John R. Deni

Why does the United States need European allies, and why is it getting more difficult for those allies to partner with Washington in standing up to China, pushing back against Russia, and pursuing other common interests around the world? This book addresses the economic, demographic, political, and military trends that are fundamentally upending the ability and willingness of European allies to work with Washington. Brexit and its impact on Britain’s economy and its military, Germany’s seemingly relentless economic and political rise, France’s continuing economic malaise, Italy’s aging population and its withdrawal from major overseas operations, and Poland’s demographic decline and single-minded obsession with Russia will combine to make partnership with Washington nearly impossible. In short, the constellation of allies and partners the United States has relied on since 9/11 will look very different a decade from now. How should Washington respond? It doesn’t hold all the cards, but this book offers an array of practical recommendations for American leaders. By leveraging these proposals, U. S. policy-makers can avoid the worst-case scenarios and make the most of limited opportunities.

Why does the United States need European allies, and why is it getting more difficult for those allies to partner with Washington in standing up to China, pushing back against Russia, and pursuing other common interests around the world? This book addresses the economic, demographic, political, and military trends that are fundamentally upending the ability and willingness of European allies to work with Washington. Brexit and its impact on Britain’s economy and its military, Germany’s seemingly relentless economic and political rise, France’s continuing economic malaise, Italy’s aging population and its withdrawal from major overseas operations, and Poland’s demographic decline and single-minded obsession with Russia will combine to make partnership with Washington nearly impossible. In short, the constellation of allies and partners the United States has relied on since 9/11 will look very different a decade from now. How should Washington respond? It doesn’t hold all the cards, but this book offers an array of practical recommendations for American leaders. By leveraging these proposals, U. S. policy-makers can avoid the worst-case scenarios and make the most of limited opportunities.

For the purposes of efficiently and effectively assuring allies and deterring adversaries in Europe and on the Korean Peninsula, the Army s force posture is out of balance today, with insufficient units and Soldiers stationed overseas. Since the end of the Cold War during which hundreds of thousands of Soldiers were stationed overseas the pendulum has swung too far in the direction of a U. S.-stationed Army, yielding an over-reliance on rotational deployments for continuous heel-to-toe presence to achieve deterrence and assurance effectively and at reasonable, sustainable cost. The preceding assessment is the result of a 10-month study examining the costs and benefits defined broadly of rotational deployments versus forward stationing. Not all of the available quantitative and qualitative data point in the same direction. There are indeed a myriad of sometimes conflicting costs and benefits that must be considered in determining whether and how U. S. Army posture has become unbalanced and what to do about it.

For much of the last 25 years, NATO has focused on crisis management in places such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, resulting in major changes to alliance strategy, resourcing, force structure, and training. Re-embracing collective defense —which lies at the heart of the Treaty of Washington’s Article 5 commitment— is no easy feat, and not something NATO can do through rhetoric and official pronouncements. Nonetheless, this shift is vitally necessary if the alliance is to remain the bulwark of Western defense and security. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its invasion of Ukraine have fundamentally upended the security environment in Europe, thrusting NATO into the spotlight as the primary collective defense tool most European states rely upon to ensure their security. Collective defense is one of the alliance’s three core missions, along with crisis management and cooperative security. It is defined in Article 5, the most well-known and arguably most important part of NATO’s founding treaty, which states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Although all three missions are vital to the interests of NATO’s many member states, collective defense has become first among equals once again. However, three very significant hurdles stand in the way of the alliance and its member states as they attempt to re-embrace collective defense. These loosely correspond to an ends-waysmeans construct. First is the alliance's strategy toward Russia. Is Russia an adversary, a partner, neither, or both? How should strategy and policies change to place the alliance and its members on more solid ground when it comes to managing Russia? Second are the ongoing disputes over resourcing and burden-sharing. In recent years, it has become commonplace for American leaders to publicly berate European allies in an effort to garner more contributions to the common defense. How might the alliance better measure and more equitably share security burdens? Third is the alliance’s readiness to fulfill its objectives. Many allies have announced or are implementing increases in defense spending. However, governments of European NATO member states are strongly incentivized by domestic politics to favor acquisition of military hardware or spending on personnel salaries and benefits, usually at the expense of readiness. The result is that NATO military forces risk quickly becoming hollow in a way that is often underappreciated, which will prevent the alliance from fulfilling the collective defense promise inherent in Article 5. The book examines all such questions to assess NATO’s return to collective defense and offer a roadmap for overcoming those challenges in both the short and long-term.

For much of the last 25 years, NATO has focused on crisis management in places such as Kosovo and Afghanistan, resulting in major changes to alliance strategy, resourcing, force structure, and training. Re-embracing collective defense —which lies at the heart of the Treaty of Washington’s Article 5 commitment— is no easy feat, and not something NATO can do through rhetoric and official pronouncements. Nonetheless, this shift is vitally necessary if the alliance is to remain the bulwark of Western defense and security. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and its invasion of Ukraine have fundamentally upended the security environment in Europe, thrusting NATO into the spotlight as the primary collective defense tool most European states rely upon to ensure their security. Collective defense is one of the alliance’s three core missions, along with crisis management and cooperative security. It is defined in Article 5, the most well-known and arguably most important part of NATO’s founding treaty, which states: “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.” Although all three missions are vital to the interests of NATO’s many member states, collective defense has become first among equals once again. However, three very significant hurdles stand in the way of the alliance and its member states as they attempt to re-embrace collective defense. These loosely correspond to an ends-waysmeans construct. First is the alliance's strategy toward Russia. Is Russia an adversary, a partner, neither, or both? How should strategy and policies change to place the alliance and its members on more solid ground when it comes to managing Russia? Second are the ongoing disputes over resourcing and burden-sharing. In recent years, it has become commonplace for American leaders to publicly berate European allies in an effort to garner more contributions to the common defense. How might the alliance better measure and more equitably share security burdens? Third is the alliance’s readiness to fulfill its objectives. Many allies have announced or are implementing increases in defense spending. However, governments of European NATO member states are strongly incentivized by domestic politics to favor acquisition of military hardware or spending on personnel salaries and benefits, usually at the expense of readiness. The result is that NATO military forces risk quickly becoming hollow in a way that is often underappreciated, which will prevent the alliance from fulfilling the collective defense promise inherent in Article 5. The book examines all such questions to assess NATO’s return to collective defense and offer a roadmap for overcoming those challenges in both the short and long-term.

Although different U. S. Presidential administrations often face differing national security challenges, one element common to all American Presidents is the desire for policy options when it comes to managing those challenges. Options provide room for maneuver strategically, operationally, and politically. In this monograph, the U. S. Army War College's Dr. John R. Deni argues that some persistent biases and some more recent trends in defense strategy, planning, and budgeting are likely to have the effect of reducing the options available to current and future senior U. S. leaders.

As this monograph goes to press, the nuclear agreement negotiated between Iran and the so-called P5+1-the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council consisting of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, plus Germany-is the subject of heated debate within Washington. The negotiations that produced the agreement perhaps best exemplify the efforts by the Barack Obama administration to use diplomacy to address the most vexing security challenges of the day. The United States and Iran have struggled to overcome mutual hostility and distrust stemming from the 1953 coup against the Mohammad Mossadegh government and the 1979-80 hostage crisis, not to mention Teheran's use of Hezbollah as a proxy against American ally Israel. Yet despite this, the administration persisted over several years to first intensify and broaden economic sanctions against Iran, and then to engage in painstaking negotiations with an authoritarian country that routinely and methodically employs...

Global energy markets are undergoing dramatic shifts. Developing countries are beginning to outpace their more developed counterparts in energy demand, the result not simply of higher economic growth rates in the former, but also due to increased efficiency in the latter. Traditional producers of hydrocarbons in places such as Latin America, Eurasia, North Africa, and the Middle East face a host of political, economic, technical, and societal challenges that could potentially lead to major disruptions in the global energy supply. Meanwhile, the unconventional fossil fuels revolution has led to major changes in the flow of the global energy supply, seemingly overnight.

Significant political, economic, and social change can dramatically impact the international security environment and hence U. S. security. For example, the revolutions that have unfolded across the Middle East and North Africa over the last several years have impacted American interests such as the security of Israel and the spread of democracy. Likewise, the less "revolutionary" but equally impactful changes that have unfolded across Latin America over the last 15 years have affected American interests such as free and open trade and access to reliable energy sources. In response to these changes, American leaders will wield diplomacy, development, and defense tools to safeguard U. S. interests and to fulfill broader policy objectives. Whether and how those leaders choose to wield Landpower-a critically important element of the defense toolbox-is subject to significant debate these days in light of sequestration's continuing impact and the post-war drawdown impacting the U. S. Army in particular.

The United States prefers to fight in coalitions, and has made this clear in both word and deed. Most of the key American national security or defense strategies, such as the Quadrennial Defense Review report or the National Security Strategy, of the last decade or more note this fact. In practice, the United States worked diligently and tirelessly to construct and maintain coalitions of the willing in both Iraq and Afghanistan. American political and military leaders did this-and will continue to do this for future conflicts-because coalition allies provide both political legitimacy at home and abroad for broad national security policies and specific military operations, and because coalition partners help to shoulder security burdens. For these reasons, it seemed appropriate and necessary to address the role that allies play today and might continue to play in American national security formulation and implementation during an era of change for the U. S. military, and for the U. S. Army in particular.

The U. S. Army performs a number of critical missions across the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region. These include underwriting deterrence, building coalition capability, strengthening institutional capacity among partner defense establishments, maintaining interoperability, promoting military professionalism, building operational access, and conducting humanitarian assistance missions. For many, it may come as a surprise to know that almost all of the many Army activities and events that support these missions outside of Northeast Asia are conducted with U. S. Army forces based in the 50 states, often Alaska and Washington State. The roughly 22,000 U. S. Army Soldiers based in South Korea and Japan are focused largely on deterring North Korea from large-scale aggression, and assuring South Korea and other countries of the steadfastness of Washington's alliance commitment.

In 2010, NATO decided to expand its ballistic missile defense program, in part because of the American offer to include its European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as the centerpiece of an expanded effort. For the Allies' part, few have actually contributed tangible ballistic missile defense assets, in terms of missile interceptors, radars or other sensors, or ballistic missile defense-related platforms. This is likely to have significant implications for the U. S. Army, which has an important but largely underappreciated role in NATO missile defense today. In particular, the Army is likely to face increased manpower demands, materiel requirements, and training needs in order to meet the demand signal created by the NATO ballistic missile defense program. Additionally, Army units involved directly in or in support of ballistic missile defense are likely to face a higher OPTEMPO than currently projected. Ultimately, this will exacerbate the perceived imbalance in transatlantic burden-sharing...

The maintenance and management of the NATO alliance is a delicate balancing act between responding to security threats and navigating the bargaining positions of the member states. This book highlights how the alliance managed to maintain that balance in an area critical to its operations today around the world - changing its Cold War-era doctrine and structures. Based on his findings, John Deni debates whether the NATO alliance ought to be considered by policy makers to be a political organization first and a military one second. Providing new empirical data valuable to our understanding of NATO's post-Cold War evolution, the book offers a unique perspective on alliance management and maintenance. It sheds light on the continuing debate surrounding NATO's role in security, how the alliance will fight and whether NATO is properly structured to continue providing security for its member states.