Office of the Under Secretary of Defense

Software has become the central ingredient of the information age, increasing productivity, facilitating the storage and transfer of information, and enabling functionality in almost every realm of human endeavor. However, as it improves the Department of Defense's (DoD) capability, it increases DoDs dependency. Each year the Department of Defense depends more on software for its administration and for the planning and execution of its missions. This growing dependency is a source of weakness exacerbated by the mounting size, complexity and interconnectedness of its software programs. It is only a matter of time before an adversary exploits this weakness at a critical moment in history. The software industry has become increasingly and irrevocably global. Much of the code is now written outside the United States (U. S.), some in countries that may have interests inimical to those of the United States. The combination of DoDs profound and growing dependence upon software and the expanding opportunity for adversaries to introduce malicious code into this software has led to a growing risk to the Nation's defense. A previous report of the Defense Science Board, "High Performance Microchip Supply", discussed a parallel evolution of the microchip industry and its potential impact on U. S. defense capabilities. The parallel is not exact because the microchip fabrication business requires increasingly large capital formation - a considerable barrier to entry by a lesser nation-state. Software development and production, by contrast, has a low investment threshold. It requires only talented people, who increasingly are found outside the United States. The task force on microchip supply identified two areas of risk in the off-shoring of fabrication facilities - that the U. S. could be denied access to the supply of chips and that there could be malicious modifications in these chips. Because software is so easily reproduced, the former risk is small. The latter risk of "malware," however, is serious. It is this risk that is discussed at length in this report.

The Defense Science Board Task Force on Unexploded Ordnance, UXO, met from September 2002 to May 2003. The Task Force's charter contained two principal questions: (1) can advanced technology help reduce the very high cost of UXO cleanup at former and current test and training sites and (2) can advanced technology help minimize the environmental impact of future live-fire munitions training? The Task Force's answer to both these questions is a qualified "yes". Today's UXO cleanup problem is massive in scale with some 10 million acres of land involved. Estimated cleanup costs are uncertain but are clearly tens of billions of dollars. This cost is driven by the digging of holes in which no UXOs are present. The instruments used to detect UXOs (generally located underground) produce many false alarms, -i.e., detections from scrap metal or other foreign or natural objects-, for every detection of a real unexploded munition found. Because each of these false alarms could potentially be a UXO, a careful excavation is required, leading to very high costs. The Task Force believes that modern technology can substantially reduce such false alarms leading to a dramatic reduction in overall cleanup cost. Some substantial changes in cleanup management structure are needed to foster the deployment of such technology. Much of the aforementioned 10 million acres is free of UXOs and this land could be returned to public use relatively quickly. The Task Force recommends an aggressive five-year program to accomplish this release. The Task Force concluded that technology can also help with future environmental problems associated with live-fire testing. The DoD uses over two million rounds of high explosive munitions per year for training purposes. Thus we are continuing to produce UXOs at a substantial rate. The Task Force believes that the future problem can be controlled by a variety of measures. First, we should carefully examine this extensive use of live munitions in training. Simulation techniques and inert rounds can reduce the number of live rounds actually used. Second, environmentally friendly "green" munitions are being developed. These green munitions combined with a significant improvement in fuze reliability, especially for medium caliber rounds, offer our best solution for the longer term. There is an emerging problem of chemical constituents of UXOs leaching into the ground water and possibly contaminating public water supplies. This is a volatile issue, an issue which has alrea9y closed down one major test facility. It deserves careful attention by the DoD . The Task Force recommendations, if implemented, can save tens of billions of dollars in future cleanup costs and can preserve the ability of the DoD to control its own destiny and to conduct live-fire testing into the distant future. The funding impact of the Task Force recommendations is not great considering the dollars to be saved downstream. Current DoD spending on the UXO problem is about $200 million per year. The implementation of the Task Force recommendations would require a rough doubling of this yearly funding.

After conducting an 18-month study, this Task Force concluded that the cyber threat is serious and that the United States cannot be confident that our critical Information Technology (IT) systems will work under attack from a sophisticated and well-resourced opponent utilizing cyber capabilities in combination with all of their military and intelligence capabilities (a "fullspectrum" adversary). While this is also true for others (e.g. Allies, rivals, and public/private networks), this Task Force strongly believes the DoD needs to take the lead and build an effective response to measurably increase confidence in the IT systems we depend on (public and private) and at the same time decrease a would-be attacker's confidence in the effectiveness of their capabilities to compromise DoD systems. This conclusion was developed upon several factors, including the success adversaries have had penetrating our networks; the relative ease that our Red Teams have in disrupting, or completely beating, our forces in exercises using exploits available on the Internet; and the weak cyber hygiene position of DoD networks and systems. The Task Force believes that the recommendations of this report create the basis for a strategy to address this broad and pervasive threat.

Since renouncing the development, production, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons in 1969, the Department of Defense (DoD) has invested in militarily relevant biological defense. Also in 1969, the U. S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) was created to develop medical defensive countermeasures. Medical biological defensive research has focused mainly on the development of vaccines, drugs, and diagnostics as defensive countermeasures. DoD maintains a network of laboratories and centers dedicated to developing defensive capabilities to protect against biological select agents and toxins (BSATs). Most of these facilities evolved from small specialized laboratories that focused on a particular area of today's modern research and development-performing work that ranges from basic science and technology to supporting systems in biological defense. All laboratories participating in DoD research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E) are required to comply with the code of federal regulations and DoD directives, policies, and regulations. These sets of regulations specify safety and security policy, responsibilities, and procedures for service and contract laboratories conducting research and development in support of the DoD biological defense program. In general, biosafety encompasses risk assessment, safe practices, and containment equipment to protect researchers from exposure to infectious agents and facility barrier systems that prevent the release of an agent into the environment to ensure protection of the public health. Biosecurity includes physical security, select agent accountability, and personnel reliability in an effort to prevent unauthorized access to biological select agents and toxins. There is obvious overlap between the two terms. The DoD labs employ an in-depth approach to securing BSATs during operations that require manipulation, storage, or transport of these hazardous materials. Layers of security include physical security of facilities, secured storage equipment, secured transportation of BSATs, surveillance systems, and personnel security processes that assure only the most reliable and skilled personnel have access to the materials necessary to conduct research appropriate to the mission. There are numerous directives and regulations, established by different government agencies that govern biological safety and security (see list of References and Regulations at the end of this report).

Lessons from recent combat experiences in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq have shown that UAVs can provide vastly improved acquisition and more rapid dissemination of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) data. They are one of the principal contributors to successful outcomes for the United States, in these campaigns. The benefits and promise offered by UAVs in surveillance, targeting and attack have captured the attention of senior military and civilian officials in the Defense Department (DoD), members of Congress, and the public alike. Indeed, these recent combat operations appear to indicate that unmanned air systems have at last come of age. There is no longer any question of the technical viability and operational utility of UAVs. The success of UAVs in recent conflicts represents a historic opportunity to exploit the transformational capabilities inherent in UAVs/Uninhabited Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs). Transformation is not a term, it is a philosophy. Transformation is a predisposition to exploring adaptations of existing and new systems, doctrine and organizations. True transformation is not the result of a one-time improvement, but of sustained and determined effort. For example, the American forces used multiple Predator UAVs during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) to provide a far more comprehensive operational perspective across the theater to the Combined Air Operations Center by integrating the Predator common operating picture with the Falcon View mission planning system. There is now another mission imperative and that is distance. During this review the new concept of Global Persistence Surveillance has specifically focused on the contributions of UAVs and UCAVs. During OIF Predator UAVs also enabled time-critical targeting via streaming video to strike platforms. Likewise one Global Hawk in the Iraqi theater from 8 March 03 to 23 April 03 accounted for 55% of the Time Sensitive Targets generated to kill air defense equipment. In 16 missions, Global Hawk located 13 Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) batteries, 50 SAM launchers, over 70 SAM transport vehicles and over 300 tanks. Notwithstanding the success of UAVs in OIF, UAVs have not been fully "embedded" in current Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) or valued with effects driven methodology. Future UAV programs must be conceived with this mix in mind, i.e. predefined operational concepts and effects driven methodology. UAVs are ideal systems to support the emerging joint character and the asymmetric nature of warfare. The Task Force feels it is time for DoD and the Services to move forward and make UAVs and UCAVs an integral part of the force structure, not an "additional asset". To do so requires appropriate planning, appropriate budgeting, and continued management attention of DoD and Service leadership. The DoD and the Services have already started to integrate UAVs into their force structure plans. Currently there are UAV plans and roadmaps within the DoD and Services and the FY 04 budget also shows substantial increases in funding of UAV programs. While progress has been made in planning and funding for UAVs, the Services need to move from deconfliction to integration to interdependence. UAV capabilities should be assessed in the larger context of the Global Persistent Surveillance. UAVs can ideally complement current architectures for Future Imagery Architecture, New Imagery System, and Space Based Radar. This study identifies steps the Department of Defense and Armed Services can take to field a robust UAV and UCAV capability. The recommendations in his executive summary indicate the Task Force's top level recommendations. Additional recommendations can be found in the body of the report. The Task Force's findings and recommendations fall into eight subject areas and are described in this executive summary in order of importance.

The Overview Book has been published as part of the President's Annual Defense Budget for the past few years. This continues for FY 2014, but with modifications as proposed by congressional staff. From FY 1969 to FY 2005 OSD published the "Annual Defense Report" (ADR) to meet 10 USC Section 113 requirements. Starting with the President's FY 2006 Budget, this report was no longer produced. Subsequently, the Overview began to fill this role. This year to ensure compliance with Section 113, new chapters are added to include reports from each Military Department on their respective funding, military mission accomplishments, core functions, and force structure. Key initiatives incorporated in the FY 2014 Defense budget. Our budget is formulated based on aligning program priorities and resources based on the President's strategic guidance. This year's budget involves key themes to: achieve a deeper program alignment of our future force structure with resource availability; maintain a mission ready force; continue to emphasize efficiencies by being even better stewards of taxpayer dollars; and continue to take care of our people and their families. Implementing Defense Strategic Guidance. The FY 2014 budget request continues the force structure reductions made in the FY 2013 budget request. Following the President's National Security Strategy and the January 2012 revisions to that strategy, the Budget continues to make informed choices to achieve a modern, ready, and balanced force to meet the full range of potential military requirements. The restructured force will be balanced by technological advancements to deter and defeat aggression, to maintain flexibility, to ensure surge capability, and to sustain readiness levels to ensure effective mobilization. There will be a rebalance of force structure and investments toward the Asia-Pacific and Middle East regions while sustaining key alliances and partnerships in other regions. This budget will protect basic and applied research despite a significantly constrained fiscal environment in order to ensure our technological edge. The Administration emphasizes a strong national investment in research and development (R&D), especially science and technology (S&T); this is absolutely vital to our future competitive advantage. Maintain A Ready Force. Readiness priorities currently funded in the FY 2014 budget will preclude moving toward a hollow force. Still we face significant fiscal challenges especially for readiness if sequester continues, because reductions in operations and training, and indirectly for personnel and equipment extend across practically all categories of the defense budget. The readiness investments in this budget made in training technologies, force protection, command and control, and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems sustains our standing as the most formidable military force in the world. However, the effects of sequestration will require the Department to cut roughly $41 billion from the annualized level of FY 2013 funding in the last six months of the fiscal year. Should this specter of sequestration hanging over FY 2013 and FY 2014 budget years become a long-term reality it will make it nearly impossible to sustain most of the readiness initiatives presented in this budget.