Judith Thomson

Spårvagnsproblemet – tankeexperimentet som Philippa Foot formulerade på 1960-talet och som Judith Thomson namngav på 1970-talet – vad ska man egentligen säga om det? Vad handlar det om och kan vi lära oss något av det? I "Spårvagnsproblemens mysterier" får vi några exempel på det bästa tänkandet från de ledande rösterna på området. F. M. Kamms Tannerföreläsningar från Berkeley 2013 följs av ett intensivt replikskifte om problemet med kommentarer av Judith Thomson, Thomas Hurka och Shelly Kagan. Kanske kommer detta utbyte, som bokens redaktör Eric Rakowski skriver i sin inledning, bli ovärdeligt för framtida arbeten om spårvagnsproblemet.

“This is like you, Philip, but have you truly thought it out? These are dangerous times. You would be hazarding everything, not only your estate and your favour with Louis but quite possibly your freedom, even your life.” - Excerpt from Flowers of Languedoc It is the last decade of the eventful 17th Century. It is also a period of constant war between William, the King of England and the French Sun King, Louis XlV, a situation half-French Philip Devalle finds trying as his loyalties are constantly divided. Weary of war and politics, Philip has a new plan. However, as always with Philip, things are never as simple as they seem and there are those who will not want him to succeed. Philip’s latest enterprise, in the mountains and sunny slopes of Languedoc, will make him new enemies as he becomes involved in the plight of the French Huguenots and the struggle for power between two monarchs. He will need determination, ingenuity and courage, as well as his loyal friends, if he is to safeguard his inheritance and the future of his family. For these are uncertain years…

Do moral questions have objective answers? In this great debate, Gilbert Harman explains and argues for relativism, emotivism, and moral scepticism. In his view, moral disagreements are like disagreements about what to pay for a house; there are no correct answers ahead of time, except in relation to one or another moral framework. Independently, Judith Jarvis Thomson examines what she takes to be the case against moral objectivity, and rejects it; she argues that it is possible to find out the correct answers to some moral questions. In her view, some moral disagreements are like disagreements about whether the house has a ghost. Harman and Thomson then reply to each other. This important, lively accessible exchange will be invaluable to all students of moral theory and meta-ethics.