Roger Sherman

Using game theory to understand how competing public and private interests shape the contemporary urban landscapeIn the American city, property rights involve not one but numerous stakeholders, some connected to the parcel by title and others through less formal arrangements, whether political, economic, or cultural. Negotiations between these stakeholders over the use of property are frequently complicated, even convoluted. In L. A. under the Influence, Roger Sherman contends that it is these negotiations, rather than more commonly accepted factors like history, symbolism, and planning, that not only shape a city but also influence the development of its smallest common increment: the individual parcel. Through a series of case studies in Los Angeles, Sherman applies game theory to scrutinize the behavior of these intersecting private and public interests, revealing an alternative logic of architectural composition. Making extensive use of diagrams, photographs, and a range of negotiation models employed within game theory, including pecking order, negotiated access, multilateral exchange, and tit for tat, he identifies the characteristic features and behaviors of this new spatial logic. For Sherman, these models offer an exciting new role for architecture in urban planning and design. Sherman urges architects to utilize design strategy as a means of mediating between the various stakeholders involved in a project, identifying and creating affiliations between otherwise conflicting interests. The architect’s willingness to engage with these negotiations, he argues, has the potential to produce formally and spatially audacious projects as well as recover the social and political relevance of architecture itself.

Competition may not function well where technology calls for large and complex investments, as in the electrivity industry where public utilities often provide service. This book presents economic welfare foundations for the purpose of evaluating how well, from a social point of view, an enterprise performs when competition is unable to function. Problems with existing institutions are emphasized. Topics treated include welfare measures and their uses in peak-load pricing, second-best pricing, and income distribution. Professor Sherman covers public choice difficulties of government intervention, and describes problems with incentives in statutory monopolies and efforts to overcome them through the study of principal-agent relationships. Contestability and sustainable prices are also discussed, as well as effects of uncertainty and imperfect information.