Peter O. Christensen

Timeliness, Accuracy, and Relevance in Dynamic Incentive Contracts examines managerial performance measures from the perspective of timeliness, accuracy, and relevance in multi-period incentive problems. The authors use a simple linear framework where managerial actions do not affect risk and compare and contrast consumption risk for a manager’s preferences with single and multiple consumption dates, respectively. Both full commitment to and renegotiation of long-term contracts are considered. Under full commitment, timely and accurate information is usually relevant and desirable; the only differences arise from the modeling of managerial preferences, through the manager’s consumption risk. In particular, the timeliness of performance reports can be irrelevant; then, delaying reports is desirable if it can increase their accuracy. Under renegotiation of long-term contracts, the timeliness of information release relative to renegotiation is essential. Any information released prior to renegotiation is incorporated into an ex post efficient (renegotiated) contract and is particularly useful in insuring the manager against future consumption risk. Delayed reporting destroys this insurance value and can make late reports irrelevant, independent of the modeling of managerial preferences. But timely reports can create ex ante inefficient action incentives for managers, and then accuracy can be costly as well.

Equity Valuation reviews and critically examines the standard approach to equity valuation using a constant risk-adjusted cost of capital and develops a new valuation approach discounting risk-adjusted fundamentals using nominal zero-coupon interest rates. It is organized as follows:Chapter 2 (Risk-Adjusted Discount Rates) reviews standard valuation models based on risk-adjusted discount rates. Chapter 3 (Multi-Period Asset Pricing Theory and Accounting Relations) examines key results from multi-period asset pricing theory in discrete-time, and shows how equity valuation models can equivalently be based on free cash flows or accrual accounting numbers. Based on these results, the authors derive an accounting-based multi-period equity valuation model presented in Chapter 4 (An Accounting-Based Multi-period Equity Valuation Model) with equilibrium risk-adjustments determined by prices of aggregate consumption claims. Chapter 5 (Equity Valuation with HARA Utility) includes a general equilibrium analysis of a setting in which the investors have HARA utility, and aggregate consumption and residual operating income are jointly normally distributed. A set of appendices follows including Appendix B that extends the setting to preferences with external habit formation (which recently has gained popularity in asset pricing theory). Appendix C, which discusses the relationship between risk-adjusted expected cash flows and certainty equivalents.