Congressional Research Service

The Property Clause in the U. S. Constitution (Article IV, 3, Clause 2) grants Congress the authority to acquire, dispose of, and manage federal property. The 113th Congress is considering multiple federal land and natural resources policy and management issues. These issues are complex and often interrelated, and include how much and which land the government should own, and how lands and resources should be used and managed. These issues affect local communities, industries, ecosystems, and the nation. Four agencies (referred to in this report as the federal land management agencies, or FLMAs) administer a total of 614 million surface acres (95%) of federal lands: the Forest Service (FS) in the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), and National Park Service (NPS), all in the Department of the Interior (DOI). The federal estate also extends to the energy and mineral resources located below ground and offshore. These include about 700 million onshore acres of the federal subsurface mineral estate that are managed by BLM. In addition, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM), also in DOI, manages approximately 1.7 billion offshore acres located in federal waters within and beyond the U. S. Exclusive Economic Zone. Not all of these acres contain extractable mineral and energy resources. This report introduces some of the broad themes and issues Congress considers when addressing federal land policy and resource management. Federal land policy includes questions about the extent and location of the federal estate. For example, some legislation in the 113th Congress would continue funding laws that authorize the acquisition of additional lands, while other legislation proposes conveying some land out of federal ownership or management. Other issues for Congress include whether certain lands or resources should have additional protections, for example, by designating certain lands as wilderness or national monuments, or protecting endangered species and their habitat. Congress may also address questions about wildfire management on both federal and nonfederal lands, including questions of how to fund suppression efforts. Other policy questions involve how federal land should be used. Certain federal lands are considered primary- or dominant-use lands as specified in statute by Congress. For example, the primary-use mission of the National Wildlife Refuge System is to conserve plants and animals, and the dual-use mission of the National Park System is to conserve unique resources and provide for their use and enjoyment by the public. BLM and FS lands, however, have a statutory mission to balance multiple uses: recreation, grazing, timber, habitat and watershed protection, and energy production. Conflicts arise as users and land managers attempt to balance these uses both spatially and temporally. The 113th Congress has introduced several bills that would attempt to clarify and prioritize these uses. Some legislation would prioritize timber production, while other legislation would prioritize habitat or species conservation above other uses. Some legislation would ensure that all federal lands were accessible for hunting and fishing, while other legislation would ensure access to federal lands for energy development. In addition to questions about balancing energy production against other uses, other questions include how to balance traditional and alternative energy production on federal lands. Congress also considers how to charge for access and use of federal resources and lands, how to use those funds, and if and how to compensate local governments for the presence of untaxed federal lands within their borders. Title XXX of the FY2015 National Defense Authorization Act (H. R. 3979) contains a package of provisions related to federal land and natural resources management.

International sanctions on Iran's key energy and financial sectors harmed Iran's economy and arguably contributed to Iran's acceptance of restrictions on expanding its nuclear program in exchange for modest sanctions relief. The interim nuclear "standstill" agreement (Joint Plan of Action, JPA) began implementation on January 20, 2014, and has been extended twice (until June 30, 2015) to allow time to translate it into a comprehensive nuclear agreement. The economic pressure of sanctions included the following: Iran's oil exports decreased to about 1 million barrels per day (mbd) at the end of 2013-far below the 2.5 million barrels per day Iran exported during 2011. Iran's economy shrank by about 5% in 2013 as Iran's private sector reduced operations and many of its loans became delinquent. Sanctions have constricted Iran's ability to procure equipment for its nuclear and missile programs and to import advanced conventional weaponry. However, the sanctions have not halted Iran's provision of arms to the Assad government in Syria, the Iraqi government, or to other pro-Iranian factions in the Middle East. Nor have sanctions altered Iran's repression of dissent or monitoring of the Internet. The JPA has provided Iran with some sanctions relief, made possible by waivers and suspensions of provisions of several U. S. sanctions laws and executive orders. The core-and the most readily quantifiable component-of the sanctions relief is $700 million per month in access to hard currency from oil sales. Iran is also able to access about $65 million per month in additional hard currency to provide to educational institutions for Iranians studying abroad. The JPA caps Iran's oil exports at 1 mbd but does not cap experts to its oil customers of oil products such as condensates. Iran appears to be increasing exports of condensates to compensate for the limitations on crude oil sales. The JPA suspends sanctions on Iran's auto manufacturing sector and on its sales of petrochemicals, although activity in these sectors does not appear to be producing nearly as much revenue as was estimated. The JPA sanctions relief has halted further economic deterioration but not stimulated any dramatic economic rebound, to date. And, the fall in oil prices since June 2014 has introduced additional uncertainty to Iran's economy. Some assess that Iranian leaders need a comprehensive nuclear deal to achieve the economic improvement demanded by the population. By all accounts, a comprehensive nuclear agreement, if reached, will entail significant easing of U. S. and third country sanctions on Iran-particularly those sanctions that reduced Iran's oil exports and limit its access to the international financial system. The Administration has said that substantial sanctions relief under a comprehensive deal would be provided, but that comprehensive sanctions relief would be stepwise as Iran fulfills the terms of an agreement. Although it might be able to act on its own authority to suspend most sanctions on Iran, the Administration has said it would work with Congress on long-term sanctions relief in the event of a final nuclear deal. Most observers assess that additional U. S. sanctions are likely to be proposed, and perhaps enacted, if negotiations on a comprehensive settlement break down. See also CRS Report RL32048, Iran: U. S. Concerns and Policy Responses, by Kenneth Katzman; CRS Report R43311, Iran: U. S. Economic Sanctions and the Authority to Lift Restrictions, by Dianne E. Rennack; and CRS Report R43492, Achievements of and Outlook for Sanctions on Iran, by Kenneth Katzman.