U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

Up until the 1960s the grip and influence of colonial Europe all but covered the continent of Africa. This book addresses reasons why civil wars in Africa, particularly West Africa, seem to occur over and over. Using a model developed for the World Bank by Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, incidences of civil war can be predicted. This book uses this model to focus-in on three countries in West Africa-Liberia, C te d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and Sierra Leone-to determine why civil war has occurred and the likelihood that civil war will occur in the future, or not. Why does African armed struggle rarely consist of uniformed combatants fighting for power? In fact, African civil war has never been well defined. Political violence against noncombatants occurs most often in armed conflicts but is not necessarily present in all civil wars. However, in West Africa where there is civil war, you will find child soldiers; where you find child soldiers you will certainly find political violence against noncombatants. In conclusion, this work addresses what the long term effects of grown up child soldiers are as they transition from soldier to productive member of society; "productive" being the pivotal concept.

This book argues that the Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) limits Department of Defense (DoD) information-sharing initiatives, but that such limitations are necessary to the preservation of civil-military relations. Throughout its history, the United States has struggled with the appropriate role of federal military forces in domestic operations, and the PCA reflects this struggle. With respect to domestic intelligence operations, the federal government has emphasized the importance of information sharing between the various federal agencies, including the DoD, and local law enforcement. The book begins by explaining the United States intelligence infrastructure, the relationships between the various agencies, and the functions of DoD within that structure. Next, the book analyzes the PCA and accompanying regulations designed to restrict the use of federal forces in a law enforcement capacity. Then, through three case studies dating from the 1920s, the 1970s, and post-11 September 2001, the study discusses the practical application of PCA restrictions to DoD domestic intelligence operations, as well as lessons learned from past operations. This section concludes that the PCA does in fact inhibit information sharing between DoD and state authorities. Finally, the book concludes that such inhibitions are crucial to preserving healthy civil-military relations within the United States.

This book is an analysis and evaluation of the British and American campaign strategies in the Southern Campaign of the War for American Independence. After over four and one-half years of inconclusive fighting in America, the British government developed a plan to restore Royal control of the American South where large numbers of Loyalist Americans were expected to rally in support of the Crown. Control of the southern provinces would allow the British army to isolate the North where the rebellion was strongest. In May 1780, the American army of the South surrendered to a British army at Charlestowne, South Carolina. The Americans raised a new army in the South, but it too was decisively defeated at Camden, South Carolina, in August 1780. American prospects in the Southern Department appeared bleak until the arrival of Nathanael Greene in December 1780. Despite a scarcity of resources, Greene rebuilt the American southern army and fought an inspired campaign of compound warfare to counter the expanding British control of the Carolinas. Lord Cornwallis led the British army on a protracted pursuit of Greene's forces across North Carolina following the American victory at Cowpens in January 1781. The British army, operating well beyond its supply lines, was exhausted by the pursuit of Greene. Despite winning a narrow tactical victory at Guilford Courthouse in March of 1781, the British force was rendered operationally ineffective. Cornwallis withdrew to Virginia where he would ultimately be trapped at Yorktown. This book demonstrates the application of operational design using the British and American strategies in the Southern Campaign as a historical case study. The methodology for this study is based on the linkages between ends, ways, and means through the elements of operational design. Nathanael Greene ultimately succeeded because he implemented a strategy that was designed to match his means to his ends.

The National Guard's origins trace back to the militia of the first settlements in America. Since its inception in 1636, the National Guard has played vital role in the nation's defense from the Revolutionary War to the most recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The utility of the National Guard has been questioned since the late nineteenth century, but political pressure from the states has always been sufficient to maintain a National Guard. This monograph examines the National Guard's performance as the primary source for state volunteers in the Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection 1898-1899. While the Regular Army generally viewed the National Guard as less professional and incapable of defending the nation, the results from the National Guard's preparation for the Philippines supported the Regular Army's disdain for them and seemed to indicate a likelihood of failure in combat. However, actual results from the Philippines lead to a different conclusion about the National Guard. This conclusion supports the National Guard as an operational force instead of the strategic reserve as they had been used since World War II. This change in the National Guard's employment is even more critical because of the economic and security challenges the nation faces.