James F. Adams

How can we ensure that the "right" person is elected to office? Voter turnout, balloting methods, candidates, and, in the case of the 2000 US presidential election, the courts all conspire to produce electoral results that are horrific to some, wonderful to others, and tolerable to most. The "Geometry of Elections" utilizes mathematical theories to analyze how people vote and explores possible voting systems that could minimize the likelihood of the "wrong" candidate being elected. The "Geometry of Elections" examines real-world elections held in the United States, Britain, and France and asks: What criteria do voters use to determine the "right" candidate or party, and if there is a "right" candidate, how can we design a more accurate voting system? Applying spatial modeling and insights from geometry to real-world political elections, the authors present an intriguing examination of how voters conceptualize and eventually vote for politicians and policy positions.

How can we ensure that the "right" person is elected to office? Voter turnout, balloting methods, candidates, and, in the case of the 2000 US presidential election, the courts all conspire to produce electoral results that are horrific to some, wonderful to others, and tolerable to most. The "Geometry of Elections" utilizes mathematical theories to analyze how people vote and explores possible voting systems that could minimize the likelihood of the "wrong" candidate being elected. The "Geometry of Elections" examines real-world elections held in the United States, Britain, and France and asks: What criteria do voters use to determine the "right" candidate or party, and if there is a "right" candidate, how can we design a more accurate voting system? Applying spatial modeling and insights from geometry to real-world political elections, the authors present an intriguing examination of how voters conceptualize and eventually vote for politicians and policy positions.

This book integrates spatial and behavioral perspectives - in a word, those of the Rochester and Michigan schools - into a unified theory of voter choice and party strategy. The theory encompasses both policy and non-policy factors, effects of turnout, voter discounting of party promises, expectations of coalition governments, and party motivations based on policy as well as office. Optimal (Nash equilibrium) strategies are determined for alternative models for presidential elections in the US and France, and for parliamentary elections in Britain and Norway. These polities cover a wide range of electoral rules, number of major parties, and governmental structures. The analyses suggest that the more competitive parties generally take policy positions that come close to maximizing their electoral support, and that these vote-maximizing positions correlate strongly with the mean policy positions of their supporters.