Stephen D. Sklenka

This book focuses on the critical yet often overlooked subject of operational leadership. Using a case study of General George S. Patton, Jr. and his command of the U. S. Third Army during World War II as the backdrop, I intend to offer lessons learned from Patton's time as a commander at the operational level for potential future operational leaders who aspire to such command. The scope of this paper is straightforward; this is a study of operational leadership as performed by perhaps its most skilled practitioner. A detailed analysis of Patton's tactical accomplishments is not contained herein. Nor is a study of his pre-Third Army actions conducted. There are more than enough volumes that describe all of those impressive actions. Further, this paper will not delve into the controversial actions that colored Patton's career; there are even more volumes addressing those topics.

This paper focuses on the interrelationship among national interests, stated ends, means to achieve those ends, and the strategies required to tie all of them together into a cohesive and effective vision for the commitment of U. S. forces. The introduction addresses the current U. S. debate regarding proposed actions in the Iraq War and postulates that the lack of true strategic discussion, particularly by our national leadership who instead prefer to focus on far less appropriate discussions such as tactics and techniques, inhibits the development of a comprehensive and effective overarching vision and ultimately is to blame for the setbacks that the U. S.-led coalition has experienced in Iraq. This lack of strategic foresight, however, is not surprising and has become endemic to American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. The fact that so much of U. S. post-Cold War foreign policy involves interventions merely exacerbates the difficulties a lack of strategic foresight engenders.