Megan McKernan

The United States newest military service, the U. S. Space Force (USSF), has a unique opportunity to take advantage of the widening range of commercial capabilities and create a new culture and new management processes to respond to the growing challenges presented by potential adversaries in space. The authors describe an unconstrained ?clean sheet? approach to space acquisition for USSF designed around the new service's unique mission.

Congress asked six questions about the extent of, and opportunities to improve, data collection and analytic capabilities in the U. S. Department of Defense to inform acquisition decisions. This report identifies and measures extensive capabilities and recent progress in following commercial best practices. However, barriers to improvement include a culture against data sharing because of concerns about security and oversight burden.

This report provides a closer look at the current state of the Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) program as well as how new CUI rules might affect DoD acquisition data management. We found a high degree of overlap in the content of past and present CUI labels used for acquisition data, but the problem going forward is translating new policy into practice.

Acquisition data and information are the foundation for decisionmaking, management, and oversight of weapon-system acquisition programs. The authors review 21 key acquisition data information systems, their origins and uses, and how acquisition data might be improved. They also summarize background on acquisition data; review commercial practices in data management; and offer findings and recommendations to improve quality, access, and use.

Acquisition data play a critical role in the management of the U. S. Department of Defense s portfolio of weapon systems, but identifying which unclassified but potentially sensitive data require protection as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) and how to label them appropriately is a challenge. The authors evaluated current CUI labeling procedures, practices, and security policies and recommend improvements."

The report contains two analyses. First, the authors examine the cause of a Nunn-McCurdy unit cost breach of the Joint Precision Approach and Landing System Inc. 1A major defense acquisition program. Second, they document a methodology to assess the performance of an acquisition portfolio. The methodology included identifying objectives, selecting data and metrics, and analyzing visualizations of portfolio performance.

Acquisition data underpin the management and oversight of the U. S. defense acquisition portfolio. However, balancing security and transparency has been an ongoing challenge. This report identifies the problems and challenges associated with sharing unclassified information within the U. S. Department of Defense and investigates the role of policies and practices associated with such sharing.

The report presents the results of two studies: The first compares the capabilities and development approaches used in the Joint Tactical Radio System wideband networking waveform and the commercial long-term evolution waveform, and the second analyzes military acquisition programs that have exceeded certain cost thresholds more than once.

This report summarizes a selection of the defense acquisition literature from the 1960s to the present on potential sources of prolonged acquisition cycle times and schedule growth, as well as potential opportunities for improvement. It presents the range of possible causes of schedule-related problems and various recommendations cited for improving schedules by various authors and organizations.

Recent conflicts have driven the U. S. military to acquire new capabilities rapidly to meet urgent operational needs. These needs have forced the U. S. Army to rely on nontraditional practices to acquire new systems. By examining nontraditional acquisition practices used during the conflicts, this study examines how U. S. Army program managers can better manage rapid acquisition, focusing on command and control systems.

Department of Defense policies, procedures, and organizations for program management and oversight of defense acquisition programs do not align well with shipbuilding. Ship acquisition programs have characteristics that deviate from the normal framework in significant ways, resulting in disconnects and some confusion. The authors examine these differences and suggest policies that can better account for them.

Contrary to widespread perceptions, program office personnel do not spend inordinate amounts of time on statutory and regulatory compliance activities. Further, the authors could not identify any areas in which policy change or streamlining implementation would save significant dollars in program management funds, reduce personnel, or improve program outcomes.