Matt M. Matthews

A Tumultuous Time in KansasBoth before and during the American Civil War, ragtag groups of Kansas militants patrolled the Kansas-Missouri border. Known as "Jayhawkers" and later "Red Legs," they raided anyone they believed sympathetic to secession. For many in the state, these irregular warriors were heroes fighting for a Free Kansas and preservation of the Union; for their victims, these men were little more than opportunistic thieves. James Montgomery teamed up with Harriet Tubman to lead the Combahee River Raid, an audacious mission in South Carolina that liberated more than 750 slaves. George H. Hoyt, who once defended famed abolitionist John Brown, became a leader of a contentious group of pro-Union partisans known as the "Red Legs." Authors Paul A. Thomas and Matt M. Matthews seek to answer the question of who these men were.

Making history useful to the reader - this is one of the missions of the Combat Studies Institute. We strive to produce works that recount historical events to inform decision makers and to enable experiential learning. This collection of events put together by John McGrath, which occurred in Iraq during the 2003-2005 timeframe, addresses that mission. The authors largely used primary source material - interviews and unit histories - to develop these vignettes and in doing so have made the works relatable not only to Soldiers who experienced similar situations but to any reader who can imagine themselves having to function in these types of situations. We honor those involved in these actions and hope that by recounting their stories others may not only recognize them for their service but may also learn and grow from their experience. This work is the continuation and revision of a project started in 2006 with the publication of "In Contact " by the Combat Studies Institute. The original concept was to present a series of military vignettes in a style similar to the widely used case-study methodology commonly found in military literature. The final version of "Between the Rivers," instead of following this strict case-study format, presents combat action vignettes as narrative accounts of the various types of actions challenging combat leaders in Iraq in 2003-2005. The present volume lies directly within the tradition of these predecessor works on small-unit actions. Since the fall of2001, the United States Army, along with the other American armed services, has been engaged in military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Because the current conflict has so many different fronts and facets, no handful of small- unit case studies could do justice to such a complex tapestry of events. This book thus represents a volume that showcases the American soldier in combat operations within the context of the Global War on Terrorism/The Long War. This series of five case studies is drawn from events in Iraq. Four of the studies discuss combat operations within a counterinsurgency framework at the company and battalion levels. The final case study presents a deployment dilemma facing a brigade-level task force commander when he was asked to replace a whole division in the same geographical space. In each case, the story is derived from oral interviews and key documents and is fully annotated. The primary purpose for presenting these vignettes is to provide a vicarious education in what future participants will face as the War on Terrorism continues and beyond.

This analysis of the war includes examination of IDF and Hezbollah doctrine, as well as an overview of the operational and tactical problems encountered by the IDF. The author argues that the Israeli reliance on poorly understood and controversial Effects-Based Operations (EBO) and Systemic Operational Design (SOD) warfighting theories, and a nearly singular dependence on air power, were root causes of Israeli problems. Additionally, after years of counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in the Gaza Strip and West Bank territories, IDF ground forces were tactically unprepared and untrained to fight against a determined Hezbollah force that conducted what was, in many ways, a conventional, fixed-position defense. In researching this study, Mr. Matthews interviewed several prominent IDF officers and other experts in the field. Originally published by the U. S. Army Combined Arms Center