U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

'This study is an historical analysis of the Soviet operational use of tank and mechanized corps, and tank armies, in the deliberate defenseat the Battle of Kursk in 1943. It centers on the question of how effective was the Red Army in employing these' units during this momentous battle. Events that shaped the battle and a brief comparison of forces set the stage. A discussion of the actual battle on the Central and Voronezh Fronts is followed by an analysis of the effectiveness of the employment of the operational armored units. The battle analysis methodology as promulgated by the Combat Studies Institute at the United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, established the guidelines for the study. Both Western and Soviet sources were utilized. Objectivity and compatability of all available source material were of paramount importance in establishing the validity and accuracy of variousaccounts. The study concludes the Soviets prepared superbly for the operational battle; however, execution fell short of expectations. Because this was the first time the Soviets used tank armies in battle, an analysis of Kursk serves as an excellent catalyst for subsequent examination of present Soviet defensive doctrine and the use of tank armies in defense.

This study attempts to analyze the decisions made by Field Marshal Albert Kesselring prior to and during the battle of Anzio in February 1944. The focus of the investigation is on Kesselring's decision to shift Army Group reserves from the Rome area prior to the Allied amphibious assault at Anzio on 18 January 1944, then his involvement in the development and execution of theGerman counterattack against the Allied beachhead conducted on 16 February 1944. The investigation reveals that Kesseiring, the Army Group Commander, made a proper and effective decision in committing the Army Group reserves to the German defensive line prior to the invasion, and that his involvement in thedevelopment and execution of the German counterattack at Anzio was doctrinally sound and generally effective.

This historical study investigates why Union joint operations between army and navy forces on the Mississippi and other western rivers were effective. It examines the development of a joint doctrine at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Joint riverine warfare on the western rivers was a new experience for the U. S. military. There was no clear delineation between services of specific missions or responsibilities. Joint operations incorporated numerous battlefield operating systems that the leadership had to integrate and synchronize. At the strategic level, Washington attempted to provide adequate vessels and other resources for the war on the rivers. How.ver, the national leadership never did institute an adequate joint command and control structure for the Western Theater. The army operational commanders came to depend on the advice of the naval officers for acquiring vessels and advice on water-borne operations. On the other hand, the naval officers relied on the infrastructure of an established army to facilitate their operations. The personalities of the joint leadership were important factors in the success of joint warfare. Grant, Sherman, and Porter developed a special relationship, which allowed them to overcome tactical disagreements, and maintain a clear focus on the strategic objective of capturing Vicksburg.

The Battle of Attu is a case study for the importance of the proper application of operational art into the planning and preparation of a majormilitary operation. This monograph provides a succinct historical account of the events surrounding the Battle of Attu and the Aleutian IslandCampaign in order to provide the strategic and operational context that shaped the American operational approach. Analysis of primary source dataused includes personal accounts, media sources, and previous studies. America was successful due to its ability to organize and apply combat powerby leveraging the elements of operational art; specifically, the elements of operational reach and basing. These elements led to the building of depthduring the Battle of Attu which was critical to the successful outcome of the battle.

This book traces the historical origins, evolution, and continuing influence ofliberal and conservative political ideology on American Defense policy. The study concentrates on a comparison of the periods 1783-1800, the military debates of the early republic, and 1989-1994, the current debates on the structure of the post-Cold War American Military. The central thesis is that the parallels between the public debates on the proposed downsizing of the United States' Armed Forces in the 1990s and the debates on the creation of a permanent American military establishment in the 1780s and 1790s reflect the continuing influence of fundamental republican/liberal and federalist/conservative political ideologies. During the nation's solidified into coherent political movements which continue to dominate public debate. The book concludes that an understanding of the origin and nature of these pro and anti-military political prejudices is essential if military leaders are going to design future forces that will accommodate the concerns of all parties. Specifically, these force structures must allow for the complex and unique relationship between American society, the professional military, and the citizen soldier.