Congressional Research Service

The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2008 (Post-9/11 GI Bill(R))-enacted as Title V of the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (P. L. 110-252) on June 30, 2008-is the newest GI Bill and went into effect on August 1, 2009. There were four main drivers for the Post-9/11 GI Bill: (1) providing parity of benefits for reservists and members of the regular Armed Forces, (2) ensuring comprehensive educational benefits, (3) meeting military recruiting goals, and (4) improving military retention through transferability of benefits. By FY2010, the program had the largest numbers of participants and the highest total obligations compared to the other GI Bills. The Post-9/11 GI Bill provides benefits to veterans and servicemembers who serve on active duty after September 10, 2001. Participants may be eligible for payments to cover tuition and fees, housing, books and supplies, tutorial and relocation assistance, and testing and certification fees. Individuals who serve on active duty for 36 months after September 10, 2001, may receive a tuition and fees benefit of up to the amount of in-state tuition and fees charged when enrolled in public institutions of higher learning (IHLs), or up to $19,198.31 when enrolled in private IHLs in academic year 2013-2014. Benefit payments vary depending on the participant's active duty status, length of qualifying active duty, rate of pursuit, and program of education. There are two mechanisms by which dependents of individuals with military service may be eligible for Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits. Transferred Post-9/11 GI Bill benefits may be available to the dependents of servicemembers who serve for at least 10 years. Also, the Post-9/11 GI Bill Marine Gunnery Sergeant John David Fry Scholarship Program may be available to the spouse and children of servicemembers who die while serving on active duty in the line of duty. The Post-9/11 Veterans Educational Assistance Improvements Act of 2010 (P. L. 111-377) made several amendments to eligibility and benefits under the Post-9/11 GI Bill. The Restoring GI Bill Fairness Act of 2011 (P. L. 112-26) temporarily reversed a P. L. 111-377 amendment to the tuition and fees benefit for some individuals. The Honoring America's Veterans and Caring for Camp Lejeune Families Act of 2012 (P. L. 112-154) requires the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) to provide annual reports to Congress on the Post-9/11 GI Bill and the Survivors' and Dependents' Educational Assistance program (DEA). Congress, administrators, and participants have raised several issues recently. The 113th Congress enacted the Veterans' Access to Care through Choice, Accountability, and Transparency Act of 2014 (P. L. 113-146) on August 7, 2014, expanding the Fry Scholarship to spouses and disapproving courses at public IHLs for some GI Bill participants if the IHL charges the participant more than in-state tuition and fees for said courses. Another salient issue in light of the amount of federal funds devoted to these benefits, an average of $13,465 per participant and a total of $10.2 billion in FY2013, regards the quality of the programs of education for which Post- 9/11 GI Bill participants use their benefits, the ability of participants to make informed decisions on the use of benefits, and misleading or deceptive recruiting techniques of some IHLs. The VA, in partnership with DOD and the Department of Education, is implementing Executive Order 13607, Establishing Principles of Excellence for Educational Institutions Serving Service Members, Veterans, Spouses, and Other Family Members, and the Improving Transparency of Education Opportunities for Veterans Act of 2012 (P. L. 112-249) to improve disclosures to and protections for Post-9/11 GI Bill participants. Issues have also been raised regarding benefit overpayments, transferability, benefit uses, and qualifying active duty service.

A priority of Obama Administration policy has been to reduce the perceived threat posed by Iran to a broad range of U. S. interests. Well before Iran's nuclear issue rose to the forefront of U. S. concerns about Iran in 2003, the United States had seen Iran's support for regional militant groups, such as Lebanese Hezbollah, as efforts to undermine U. S. interests and allies. To implement U. S. policy, the Obama Administration has orchestrated broad international economic pressure on Iran to try to compel it to verifiably demonstrate to the international community that its nuclear program is for purely peaceful purposes. Three rounds of multilateral talks with Iran in subsequent to the accession of the relatively moderate Hassan Rouhani as president of Iran achieved a November 24, 2013 interim agreement ("Joint Plan of Action") that halts the expansion of Iran's nuclear program in exchange for modest and temporary sanctions relief. The agreement is to remain in force for six months, during which time a permanent resolution of the Iran nuclear issue is to be negotiated. International sanctions have harmed Iran's economy, and Rouhani's election appeared to reflect popular Iranian sentiment for a negotiated nuclear settlement that produces an easing of international sanctions. Rouhani's election has also improved prospects for a nuclear issue settlement as well as an end to the 34 years of U. S.-Iran estrangement. On September 27, 2013, President Obama and Rouhani spoke by phone-the first leadership level contacts since the 1979 Islamic revolution-as Rouhani departed a week-long visit to the U. N. General Assembly meetings in New York. In their speeches to the Assembly, both President Obama and Rouhani indicated that not only could the nuclear issue be settled but that the long era of U. S.-Iran hostility could be ended. The interim nuclear agreement has apparently also eased tensions between Iran and its neighbors in the Persian Gulf region. However, like the United States, the Gulf states, Israel, and other regional states appear to concerned that Iran's regional ambitions are unchanged. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has openly expressed opposition to the Joint Plan of Action as failing to dismantle Iran's uranium enrichment and other infrastructure, and as paving the way for a broad unraveling of international sanctions on Iran. Some experts assert that the nuclear deal could give Iran additional political and economic resources to support pro-Iranian movements and regimes, such as the embattled government of Bashar Al Assad of Syria. President Obama has maintained-both before and after the interim agreement was signed-that the option of U. S. military action against Iran's nuclear facilities remains open. However, further U. S.-or Israeli-discussion of military options against Iran is unlikely unless Iran fails to implement the interim deal or negotiate the longer term settlement of the nuclear issue. In line with a provision of the interim agreement that no new sanctions be imposed on Iran during the six month agreement period, the Administration is requesting that Congress postpone further consideration of an expanded Iran sanctions bill, H. R. 850, which passed the House on July 31, 2013, or similar legislation. Rouhani's presidency has the potential to increase the domestic popularity of Iran's regime if he implements campaign pledges to ease repression and social restrictions. His unexpected election win-a result of a large turnout of reform-minded voters such as those who protested the 2009 election results-appeared to counter the views of many experts who assessed the domestic reform movement as cowed by regime suppression and inactive. For further information, see CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman; and CRS Report R43333, Interim Agreement on Iran's Nuclear Program, by Kenneth Katzman and Paul K. Kerr.

The United States Constitution established only one federal court-the United States Supreme Court. Beyond this, Article III of the Constitution left it to the discretion of Congress to "ordain and establish" lower federal courts to conduct the judicial business of the federal government. From the very first, Congress established a host of different federal tribunals to adjudicate a variety of legal disputes. The two central types of federal "courts"-courts established under Article III and those tribunals that are not-differ in many respects, including with regard to their personnel, purposes, and powers. Courts established pursuant to Article III are mainly defined by the three central constitutional provisions to which they are subject: resolution of cases that only present live "cases or controversies," lifetime tenure, and salary protection. The primary purpose for these safeguards was to insulate the federal judiciary from potential pressures, from either the political branches or the public, which might improperly influence the judicial decision-making process. Notwithstanding Article III's seemingly literal command that the "judicial power" shall extend to all cases "arising under" the Constitution or federal law, Congress has assigned a host of cases arising under federal law to non-Article III bodies. Unlike Article III judges, these bodies, generally referred to as "non-Article III courts," "legislative courts," or "Article I courts," enjoy neither lifetime tenure nor salary protection. There are two main categories of non-Article III courts. The first are standalone courts, created under Congress's Article I power, which have similar authority as Article III courts, such as entering their own judgments and issuing contempt orders. Examples of legislative courts include the United States Tax Court; the Court of Federal Claims; the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims; the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces; and federal district courts in Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands. The second category of non-Article III tribunals is commonly referred to as "adjuncts" to Article III courts. This category is mainly comprised of federal administrative agencies and magistrate judges.