Janusz Bugajski

This book is the culmination of two years of extensive travel to all the countries, old and new, in eastern Europe. It attempts to establish the contours and dimensions of international conflict and cooperation in eastern Europe during the early post-Communist period.

This book provides a comparative analysis of oppositionist trends in the Soviet satellite states of contemporary Eastern Europe. It evaluates the extent and objectives of independent social activism in these countries, and explores both the causes and effects of public dissent.

This study consists of a comprehensive examination of Communist policies toward rural populations and indigenous societies in a cross-section of developing Third World states. It explores the universal threads and national adaptations of Communist or Marxist-Leninist theory and praxis.

This in an investigation of the sources, manifestations and implications of international conflict and co-operation throughout Eastern Europe within the broader framework of regional instabilities accompanying the post-communist transition. Tracing key historical antagonisms, the author assesses contemporary clashes within Eastern Europe and evaluates the progress and prospects for integration into the wider European community.

This book provides a comparative analysis of oppositionist trends in the Soviet satellite states of contemporary Eastern Europe. It evaluates the extent and objectives of independent social activism in these countries, and explores both the causes and effects of public dissent.

This study consists of a comprehensive examination of Communist policies toward rural populations and indigenous societies in a cross-section of developing Third World states. It explores the universal threads and national adaptations of Communist or Marxist-Leninist theory and praxis.

This monograph provides a set of recommendations to the United States, NATO allies, and EU institutions in promoting a more consequential Eastern Dimension. Above all, the U. S. administration needs to clearly make the argument that progress toward stable states and secure democracies in a widening Europe and an expanding trans-Atlantic community that encompasses the Black Sea zone is in America's national interests and serves its strategic goals. The eventual inclusion of all East European states that are currently situated outside NATO and the creation of a wider Alliance would help expand and consolidate democratic systems, open up new markets, stabilize Washington's new allies, and increase the number of potential U. S. partners.

As the Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 demonstrated in no uncertain terms, Russia has developed into a neo-imperialist power seeking to restore its spheres of dominance, to undermine the emergence of a wider Europe, and to prevent the development of a coherent transatlantic community. Under the Vladimir Putin and Dmitri Medvedev presidencies, the Russian Federation has set for itself an ambitious foreign policy goal of counterbalancing U. S. influence and curtailing the expansion of Western multinational institutions. This strategy's key component is to raise Russia's global stature and to diminish America's role by undermining the NATO alliance and neutralizing the European Union. The Georgian conflict demonstrates that Moscow is prepared to use military force to achieve its strategic objectives. Janusz Bugajski explores how the Russian authorities have systematically sought to undermine Western interests through sustained diplomatic campaigns, increasing control over energy supplies, escalating political subversion, and the recent military campaign in the Caucasus. He provides evidence that the notion of a "strategic partnership" between Washington and Moscow is premature at best and a dangerous deception at worst. The struggle between the Western democratic model and the Russian authoritarian alternative will have a lasting impact on America's global alliances.

This book provides a set of recommendations to the United States, NATO allies, and EU institutions in promoting a more consequential Eastern Dimension. Above all, the U. S. administration needs to clearly make the argument that progress toward stable states and secure democracies in a widening Europe and an expanding trans-Atlantic community that encompasses the Black Sea zone is in America's national interests and serves its strategic goals. The eventual inclusion of all East European states that are currently situated outside NATO and the creation of a wider Alliance would help expand and consolidate democratic systems, open up new markets, stabilize Washington's new allies, and increase the number of potential U. S. partners.

In the postD9/11 era of heightened security awareness, conflicting strategies for containing and combating security risks have strained relations between the United States and the European Union despite common goals. These differences between the U. S. and the EU do not signal that the alliance should be discarded, as many fundamental U. S. and European interests are reconcilable_and an uncertain and disunited Europe, distracted and alienated by its internal differences, could become even more problematic for Washington. Instead, to maintain dependable partners within the EU, America should focus greater attention on its new allies in central and eastern Europe (CEE), who will be a guiding force in the continuing development of U. S.-EU relations. The CEE countries have generally exhibited a more pro-U. S. approach than many of their western European neighbors; however, public opinion and political positions are shifting, and in several states opinions are converging with opinions in the older EU countries. Looking toward the UK as a role model, other CEE countries have sought to emulate London's position by avoiding stark choices between the United States and Europe and by successfully combining both orientations in their foreign policies. A dividing line may be emerging between the wider Baltic region and the central European region, a line that is most evident in perceptions of instability along the eastern borders of central and eastern Europe and a sense of a growing threat from Russia. The U. S. must resist the temptation to focus its diplomatic efforts on bilateral agreements with those European countries in closest alignment to it, and instead use these dependable and durable partners among the CEE states to develop more predictable and productive relations with the EU for the sake of long-term stability. To accomplish this strategic objective, Washington needs to refocus the NATO alliance, ensure U. S.-EU complementarity, jointly pursue the expansion of democratic systems, reward its new allies, intensify economic and social interchanges, promote military rebasing, improve public diplomacy, defuse any current or latent controversies, and more effectively engage emerging allies throughout central and eastern Europe. Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic & International Studies.

In the post–9/11 era of heightened security awareness, conflicting strategies for containing and combating security risks have strained relations between the United States and the European Union despite common goals. These differences between the U. S. and the EU do not signal that the alliance should be discarded, as many fundamental U. S. and European interests are reconcilable—and an uncertain and disunited Europe, distracted and alienated by its internal differences, could become even more problematic for Washington. Instead, to maintain dependable partners within the EU, America should focus greater attention on its new allies in central and eastern Europe (CEE), who will be a guiding force in the continuing development of U. S.-EU relations. The CEE countries have generally exhibited a more pro-U. S. approach than many of their western European neighbors; however, public opinion and political positions are shifting, and in several states opinions are converging with opinions in the older EU countries. Looking toward the UK as a role model, other CEE countries have sought to emulate London's position by avoiding stark choices between the United States and Europe and by successfully combining both orientations in their foreign policies. A dividing line may be emerging between the wider Baltic region and the central European region, a line that is most evident in perceptions of instability along the eastern borders of central and eastern Europe and a sense of a growing threat from Russia. The U. S. must resist the temptation to focus its diplomatic efforts on bilateral agreements with those European countries in closest alignment to it, and instead use these dependable and durable partners among the CEE states to develop more predictable and productive relations with the EU for the sake of long-term stability. To accomplish this strategic objective, Washington needs to refocus the NATO alliance, ensure U. S.-EU complementarity, jointly pursue the expansion of democratic systems, reward its new allies, inte

The Russian regime under President Vladimir Putin has embarked on a coherent long-term strategy to regain its influence over former satellites and to limit Western penetration in key parts of this region. Moscow is intent on steadily rebuilding Russia as a major power on the Eurasian stage and will use its neighbors as a springboard for expanding its dominance. In this first systematic analysis detailing Russia's post-Cold War imperialism, Bugajski challenges the contemporary equivalent of Cold War appeasement, which views Russia as a benign and pragmatic power that seeks cooperation and integration with the West.

This comprehensive one-volume guide to politics in Eastern Europe provides a wealth of information on the region. The author outlines the emergent political spectrum of parties and coalitions, which are described in the 20 country chapters that make up the heart of the book. Parties are classified across the political spectrum and discussed individually in terms of programs, leadership, and political activity. Tables at the end of each country chapter present basic political data and electoral results. A concluding essay evaluates democratic development in the region.

This guide charts national histories and policies, relevant statistics and chronologies, and the identities, programmes, and activities of the full spectrum of ethnically-based parties and organizations in Central and Eastern Europe.

This guide charts national histories and policies, relevant statistics and chronologies, and the identities, programmes, and activities of the full spectrum of ethnically-based parties and organizations in Central and Eastern Europe.

In this groundbreaking study, Janusz Bugajski evaluates the impact of Sandinista political, economic, and social programs. The book focuses on the confrontations between the regime and Nicaragua's rural population, particularly the Ladino peasantry and the Indian and black indigenous minorities of the Atlantic coast region. The book concentrates on the Sandinista's agrarian strategies in order to distinguish between short-term policies and long-term programs. It addresses the question of whether any durable and novel ideological, political, and economic elements have been introduced in Nicaragua in terms of Marxist-Leninist models of state socialism--expecially vis-a-vis peasantry and the country's ethnic minorities. Upon seizing power in July 1979, the Sandinistas embarked on a socialist transformation of Nicaraguan society. This book concludes that in confronting major internal and external obstacles, the regime opted for a degree of economic flexibility without abandoning its long-term political objectives. The regime's Leninist political arrangements, claims Bugajski, were therefore combined with a quasi-Communist economic program. The Sandinistas captured and remodeled all levers of social control, including the state apparatus, the armed forces, and the security network, and fortified those mechanisms that could most effectively extend their domination. But in order to minimize economic dislocation, political opposition, and social unrest, to uphold productivity, to obtain vital agro-export revenues, and to prevent international isolation, Managua implemented a transitory mixed economy and continued to tolerate a politically weakened private sector.