Strategic Studies Institute

As the United States reassesses relations with Russia and develops doctrine that addresses a turbulent security environment, Dr. Richard J. Krickus addresses a brace of pivotal questions that have a bearing on the future of Vladimir Putin and his Power Vertical. Are Putin's days numbered as many Russian watchers predict and what will Russia look like after he leaves the Kremlin? Toward this end, Krickus assesses four plausible scenarios. They include first, Status Quo, depicting the major geo-political features of Russia today; second, Stalin Lite that embraces most of the characteristics of a police state; third, The Western Path to Development that reflects pluralistic phenomenon associated with a "normal" European country; and fourth, Russia in Chaos, an outcome that anticipates the virtual disintegration of Russia as we know it today.

In recent years, attention by the U. S. national security establishment to challenges in the Western Hemisphere has concentrated on issues of transnational organized crime, socialist populism, potential terrorist threats, and similar challenges arising from poverty, inequality, and weak governance in parts of the region. As Latin America and the Caribbean nations have expanded their economic and other forms of engagement with countries beyond the region, the majority of attention has gone to activities in the region by the People's Republic of China, and to a lesser extent, by the Islamic Republic of Iran. The equally important re-engagement with the region by the Russian Federation during this period has received less attention, particularly among scholarly articles. Russia's re-engagement with the region, which began in earnest in 2008, coincided with an escalation in tension with the United States over the role of Russia in the civil war in Georgia and the related succession of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Army has an opioid drug problem that is not going away under current personnel policies and medical practices. The survey results recorded here indicate that senior officers attending the U. S. Army War College (USAWC) recognize that the opioid problem is distinct in nature and origin from those of recreational drug abuse. Yet, these officers are saddled with a legacy drug enforcement structure and outdated procedures that do not track opioid usage across the force and do not address the root cause of the issue. They are commanding units under a regulatory structure that belatedly responds to opioid-related misuse with the same misconduct-focused disciplinary policies as those for recreational drug use, rather than with a proactive medical and personnel approach crafted for this unique problem set that emphasizes prevention and rehabilitation. The USAWC officer survey responses reflect the fact that the majority of these future Army leaders see misuse originating out of prescribing practices...

Because of the seamlessly international nature of the Internet, effective cyber security demands close cooperation with allies and friends overseas. Yet, because of the relatively young status of the discipline, national approaches to organizing and providing for cyber defense vary widely even among those countries whose interests are most closely aligned with those of the United States. The result is that the bodies and structures responsible for cyber defense, and their affiliations and mandates, can be difficult to understand. In this Letort Paper, British cyber policy researcher Keir Giles and German computer security specialist Kim Hartmann provide an overview of four different national approaches to cyber defense: those of Norway, Estonia, Germany, and Sweden. While providing a useful guide for engagement with the relevant governmental and other organizations in each of these countries, the Paper also compares and contrasts the advantages and drawbacks of each national approach.

The focus on Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014-15 has obscured other areas of contention which previously were prominent and problematic in relations between the United States and Russia. One such area is the strenuous Russian objection to U. S. plans for ballistic missile defense, most recently in the form of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA). At some point in the near future, the issue of missile defense will once more be on the table with Russia; whether as a result of a relaxation of tensions allowing renewed bilateral discussion of security issues, or indeed because of an immediate threat of Russian escalatory action in response to the United States rolling out missile defense capabilities. In either case, U. S. policymakers and negotiators need to be prepared and fully acquainted with the wide range of issues at stake. In this respect, both the current monograph and its predecessor, European Missile Defense and Russia, provide an essential grounding...

Military personnel who have experience in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Vietnam, as well as senior leaders and military historians alike, will find this book by Dr. Chris Mason thought-provoking and useful. Dr. Mason examines indigenous personnel issues at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of war and uses empirical data and exhaustive research to argue that all three wars were lost before the first shots were fired-not on the battlefield, but at the strategic level of war. The United States interpreted all three conflicts as insurgencies, Mason writes, when in fact all three were civil wars in which the United States took a side. Success was never possible from the outset, his provocative thesis argues, because none of the three countries were nations for which the majority of their citizens were willing to fight and die. Nation-building is a slow, evolutionary, internal process through which the political identity of the peoples within a country's borders matures over centuries...

In a time of rapid change for the U. S. Army, it is essential to retain awareness of how potential adversaries are also developing their concepts of Landpower. This Letort Paper, written by an influential Russian general, lays out an authoritative view on the importance of substantial conventional land forces, as seen from Moscow. The year 2014 was an eventful one for the Russian military, opening with the seizure of Crimea, continuing through ongoing operations in and near Ukraine, and culminating with the issue of a new Military Doctrine reflecting what Russia describes as new security realities in Europe. All of these circumstances have drawn attention back to the challenge to U. S. interests posed by the Russian military. The issue of this Paper is therefore especially timely. The author, Major General Aleksandr Rogovoy, is a professor at the Russian General Staff Academy with a substantial record of academic and operational experience, and a direct contributor to the drafting of Russia's 2014 Military...

In November 2014, tense negotiations over the status of Iran's nuclear program resulted in a 7-month extension of a compliance deadline. In June 2015, negotiators will once again be grappling with the same intractable issues, where neither Iran nor the United States and its allies appear able to make the substantive concessions that would be necessary for a permanent agreement. This monograph, completed ahead of the November 2014 deadline, examines some of the underlying factors which will be constant in dealing with Iran under President Hassan Rouhani, and which will help determine the success or failure of talks in 2015. It surveys Rouhani's eventful first year in office in order to provide pointers to what may be possible-and to some key limiting factors-for Iran under his leadership. During that time, Rouhani was forced to balance his own progressive instincts with the instinctual caution of more conservative elements of the Iranian ruling elite.

The national strategy of the United States has reemphasized the Asia-Pacific region, but subsequent actions in that direction seem to be preempted by more immediate crises elsewhere in the world and by internal political disputes. Nonetheless, events in the region continue to evolve and the United States must stay actively engaged or lose its long-standing influence. With the status of China rising and other regional states weighing their options between Chinese and American power, a better understanding by American policymakers of the region's disputes is necessary to maintain American diplomatic, economic, and security influence under more austere conditions. Of the issues daunting Southeast Asia, few are as poorly understood by U. S. policymakers as the dispute between Vietnam and China over the Paracel Islands

The recent history of the conversation with Russia over plans for European missile defense has been one of repeated and unsuccessful attempts to allay strongly worded Russian concerns. None of these attempts has mitigated Russia's trenchant opposition to U. S. plans. At times, this opposition can appear based on grounds which are spurious or incomprehensible. In this monograph, Mr. Keir Giles, a British academic and long-term scholar of Russia, examines the history of missile defense, and the current dialogue, from a Russian perspective in order to explain the root causes of Russian alarm. He presents specific recommendations for managing the Russia relationship in the context of missile defense. Important conclusions are also drawn for the purpose of managing the dialogue over missile defense plans not only with Russia as an opponent, but also with European North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies as partners and hosts.

The end of the Cold War brought challenges not only for practitioners of national security policy and strategy but for those involved in the education and development of future strategic leaders and security policy practitioners. One of the primary contributors to this book, Professor James M. Smith of the U. S. Air Force Academy, launched this project in initial conversations in 1996-97 with Brigadier General Daniel J. Kaufman of the U. S. Military Academy, Dr. Robert L. Wendzel of the Air War College, and Colonel Jeffrey D. McCausland of the U. S. Army War College. All four shared a concern about the future of security studies generally, but especially about the education and development of military officers as future strategic leaders.

The September 11 attacks against U. S. targets came as a frightening shock to most Americans who had never previously heard of Osama Bin Laden or the virulent radicalism associated with his al Qaeda network. In the tumultuous aftermath of the attacks, many Americans grasped for explanations as to why these events occurred and what was to be done about them. Closely-related queries were why Islamic radicals enjoy a significant amount of popular sympathy within the Muslim World, and how this trend can be reversed. This monograph, by Dr. Alan Richards, addresses the critical questions involved in understanding and coping with the roots of Islamic radicalism. His work closely examines the links between radicalism and a series of crises associated with modernization in the Islamic World. The result is a thoughtful and probing study including policy recommendations for U. S. military and civilian decisionmakers that makes intelligible the complex subject of Islamic radicalism.

In this monograph, Dr. Evan Ellis seeks to do several things. He documents and examines the character of the new and increasing Chinese engagement in the Western Hemisphere. He then takes the analysis a step further by examining some of the potential dynamics of the Chinese engagement and its consequences for the long-term security interests of the United States. Dr. Ellis argues that China is both a significant competitor, and a potential partner of the United States in the region. Although he argues that China increasingly will vie with the United States for the hemisphere's resources and political allegiances, he also notes that China's growing dependence on its trade and investment in Latin America will give it security and stability interests that coincide with those of the United States. At the same time, the author warns that the combination of competition, trade, investment, political interests, and concomitant Chinese population increase in the region is likely to change the economic structure...

The United States has long faced numerous problems when fighting insurgencies. Many of these concern the performance of local allies, who typically play a leading role in counterinsurgency. In this monograph, Dr. Daniel Byman reviews the problems common to the security forces of local allies that have fought or may soon fight insurgencies linked to al-Qa'ida. He argues that these problems stem from deep structural weaknesses, such as the regime's perceived illegitimacy, poor civil-military relations, an undeveloped economy, and discriminatory societies. Together, they greatly inhibit the allied armed forces' effectiveness in fighting the insurgents. Various U. S. programs designed to work with allied security forces, at best, can reduce some of these issues. To be effective, any program to assist allied counterinsurgency forces should factor in the allies' weaknesses. This monograph was written under the Strategic Studies Institute's External Research Associates Program (ERAP).

Lieutenant Colonel Clarence Bouchat conceived this paper while teaching theater strategy on the Distance Education faculty at the U. S. Army War College. As an adjunct member of the resident course teaching team, he also observed resident students wrestle with the subject. While the Strategic Studies Institute does not normally publish curricular materials, this is the second time a subject has been deemed of sufficient importance and utility that it is now offered to our wider audience. Theater strategy and theater security cooperation (TSC) are two of the most important tools available in attaining national security. They offer an effective means for geographic Combatant Commanders to engage other countries, deter aggression, or resolve crises. Despite their importance, however, little current, concise, and comprehensive guidance is available on how they are planned and implemented.

Nearly every week, newspapers carry stories of the failure of the Iraqi police to provide basic civil security for the citizens of Iraq. Despite millions of dollars in aid, equipment, education, and advisors, more than 4 years later police force development lags far behind the military. Numerous reasons are offered to account for this gap: corrupt practices left over from the previous regime, infiltration by militias, weak leadership, competition by better armed and organized criminal and militant groups, and so on. However, the military is also subject to these same influences, thus none of these explanations by themselves or in combination are satisfactory. But such an explanation is critical if policymakers and advisors are going to successfully facilitate police reform. This paper argues that the poor political and security environment impacts social, political, and cultural factors in ways that are predictable, understandable, and, with external help, resolvable.

While conflict in cyberspace is not a new phenomenon, the legality of hostile cyber activity at a state level remains imperfectly defined. While there is broad agreement among the United States and its allies that cyber warfare would be governed by existing law of armed conflict, with no need for additional treaties or conventions to regulate hostilities online, this view is not shared by many nations that the United States could potentially face as adversaries. A range of foreign states use definitions for cyber conflict that are entirely different from our own, extending to different concepts of what constitutes online hostilities and even a state of war. This leads to a potentially dangerous situation where an adversary could be operating according to an entirely different understanding of international law to that followed by the United States. In this Letort Paper, Mr. Keir Giles uses Russian-language sources and interviews to illustrate the very distinct set of views on the nature of conflict...

The questionable performance of the Russian armed forces in the conflict in Georgia in 2008 provided the impetus for a program of far-reaching reform in the Russian military. The progress of this reform has been the subject of intensive study, including in a number of monographs issued by the Strategic Studies Institute. But as Mr. Keir Giles and Dr. Andrew Monaghan describe in this Paper, the most recent phase of military transformation in Russia allows conclusions to be drawn about the final shape of the Russian military once the process is complete-and about the range of threats, some of them unrecognizable to us, that is guiding that process. In this monograph, the authors use a wide range of Russian language sources and interviews to illustrate not only the Russian threat assessments highlighting the United States as a potential aggressor, but also the many unique challenges facing Russia in renewing and rearming its military.

There has been a growing recognition in the post-Cold War era that culture has increasingly become a factor in determining the course of today's complex and interconnected world. The U. S. experience in Afghanistan and Iraq extended this trend to national security and military operations. There is also a growing recognition by the national security community that culture is an important factor at the policy and strategy levels. Cultural proficiency at the policy and strategic levels means the ability to consider history, values, ideology, politics, religion, and other cultural dimensions and assess their potential effect on policy and strategy. The Analytical Cultural Framework for Strategy and Policy (ACFSP) is one systematic and analytical approach to the vital task of viewing the world through many lenses. The ACFSP identifies basic cultural dimensions that seem to be of fundamental importance in determining such behavior and thus are of importance in policy and strategy formulation and outcomes.