National Defense University

The United States has a history of conducting large, conventional, firepower centric wars to achieve victory. This tactic hindered the U. S. approach to counterinsurgency (COIN) since Vietnam. The U. S. consistently failed to recognize it was fighting an insurgency and instead tried to fight the American Way of War. The inability of the military to recognize an insurgency and provide a consolidated, comprehensive, and coherent COIN strategy began in the 1960s and continued through today. This inability has proven to be a significant failure for U. S. strategic interests around the world. From Vietnam until today, the U. S. has failed to learn the essential lesson: large, conventional units cannot do nation building or COIN operations due to their size, their inability to conduct de-centralized operations, and their reliance on heavy firepower. This book examines how U. S. COIN doctrine evolved since Vietnam through a review of historical COIN trends from which U. S. COIN strategy was developed before Vietnam, revised during the interwar years, and reinvented for Iraq, and Afghanistan. This book demonstrates that U. S. doctrine does not show how to link the tactical to strategic applications of COIN properly for success. It then makes recommendations for the future of U. S. counterinsurgency operations.

The United States has yet to use cyberwarfare in a major conflict, and the military services have differing ideas on what role cyberwarfare will play in America's next war. In addition, the services have unique and often contradictory perspectives on how they see the employment of cyberwarfare in military operations, and this conflict may affect combatant commanders' ability to employ cyberwarfare in their areas of responsibility. The United States military faced a similar problem after World War I when attempting to understand and exploit the nascent capabilities of airpower, which showed great potential but exited the Great War with an inconclusive service record. The Interwar Period saw rapid advancement in aviation, and the U. S. military struggled with questions of how to best organize, equip, and employ airpower after World War I's inconclusive results. The differing approaches of the United States Army and the United States Navy toward airpower evolution during the interwar period yield several lessons in the areas of doctrinal, personnel, and technological development that are applicable to the future employment of joint cyberpower in the post-Afgranistan War era. This book first explores how the culture and biases of the Army, Army Air Corps and Navy influenced the development of interwar theory and doctrine. It then examines airpower development through the lens of personnel, and uses the concepts of the change agent and the heterogeneous engineer to show how airpower development depended on the expertise and political acumen of senior officers who believed in airpower's potential and were determined to make it a reality. Finally, it looks at how the Army Air Corps and the Navy managed uncertainty about the nature of the nation's next war while in an environment marked by rapid technological progress in aviation.

The United States Ambassadors and Geographic Combatant Commanders are responsible for protection of United States citizens in their respective areas of responsibility. Accordingly, planning and practicing of procedures for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs) are prudent and necessary especially as stability, in aHost Nation or region, waivers: however, the decision to make necessary preparations foran evacuation may in fact precipitate the requirement to execute one, thus framing anundesirable decision to evacuate. The current fiscal constraints coupled with a future security environmentcharacterized by complexity, uncertainty and rapid change require evaluation of pastevacuations up to and including military assisted evacuations or NEOs. These lessonscan inform future leaders as they consider how to best utilize the unique characteristics ofthe Departments of State and Defense to safeguard American Citizens abroad.

By the late 1990s, the term WMD was an integral part of American national security discourse, as evident by its growing usage. A full text search of the New York Times identified the number of stories every year from 1945 to 2010 using the term WMD or a variant. Other than 1973, the term appeared in at least one article every year during that 65-year period. During the late 1940s and early 1950s, it appeared in stories about 30 times every year, declining to an average of only 20 a year in the late 1950s and the 1960s. There were fewer than nine stories every year on average during the 1970s and 1980s. In other words, contrary to common belief, the term was more common at the start of the Cold War than at the end. After the end of the Cold War, however, the term saw increasing usage. It appeared an average of more than 100 times a year in the early 1990s and an average of 160 times a year in the late 1990s (peaking at 370 appearances in 1998). Heaviest use of the term WMD occurred during and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: 1,069 stories in 2003 and 632 stories in 2004. Indeed, it appeared so often in 2002 and 2003 that WMD made lists of the most used or overused phrases. After that, the frequency declined precipitously, and now appears to have returned to about the same average rate as found during the late 1990s. Although often associated with the administration of George W. Bush, his two predecessors also used it extensively. Despite the extensive use of the term during the past two decades, there is a widespread perception that it has no accepted definition and that it means whatever the user wants it to mean.

The Giggle Factor (GF). Mention "Planetary Defense" and you'll soonunderstand. Even without invoking the sinister vision of alien beings arriving to enslave or destroy humanity, the eyebrows of serious and senior members of the national defense and scientific communities go askew when the subject is broached, whether at cocktail parties or congressional budget hearings. Even the most ardent supporters of defending the Earth from cataclysmic cometary or asteroidal impacts share occasional public or private chuckles with colleagues and skeptics-behavior considered unthinkable when discussing means to avert or mitigate the catastrophic epidemics, wars of aggression and genocide, and terrestrial natural disasters that have peppered man's history on Earth.

France is the only European ally-except for the United Kingdom (UK)-that regards its military capabilities, operational performance, and defense industry as vital levers to exert global influence. While the French believe strongly in their need to preserve "strategic independence," they see new challenges in the evolving international security environment that will oblige them to accept greater cooperation with others, even in areas once considered too sensitive to discuss. Although some French strategists remain uncomfortable with the notion of closer defense ties with the United States, others ask whether there might be a greater danger ahead: specifically, if Europe's strength dissipates as America "rebalances" toward the Asia-Pacific region, where does France turn to find capable and willing partners to protect its security interests? The Libyan conflict in 2011 brought to light many of the cross-currents that are shaping French defense policy. French leaders are proud of their military's performance in Libya, which many view as having validated President Nicolas Sarkozy's decision in early 2009 on France's return to full participation in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military structures. But the conflict also exposed Europe's continuing dependence on U. S. military capabilities, reinforced France's lack of confidence in Germany and the European Union as serious military partners, and increased its determination to improve defense cooperation with the United Kingdom. Despite some downsizing, France has resisted the dramatic cuts in defense spending and capabilities under way elsewhere in Europe. If Sarkozy wins the presidential election on May 6, 2012, he can be expected to continue many elements of the transformation strategy launched by his government's June 2008 White Book on Defense and National Security. If the Socialist Party challenger, Fran ois Hollande, wins, he will reassure leaders at the NATO Summit in Chicago (May 20-21, 2012) that France will maintain its nuclear deterrent and participation in NATO military structures. But reductions in the defense budget are likely whether Sarkozy or Hollande wins. There will be opportunities for expanded U. S.-French and perhaps U. S.-UK-French defense cooperation under a Sarkozy or Hollande administration. But Paris and Washington will need to manage tensions related to their respective defense industries. For the United States, more is at stake than the health of the French defense establishment. France's policies, capabilities, and operational commitments can play an important role in shaping those of many other Europeans. By working even more closely with its oldest ally, the United States can help ensure the credibility and effectiveness of the Alliance as a whole.