Howard P. Willens

On February 1, 1975, National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger informed the Departments of Defense, Interior, and State that President Gerald R. Ford had decided that the United States "should seek agreement with Guamanian representatives on a commonwealth relationship no less favorable than that which we are negotiating with the Northern Marianas." This presidential decision was based on a year-long classified study by these agencies, which concluded that the national security and defense interests of the United States required that Guam's legitimate complaints about its political status be promptly addressed. Two years later, when President Ford left office in January 1977, this directive remained unimplemented and unknown to Guam's elected officials. This book explores the origin and fate of this important and previously undisclosed study of Guam's political status.

On February 1, 1975, National Security Adviser Henry A. Kissinger informed the Departments of Defense, Interior, and State that President Gerald R. Ford had decided that the United States "should seek agreement with Guamanian representatives on a commonwealth relationship no less favorable than that which we are negotiating with the Northern Marianas." This presidential decision was based on a year-long classified study by these agencies, which concluded that the national security and defense interests of the United States required that Guam's legitimate complaints about its political status be promptly addressed. Two years later, when President Ford left office in January 1977, this directive remained unimplemented and unknown to Guam's elected officials. This book explores the origin and fate of this important and previously undisclosed study of Guam's political status.

In 1975, after three centuries of colonial rule, the people of the Northern Marianas exercised their right of self-determination to become US citizens in a self-governing commonwealth under U. S. sovereignty. This title is an account of their tenacious efforts to shape a political future separate from other Micronesian peoples, of the negotiations that produced the Covenant defining the commonwealth relationship, and its eventual approval by the Northern Marianas people and the US Congress.

After World War II, the United States assumed responsibilities for the Northern Mariana Islands, the Caroline Islands, and the Marshall Islands under a 1947 trusteeship agreement with the United Nations. The United States had the obligation to prepare these Micronesians for self-government or independence after termination of the trusteeship, but the Interior, State, and Defense Departments paid little attention to this question until 1961. Willens and Siemer examine the Kennedy administration's formation of a new Micronesian policy aimed at bringing these islanders under U. S. sovereignty by 1968, the inability of the federal agencies to achieve this objective, and their refusal to acknowledge that the Northern Marianas people had very different economic and political aspirations than the other Micronesians. By 1969, the Micronesian leaders—except for those of the Northern Marianas—were increasingly attracted to a future political status that rejected United States citizenship and had most of the attributes of a sovereign nation-state. Willens and Siemer analyze the initial negotiations between United States and Micronesian representatives, the inability of the United States to respond positively to the demands of the Micronesian negotiators, and the national defense and strategic objectives at issue. By April 1972, the United States recognized that its non-fragmentation policy conflicted with the right of self-determination of the Northern Marianas people and agreed to separate status negotiations with them. A detailed review of recent Micronesian history that will be of considerable value to U. S. government officials involved with insular affairs and foreign policy and scholars and researchers of Micronesian, Pacific islands, and Marianas affairs.