Robert F. Baumann

As this overview seeks to remind the reader, the United States had a military presence in Somalia from December 1992 to the end of March 1994. A principal aim of the authors was to provide an analytical narrative of each phase of the US military involvement in Somalia. The authors address planning for a multinational intervention; workable and unworkable command and control arrangements; the advantages and problems inherent in coalition operations; the need for cultural awareness in a clan-based society whose status as a nation-state is problematic; the continuous adjustments required by a dynamic, often unpredictable situation; the political dimension of military activities at the operational and tactical levels; and the ability to match military power and capabilities to the mission at hand. This case study also cautions against the misuse of "lessons learned."

The authors were able to access and examine relevant documents, interview numerous participants, and visit U. S. and NATO forces in Bosnia in order to provide readers with an analytical narrative that covers the background to the crisis in Bosnia, the largely ineffectual efforts of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to stop the civil war there between 1992 and 1995, the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995 that produced a framework for ending the civil war and consolidating the peace, the frenetic planning that led to the deployment of U. S. forces as part of the NATO-led multinational force (Operation Joint Endeavor), and the transition of that Implementation Force (IFOR) to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) a year later. The authors shed light on several of the critical military lessons that have emerged from the U. S. experience in Bosnia.