Stephen Gardbaum

Environmental law expert Lowell E. Baier reveals how over centuries the federal government slowly preempted the states’ authority over managing their residential wildlife. Baier describes how state authority over its resident wildlife established in the 1600s for the food security of its citizens, has slowly eroded under the pressures of nationalism driven by the forces of industry, commerce and technology; how federalism has become unbalanced; and, how preemption became the legal tool used to extend the reach of the federal government invading state sovereignty over its resident and migratory wildlife. In doing so, he educates elected officials, wildlife students, and environmentalists in the precedents that led to the current state of wildlife management, and how a constructive environment can be fostered at all levels of government to improve our nation’s wildlife and biodiversity.

Stephen Gardbaum argues that recent bills of rights in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Australia are an experiment in a new third way of organizing basic institutional arrangements in a democracy. This 'new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism' promises both an alternative to the conventional dichotomy of legislative versus judicial supremacy and innovative techniques for protecting rights. As such, it is an intriguing and important development in constitutional design of relevance to drafters of bills of rights everywhere. In developing the theory and exploring the practice of this new model, the book analyses its novelty and normative appeal as a third general model of constitutionalism before presenting individual and comparative assessments of the operational stability, distinctness and success of its different versions in the various jurisdictions. It closes by proposing a set of general and specific reforms aimed at enhancing these practical outcomes.

Stephen Gardbaum argues that recent bills of rights in Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Australia are an experiment in a new third way of organizing basic institutional arrangements in a democracy. This 'new Commonwealth model of constitutionalism' promises both an alternative to the conventional dichotomy of legislative versus judicial supremacy and innovative techniques for protecting rights. As such, it is an intriguing and important development in constitutional design of relevance to drafters of bills of rights everywhere. In developing the theory and exploring the practice of this new model, the book analyses its novelty and normative appeal as a third general model of constitutionalism before presenting individual and comparative assessments of the operational stability, distinctness and success of its different versions in the various jurisdictions. It closes by proposing a set of general and specific reforms aimed at enhancing these practical outcomes.