Phillip S. Meilinger

Until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour, America did not want war, with the 1930s marked by strong isolationism and an emphasis on defense. However, in December 1941, it wasn't defensive aircraft the Army Air Corps had been steadily procuring, but offensive long-range heavy bombers, whilst US pursuit planes were decidedly inferior to their European counterparts. In this new history of the development of American air power, Phillip Meilinger dispels the notion that young air zealots pushed for a bomber-heavy force, revealing instead the technological, economic and bureaucratic forces which shaped the air force. He examines the role of scientists and engineers, developments in commercial aviation, and conflicting priorities of the Army and Air Corps, as well as how these were in turn influenced by America's political leaders. Building an Air Force is essential for understanding a conflict in which whoever controlled the skies controlled the land and seas beneath.

The United States has the most expensive and seemingly unstoppable military in the world. Yet, since World War II the nation's military success rate has been meager. The Korean War was a draw, while Vietnam, Mogadishu, Afghanistan, and Iraq were clear losses. Successes include Iraq in 1991, the Balkans (Croatia and Kosovo), Panama, the initial takedowns of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and Libya. What differentiates the failures from the successes? Failures have been marked by the introduction of large numbers of conventional American ground troops, while successes have been characterized by the use of airpower, special operations forces, robust intelligence and sensor platforms, and the use of indigenous ground troops. Phillip S. Meilinger's new book advocates strategies that limit risks in war as well as achieve measurable goals. Instead of large numbers of conventional ground troops, the author argues in favor of a focus on asymmetric capabilities--a combination of airpower, special operation forces, intelligence, and indigenous ground troops--to achieve the desired political outcomes.

Ever since the US Army bought its first "aeroplane" in 1909, debates have raged over the utility, effectiveness, efficiency, legality, and even the morality of airpower and strategic bombing. Unfortunately, much of this controversy has been colored by accusations, misconceptions, inaccuracies, myths, and simple untruths. If airpower needs criticizing - and certainly there are times when criticism is appropriate - it must be based on accurate information. In Airpower: Myths and Facts, Col Phillip S. Meilinger, USAF, retired, raises points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning airpower and strategic bombing and giving our political and military leaders a better basis on which to form decisions in future conflicts.

According to the author all aircrews, tacticians and those who direct them have to realise the limitations of air power during conflicts. For years opinion has differed as to whether the aircraft has altered war strategies or merely the tactics of war. This volume explores the limits of airpower.

According to the author all aircrews, tacticians and those who direct them have to realise the limitations of air power during conflicts. For years opinion has differed as to whether the aircraft has altered war strategies or merely the tactics of war. This volume explores the limits of airpower.