James L. Regens

A central political issue in American politics during the 1990s is the need for political campaign reform. The authors examine US Senate elections to determine the role money plays in Senate elections; their analysis indicates that the system of campaign finance resembles a market, with legislators as the recipients of financial largesse based on their institutional positions and political vulnerability. This rent-seeking relationship between economic interests and legislators has transformed the dynamic of Senate elections. The authors assess the potential impact of several electoral reform proposals. Spending limits and public funding proposals, they argue, will not have the impact expected by reform advocates. Term limit and public funding proposals would disrupt the rent-seeking relationship between legislators and economic interests. These proposals also face political and constitutional barriers to implementation.

Wetlands are a valuable natural resource, yet over 200,000 acres are destroyed in the United States per year. This book examines whether states should assume the role of protecting wetlands rather than the federal government. Wetlands are a valuable natural resource, yet over 200,000 acres are destroyed in the United States each year. An alternative recently promoted to improve wetland protection is state assumption of the law governing wetland protection, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (section 404). This book discusses the implementation problems associated with the national wetland regulation program and examines the state assumption option in twelve states, with extended case studies of Florida, Maryland, Michigan, and New Jersey.

A central political issue in American politics during the 1990s is the need for political campaign reform. The authors examine US Senate elections to determine the role money plays in Senate elections; their analysis indicates that the system of campaign finance resembles a market, with legislators as the recipients of financial largesse based on their institutional positions and political vulnerability. This rent-seeking relationship between economic interests and legislators has transformed the dynamic of Senate elections. The authors assess the potential impact of several electoral reform proposals. Spending limits and public funding proposals, they argue, will not have the impact expected by reform advocates. Term limit and public funding proposals would disrupt the rent-seeking relationship between legislators and economic interests. These proposals also face political and constitutional barriers to implementation.