United States Army

This study examines the role that the various systems of justice played in the ultimate reconciliation of the belligerents of World War II. From this standard, modern jurisprudential trends for the prosecution of war criminals is evaluated. Section II provides an overview of the goals of the traditional American justice system as compared to those of international and national systems of justice used to prosecute violators of the laws of war and or other crimes susceptible to post conflict prosecution by the international community. Section III analyzes the goals, procedures and effectiveness of the international military tribunals created for the prosecution of war criminals in the wake of World War II. Section IV provides a similar analysis for the use of national courts and commissions to try those who violate the laws of war. Sections III and IV also includes a discussion of the effectiveness of the studied systems and highlight lessons learned from the experience. Section V focuses on the important goal of reconciliation as a key aspect that should be incorporated into any system of justice that is established after the cessation of hostilities. Based on this background, section VI proposes a system of justice for the prosecution for Iraqi war criminals apprehended after the liberation of Iraq. This proposal leverages the lessons of the past with the aim of developing a system of justice for war criminals that contributes to the prospects for a lasting peace and the reconciliation of the various domestic and international parties. This proposal is based upon a philosophy that any system of post-conflict justice for war criminals must serve the ultimate ends of peace and reconciliation. And though the process should include the punishment of the wrongdoer, the process used to achieve these ends must be carefully tailored to the situation. Further, efforts must be undertaken to establish legitimacy and transparency. Transparency serves to build confidence in the outcome, and, critically, to provide the local population with immediate insight into the rule of law in action.

In 1975, U. S. Army Center of Military History commissioned a report on the History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense, Volume I (1945-1955) and Volume II (1956-1972), which was part of a larger study of the strategic arms competition that developed between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. The report addresses each country's approach to civil defense against the threat from the air and each country's emphasis on specific elements of air defense strategy at various periods between 1945 and 1972. Two central questions concerned the U. S. and Soviet defense planners: "How might we be attacked?" and "How shall we defend our country?" Overall, technological changes were the predominant factor affecting air and missile defense strategy during the period primarily as they related to the developing offensive threat. The scope and pace of technological innovations introduced a measure of uncertainty, placed considerable strain on the stability of the U. S.-Soviet relationship, and raised fundamental challenges to previous concepts of how best to defend the United States. U. S. strategy was built on the variety of new weapon system developments; while Soviet defense trends demonstrated Soviet awareness and responded to developments in U. S. strategic offensive forces. The basic patterns of action were set by initial, and early, strategic choices. Thereafter, the strategic problem centered on technological development. Threat perceptions increasingly involved possible application of new technologies by the Soviets in order to define or delimit future threats. Perceptions of future threats were influenced by the view of available technologies, whether or not the Soviets had demonstrated the capacity to apply them. Available or known technologies were extrapolated to assess future threats. However, a direct action-reaction cycle was not seen as a factor in the development of U. S. and Soviet strategic air and missile defense systems.

In 1975, U. S. Army Center of Military History commissioned a report on the History of Strategic Air and Ballistic Missile Defense, Volume I (1945-1955) and Volume II (1956-1972), which was part of a larger study of the strategic arms competition that developed between the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II. The report addresses each country's approach to civil defense against the threat from the air and each country's emphasis on specific elements of air defense strategy at various periods between 1945 and 1972. Two central questions concerned the U. S. and Soviet defense planners: "How might we be attacked?" and "How shall we defend our country?" Overall, technological changes were the predominant factor affecting air and missile defense strategy during the period primarily as they related to the developing offensive threat. The scope and pace of technological innovations introduced a measure of uncertainty, placed considerable strain on the stability of the U. S.-Soviet relationship, and raised fundamental challenges to previous concepts of how best to defend the United States. U. S. strategy was built on the variety of new weapon system developments; while Soviet defense trends demonstrated Soviet awareness and responded to developments in U. S. strategic offensive forces. The basic patterns of action were set by initial, and early, strategic choices. Thereafter, the strategic problem centered on technological development. Threat perceptions increasingly involved possible application of new technologies by the Soviets in order to define or delimit future threats. Perceptions of future threats were influenced by the view of available technologies, whether or not the Soviets had demonstrated the capacity to apply them. Available or known technologies were extrapolated to assess future threats. However, a direct action-reaction cycle was not seen as a factor in the development of U. S. and Soviet strategic air and missile defense systems.

This handbook is the standard for all U. S. Forces occupying base camp facilities (e.g., Main Base Camps, Forward Operating Bases and Outposts) in contingency operations where USAREUR has been designated as having Title X responsibility. The intent is to provide personnel with adequate living and working facilities, while being good stewards to taxpayer dollars. This Red Book outlines master planning, housing, unit facilities, utilities, service member support, and facility maintenance standards for all bases. It is essential that commanders at all levels ensure these quality of life standards are met, but not exceeded. Commanders are responsible for ensuring that all facilities comply with the requirements outlined in the handbook. Exceptions to the Red Book should be routed through the USAREUR Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Engineer, to the undersigned for decision.