Kenneth Katzman

This book shows that the revolutionary guard has resisted professionalization on the key aspect of war decision making. It explains how the Guard was able to resist ideological dilution despite its need to adopt a rationalized and complex organizational structure.

This book shows that the revolutionary guard has resisted professionalization on the key aspect of war decision making. It explains how the Guard was able to resist ideological dilution despite its need to adopt a rationalized and complex organizational structure.

Since the 2011 U. S. military withdrawal from Iraq, sectarian and ethnic divisions have widened, fueling a major challenge to Iraq's stability and to Iraq's non-Muslim minority communities. Iraq's Sunni Arabs have sided with radical Sunni Islamist insurgents as a means to reduce Shiite political domination. Iraq's Kurds have been separately embroiled in political disputes with Baghdad over territorial, political, and economic issues, particularly their intent to separately export large volumes of oil produced in the Kurdish region. The political rifts-which were contained by the U. S. military presence but have been escalating since late 2011-erupted into a sustained uprising beginning in December 2013 led by the radical extremist group Islamic State, formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The group and its allies took control of several cities in Anbar Province in early 2014 and captured Mosul and several other mostly Sunni cities in June 2014, aided by a partial collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The ISF collapse enabled the Kurds to seize control of the long-coveted city of Kirkuk. The Islamic State's gains prompted a U. S. military response in Iraq and formulation of a broader strategy, articulated by President Obama on September 10, to try to defeat the group in both Iraq and Syria. The President's speech came as a new government headed by Shiite Prime Minister Haydar al-Abbadi was inaugurated in Iraq-a government widely expected to be more inclusive of Sunnis than was the government of ex-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. President Obama states that he has ruled out any reintroduction of U. S. combat troops to Iraq (or Syria), but since the crisis began in June has deployed about 1,600 U. S. military personnel to assess the ISF, gain intelligence on ISIL, and protect American personnel and facilities. Since early August, U. S. forces have been conducting air strikes against Islamic State positions to assist efforts by Baghdad and the Kurds to reverse Islamic State gains and relieve IS pressure on Iraq's religious minorities. To help the beleaguered ISF cope with the Islamic State's challenge, the United States has expanded and accelerated delivery of HELLFIRE missiles and surveillance systems, and has begun to deliver F-16 combat aircraft and attack helicopters that were ordered long before the crisis began. The Islamic State crisis in Iraq has upended what had been a relatively stable situation at the time U. S. forces left in December 2011. The last U. S. troops departed then in keeping with a November 2008 bilateral U. S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA). At the time of the U. S. departure, the United States and Iraq had agreed to continue a number of security cooperation programs, including U. S. training for the ISF through an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) and a State Department police development program. However, those programs languished as Iraqi leaders sought to end U. S. political and military tutelage, and Iraqi leaders instead sought U. S. sales of sophisticated arms to Iraq. The ISIL offensive has caused Iran to increase aid to the Iraqi government, potentially increasing Tehran's influence in Iraq. The Administration has held discussions with Iran diplomatically on restoring stability to Iraq, but has repeatedly ruled out any direct cooperation with Tehran in Iraq. Please see CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" Crisis and U. S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman et al.

The capacity, transparency, legitimacy, and cohesiveness of Afghan governance are crucial to Afghan stability as U. S.-led NATO forces exit Afghanistan by 2016. The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001. But, the government remains rife with corruption and ethnic and political tensions among its major factions are ever present. Hamid Karzai has served as president since late 2001; he is constitutionally term-limited and will leave office after a new president takes office. The first round of presidential elections took place on April 5, 2014, and the results required a June 14 runoff between Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani. The runoff increased ethnic tensions between Pashtuns, Afghanistan's largest group represented by Ghani, and the second-largest group, the Tajiks, with whom Abdullah is identified. Amid accusations by Abdullah of a fraud-inspired large increase in turnout between the two rounds, preliminary results released July 7 showed Ghani ahead 56% to 44%. Secretary of State John Kerry has visited Afghanistan twice, brokering agreement by the two candidates to a recount all 23,000 ballot boxes and formation of a post-election unity government. The recount reportedly did not change the runoff vote outcome, but announcement has been delayed to enable completion of negotiations on the power-sharing agreement. The long delays in new leadership being inaugurated has complicating U. S. and NATO planning for a post- 2014 international mission to train Afghan forces and conduct counterterrorism operations. The election outcome is consequential because the constitution concentrates substantial power in the presidency, in large part through powers of appointment at all levels. The apparent winner of the runoff, Ghani, apparently does not want his powers as president diluted. At the same time, any Afghan leader's actual authority is constrained by an informal power structure consisting of regional and ethnic leaders that has always been at least as significant a factor in governance as the formal power structure. The faction leaders lead or can recruit armed fighters, and several are reviving their militias in concert with the ongoing drawdown of international forces. The enhanced influence of faction leaders is increasing instances of arbitrary administration of justice and human rights abuses. In addition, there has been scant progress in reducing widespread nepotism and other forms of corruption. The United States has helped establish anti-corruption institutions, but these bodies have faltered from lack of support from senior Afghan leaders who oppose prosecuting political allies. International observers assert that there have been significant gains in civil society, women's rights, and media freedoms since 2001. Those gains have come despite the persistence of traditional attitudes and Islamic conservatism in many parts of Afghanistan-attitudes that cause the judicial and political system to tolerate child marriages and imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence. Islamist influence and tradition has also frequently led to persecution of converts from Islam to Christianity, and to curbs on the sale of alcohol and on Western-oriented media programs. Afghan civil society activists, particularly women's groups, assert that many of these gains are at risk as international forces depart and as faction leaders and insurgents assert themselves.