Jay Luvaas

Unlike Sun-Tzu or Karl von Clausewitz, Napoleon never wrote a unified essay on his military philosophy. Yet as one of the world's greatest strategists and tacticians, his wisdom and genius can be found in his many and varied writings. Jay Luvaas has spent more than three decades pouring through the 32 volumes of Napoleon's correspondence, carefully translating and editing all of his writings on the art of war, and arranging them in seamless essays. The resulting book captures the brilliant commander's views on everything from the preparation of his forces to the organisation, planning and execution of his battles, all buttressing Napoleon's view that 'in war there is but one favourable moment; the great art is to seize it.' From the specifics of Napoleon's use of cavalry and unique reliance upon artillery to an all-encompassing vision of life from a man of supreme confidence and success, NAPOLEON ON THE ART OF WAR is the only straightforward explanation of Napoleon's campaigns and philosophy by the man himself.

Frederick the Great (1712-1786), King of Prussia, initiated the Seven Years' War in 1756 outfought the formidable French, Russian, and Austrian armies aligned against him and established Prussia as a major power, thereby decisively influencing the next two centuries of European history. He was also a brilliant military thinker whose observations arose from extensive battlefield experience. This volume presents a balanced selection from Frederick's writings on strategy, tactics, and mobility the problems of logistics and a two-front war the combined use of infantry, cavalry, and artillery the history of the Prussian army the critical battles of the Seven Years' War generalship as an art and much more. A majority of this material is translated here for the first time in English and available nowhere else. The result is an invaluable glimpse into the inner thoughts of a military genius.

This pioneering study focuses on the experiences and writings of the surprisingly large number of Prussian, British, and French military observers who witnessed the Civil War firsthand. Luvaas's fascinating account reveals why they came, what they wrote, what their armies learned (or failed to learn) from their reports, and how their writings influenced later European military theorists. For this edition, Luvaas has added a thoughtful introduction that analyzes why some "military lessons" are learned and others ignored and examines the extent to which such lessons can be applied to subsequent conflicts.