John R. Anderson

NMR methods have for a considerable time been standard processes for the analysis of molecular structure: so much so that they are now universally regarded as indispensable for this purpose. Nevertheless, with the passage of time, NMR methodology has been elaborated to levels of ever increasing complexity and analytical sophistication so that the non­ specialist may now be readily excused for the belief that for anything beyond relatively elementary methods one would be well advised to work in collaboration with the specialist experts. The application of NMR methods to the field of catalysis occurred, in the main, relatively late in the day, mainly be­ cause those catalysts of greatest industrial importance, that is heterogeneous catalysts, are solids and so require special NMR methods if usefully narrow NMR lines are to be ob­ servable. Even so, magic-angle spinning NMR methodology is now thoroughly well established and is finding increasing use in the study of catalyst structure. Of course, conventional NMR methods have been used for a considerable time for the analysis of the products of catalytic reactions. Chapter 1 of the present volume by Professor Jacques Fraissard and his collaborators is designed to give an account of the application of NMR methods to the field of catalysis, but not including the conventional use of NMR for reaction product analysis, since this is already well covered in the existing NMR literature.

'The question for me is how can the human mind occur in the physical universe. We now know that the world is governed by physics. We now understand the way biology nestles comfortably within that. The issue is how will the mind do that as well.' --Alan Newell, December 4, 1991, Carnegie Mellon University The argument John Anderson gives in this book was inspired by the passage above, from the last lecture by one of the pioneers of cognitive science. Newell describes what, for him, is the pivotal question of scientific inquiry, and Anderson gives an answer that is emerging from the study of brain and behavior. Humans share the same basic cognitive architecture with all primates, but they have evolved abilities to exercise abstract control over cognition and process more complex relational patterns. The human cognitive architecture consists of a set of largely independent modules associated with different brain regions. In this book, Anderson discusses in detail how these various modules can combine to produce behaviors as varied as driving a car and solving an algebraic equation, but focuses principally on two of the modules: the declarative and procedural. The declarative module involves a memory system that, moment by moment, attempts to give each person the most appropriate possible window into his or her past. The procedural module involves a central system that strives to develop a set of productions that will enable the most adaptive response from any state of the modules. Newell argued that the answer to his question must take the form of a cognitive architecture, and Anderson organizes his answer around the ACT-R architecture, but broadens it by bringing in research from all areas of cognitive science, including how recent work in brain imaging maps onto the cogntive architecture.

"The question for me is how can the human mind occur in the physical universe? We now know that the world is governed by physics. We now understand the way biology nestles comfortably within that. The issue is how will the mind do that as well?" Alan Newell, 4 December 1991, Carnegie Mellon University The argument John Anderson gives in this book was inspired by the passage above, from the last lecture by one of the pioneers of cognitive science. Alan Newell describes what, for him, is the pivotal question of scientific inquiry, and Anderson gives an answer that is emerging from the study of brain and behaviour. Humans share the same basic cognitive architecture with all primates, but they have evolved abilities to exercise abstract control over cognition and process more complex relational patterns. The human cognitive architecture consists of a set of largely independent modules associated with different brain regions. This book discusses in detail how these various modules can combine to produce behaviors as varied as driving a car and solving an algebraic equation, but focuses principally on two of the modules: the declarative and procedural. The declarative module involves a memory system that, moment by moment, attempts to give each person the most appropriate possible window into his or her past. The procedural module involves a central system that strives to develop a set of productions that will enable the most adaptive response from any state of the modules. Newell argued that the answer to his question must take the form of a cognitive architecture, and Anderson organizes his answer around the ACT-R architecture, but broadens it by bringing in research from all areas of cognitive science, including how recent work in brain imaging maps onto the cognitive architecture.

This book achieves a goal that was set 25 years ago when the HAM theory of human memory was published. This theory reflected one of a number of then-current efforts to create a theory of human cognition that met the twin goals of precision and complexity. Up until then the standard for precision had been the mathematical theories of the 1950s and 1960s. These theories took the form of precise models of specific experiments along with some informal, verbally-stated understanding of how they could be extended to new experiments. They seemed to fall far short of capturing the breadth and power of human cognition that was being demonstrated by the new experimental work in human cognition. The next 10 years saw two major efforts to address the problems of scope. In 1976, the ACT theory was first described and included a production rule system of procedural memory to complement HAM's declarative memory. This provided a computationally adequate system which was indeed capable of accounting for all sorts of cognition. In 1993, a new version of ACT--ACT-R--was published. This was an effort to summarize the theoretical progress made on skill acquisition in the intervening 10 years and to tune the subsymbolic level of ACT-R with the insights of the rational analysis of cognition. Although the appearance of generally-available, full-function code set off a series of events which was hardly planned, it resulted in this book. The catalyst for this was the emergence of a user community. Lebiere insisted that assembling a critical mass of users was essential to the ultimate success of the theory and that a physical gathering was the only way to achieve that goal. This resulted in the First Annual ACT-R Summer School and Workshop, held in 1994. In writing the book, the authors became seized by an aspiration that went beyond just describing the theory correctly. They decided to try to display what the theory could do by collecting together and describing some of its in-house applications. This book reflects decades of work in ACT-R accumulated by many researchers. The chapters are authored by the people that did that particular work. No doubt the reader will be impressed by the scope of the research and the quality of the individual work. Less apparent, but no less important, was the effort that everyone put into achieving the overall consistency and technical integrity of the book. This is the first work in cognitive science to precisely model such a wide range of phenomena with a single theory.

This book achieves a goal that was set 25 years ago when the HAM theory of human memory was published. This theory reflected one of a number of then-current efforts to create a theory of human cognition that met the twin goals of precision and complexity. Up until then the standard for precision had been the mathematical theories of the 1950s and 1960s. These theories took the form of precise models of specific experiments along with some informal, verbally-stated understanding of how they could be extended to new experiments. They seemed to fall far short of capturing the breadth and power of human cognition that was being demonstrated by the new experimental work in human cognition. The next 10 years saw two major efforts to address the problems of scope. In 1976, the ACT theory was first described and included a production rule system of procedural memory to complement HAM's declarative memory. This provided a computationally adequate system which was indeed capable of accounting for all sorts of cognition. In 1993, a new version of ACT--ACT-R--was published. This was an effort to summarize the theoretical progress made on skill acquisition in the intervening 10 years and to tune the subsymbolic level of ACT-R with the insights of the rational analysis of cognition. Although the appearance of generally-available, full-function code set off a series of events which was hardly planned, it resulted in this book. The catalyst for this was the emergence of a user community. Lebiere insisted that assembling a critical mass of users was essential to the ultimate success of the theory and that a physical gathering was the only way to achieve that goal. This resulted in the First Annual ACT-R Summer School and Workshop, held in 1994. In writing the book, the authors became seized by an aspiration that went beyond just describing the theory correctly. They decided to try to display what the theory could do by collecting together and describing some of its in-house applications. This book reflects decades of work in ACT-R accumulated by many researchers. The chapters are authored by the people that did that particular work. No doubt the reader will be impressed by the scope of the research and the quality of the individual work. Less apparent, but no less important, was the effort that everyone put into achieving the overall consistency and technical integrity of the book. This is the first work in cognitive science to precisely model such a wide range of phenomena with a single theory.

Now available in paper, The Architecture of Cognition is a classic work that remains relevant to theory and research in cognitive science. The new version of Anderson's theory of cognitive architecture -- Adaptive Control of Thought (ACT*) -- is a theory of the basic principles of operation built into the cognitive system and is the main focus of the book.

Related to the earlier well-known ACT production system theory, this book's basic goal is to present evidence for the psychological reality of a production system model of mind. Distinguished from the original theory in three ways, this volume uses the rational analyses of Anderson (1990) to improve upon that theory and extend its scope. It also relates the theory to a great deal of new data on the performance and acquisition of cognitive skills. The new theory -- ACT-R -- involves a neurally plausible implementation of a production system architecture. Rational analysis is used to structure and parameterize the system to yield optimal information processing. The theory is applicable to a wide variety of research disciplines, including memory, problem solving, and skill acquisition. Using intelligent tutors, much of the data is concerned with the acquisition of cognitive skills. The book provides analyses of data sets describing the extended course of the acquisition of mathematical and computer programming skills.

Related to the earlier well-known ACT production system theory, this book's basic goal is to present evidence for the psychological reality of a production system model of mind. Distinguished from the original theory in three ways, this volume uses the rational analyses of Anderson (1990) to improve upon that theory and extend its scope. It also relates the theory to a great deal of new data on the performance and acquisition of cognitive skills. The new theory -- ACT-R -- involves a neurally plausible implementation of a production system architecture. Rational analysis is used to structure and parameterize the system to yield optimal information processing. The theory is applicable to a wide variety of research disciplines, including memory, problem solving, and skill acquisition. Using intelligent tutors, much of the data is concerned with the acquisition of cognitive skills. The book provides analyses of data sets describing the extended course of the acquisition of mathematical and computer programming skills.

This important volume examines the phenomena of cognition from an adaptive perspective. Rather than adhering to the typical practice in cognitive psychology of trying to predict behavior from a model of cognitive mechanisms, this book develops a number of models that successfully predict behavior from the structure of the environment to which cognition is adapted. The methodology -- called rational analysis -- involves specifying the information-processing goals of the system, the structure of the environment, and the computational constraints on the system, allowing predictions about behavior to be made by determining what behavior would be optimal under these assumptions. The Adaptive Character of Thought applies this methodology in great detail to four cognitive phenomena: memory, categorization, causal inference, and problem solving.

Does a knowledge of Latin facilitate the learning of computer programming? Does skill in geometry make it easier to learn music? The issue of the transfer of learning from one domain to another is a classic problem in psychology as well as an educational question of great importance, which this ingenious new book sets out to solve through a theory of transfer based on a comprehensive theory of skill acquisition. The question was first studied systematically at the turn of the century by the noted psychologist Edward L. Thorndike, who proposed a theory of transfer based on common elements in two different tasks. Since then, psychologists of different theoretical orientations—verbal learning, gestalt, and information processing—have addressed the transfer question with differing and inconclusive results. Mark Singley and John Anderson resurrect Thorndike’s theory of identical elements, but in a broader context and from the perspective of cognitive psychology. Making use of a powerful knowledge-representation language, they recast his elements into units of procedural and declarative knowledge in the ACT* theory of skill acquisition. One skill will transfer to another, they argue, to the extent that it involves the same productions or the same declarative precursors. They show that with production rules, transfer can be localized to specific components—in keeping with Thorndike’s theory—and yet still be abstract and mentalistic. The findings of this book have important implications for psychology and the improvement of teaching. They will interest cognitive scientists and educational psychologists, as well as computer scientists interested in artificial intelligence and cognitive modeling.

Published in 1976, Language, Memory, and thought is a valuable contribution to the field of Cognitive Psychology. This book presents a theory about human cognitive functioning, a set of experiments testing that theory, and a review of some of the literature relevant to the theory. The theory is embodied in a computer simulation model called ACT.

First published in 1973. This book proposes and tests a theory about human memory, about how a person encodes, retains, and retrieves information from memory. The book is especially concerned with memory for sentential materials. We propose a theoretical framework which is adequate for describing comprehension of linguistic materials, for exhibiting the internal representation of propositional materials, for characterizing the interpretative processes which encode this information into memory and make use of it for remembering, for answering questions, recognizing instances of known categories, drawing inferences, and making deductions.