President Anwar Sadat developed a successful limited war strategy designed to exploit this unrealistic expectation. Rather than aiming to achieve a military victory or to seize strategic terrain, Sadat merely sought to break a diplomatic stalemate with a major military operation designed to soften Israeli intransigence toward negotiations and to force a change in U. S. foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. In support of these political aims, the Egyptian Armed Forces set out to discredit the Israeli Army's prowess by inflicting heavy casualties in a limited war. Sadat's success in regaining the entire Sinai without another armed struggle holds an important lesson for the United States. After its dramatic victory in Desert Storm, American armed forces feel compelled to win the next conventional war quickly, decisively, and with relatively few casualties, much like the challenge that faced Israel after the 1967 war.