U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

From recent operational experiences in Bosnia and Iraq, the U. S. Army has learned many important and hard-earned lessons. By incorporating some of these lessons learned into its capstone doctrine, FM 3-0, the Army has captured some key points and revamped its approach in conducting military operations in a complex environment. Meanwhile, a new thinking has emerged at the end of Cold War that focuses on the non-traditional way of examining warfare and armed conflict. Scholars such as Mary Kaldor, Herfried M nkler, and Rupert Smith have constructed an alternative approach concentrating on identity struggles amongst different racial, religious, ethnic, and sectarian groups as a central theme. These scholars have formulated a coherent argument that rivals the existing focus on the traditional military thinkers such as Carl von Clausewitz or Antonio Jomini. This research concentrates on whether U. S. Army's capstone doctrine, based on its operational experiences in Bosnia and Iraq, has recognized identity conflict as a vital feature in the post-Cold War environment. By analyzing and exploring different aspects of U. S. Army's operations in Bosnia and Iraq, this thesis will attempt to contribute to the discussion and debate on Army's conceptual thinking in framing the current operational environment based on recent experiences.

This book examines the operational insights offered by the analysisof the Tullahoma, or Middle Tennessee, Campaign of 1863. The bookuncovers these operational insights by examining how Major GeneralWilliam S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, andGeneral Braxton Bragg, commander of the Army of Tennessee, planned forand conducted the nine day campaign. This book of both commanders' planning and execution of a campaigncharacterized by maneuver, rather than large scale battles, highlightsfive important insights into operational warfighting, These insightsinclude the translation of strategic guidance into an operational plan, offensive and defensive operational planning, the importance of deception, there effects of sustainment on an operation, and the influence of leadership on the planning and conduct of a campaig

This study investigates the decisive factors that affected the Confederate command during the Fort Henry-Fort Donelson campaign in February 1862. The thesis is relevant not only to the study of history, but as a series of lessons for senior leaders today. In the final analysis, the ultimate failure of the Confederates during the campaign can be attributed directly to Albert Sidney Johnston. As the department commander he failed to develop an adequate strategy to meet the invasion of Grant's army or to insure that each subordinate command was prepared. Most damaging of all, Johnston neglected the defenses of the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers, which were the key invasion routes into his department. Johnston also errred badly in his selection of acommander for the beleaguered garrison of Fort Donelson. John B. Floyd's ineptitude and dishonorable acts sealed the fort's fate and assured victory for the North.

This study concerns an analysis of the Confederate defense of Vicksburg with respect to one of the nine principles of war, the principle of the offensive. The problem in the study was to determine if Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton ever applied tho principle of the offensive during his defense of Vicksburg and to determine why he failed to gain any freedom of action during the Vicksburg Campaign. The important conclusions are:1. Pemberton applied the principle prior to May 1, 1863.2. He did not apply the principle during the final Union thrust for Vicksburg, mainly because of the lack of cavalry and of intelligence.

This study investigates the decisive factors that affected the Chickasaw Bayou Campaign, General Ulysses S. Grant's first effort to seize Vicksburg. By December 1862 Grant's forces had fought into north central Mississippi. Simultaneously, Major General John A. McClernand had convinced President Lincoln to allow him to command an independent amphibious force to operate on the Mississippi against Vicksburg. Grant hastily organized his own river expedition under Major General William T. Sherman to seize Vicksburg. The resulting campaign ended in the repulse of Union forces at Chickasaw Bayou. This study identifies the decisive factors at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war which contributed to the Union loss. Grant concludedfrom the campaign that fixed lines of communications were unnecessary in supplying his army. The Confederates were lulled into a falsesense of security which ultimately contributed to their defeat at Vicksburg.

The Army has begun the process of relearning and integrating deception into doctrine andoperations. The state of doctrine and training both appear to be in need of aggressive review andmodification. History shows that it is a potent combat multiplier that can be decisive in gainingsurprise and initiative. History shows the costs of these operations to be less than one would expect. The risks appear relatively low as well. Benefits, - on the other hand, are uniformly high whencompared to cost and risk. The 1989 Army Deception White Paper attempted to set the azimuth fordeception integration. It failed to provide the required urgency and priority. This thesis uses thepremise of 'What the White Paper should have said" to explore the subject. The paper makesrecommendations based on interviews with senior defense officials, including Generals Starry, Cavazos, and Livsey; Dr. Edward Luttwak, and several experts in the field of deception. Therecommendations address doctrine development, parallel training, and the integration of deceptioninto planning. Training events such as BCTP, the NTC, JRTC, and the ARTEP must includedeception if deception is to become an effective component of Army doctrine and operations.

Legal positivists dominate discussions concerning legitimacy in military operations. From their perspective, the only validform of legitimacy is an expression of will from sovereign rulers through international organizations. Thus, resolutions fromthe UN and regional organizations are important prerequisites for military operations. Unfortunately, such a strict focus onprocedural expressions of sovereign will leads to irreconcilable paradoxes such as the procedural norms of sovereignty andprotection of basic human rights. If states possess a sovereign right of non-interference from external intervention, how thendoes the international community intervene to protect populations from mass atrocities? Many times the contradiction is notadequately addressed and peacekeepers are deployed to figure it out as they conduct operations. The result is confusedoperational approaches that lead to decreased efficacy in responsibility to protect operations.

This book argues that the various images and representations used to describe the "new navy" in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were indicative of a shift in how the American people viewed themselves, and how they viewed their proper role in the world. Specifically, this book provides a narrative of American social, economic, political, and foreign policy in the fin de si cle period, a narrative of the American naval rebuilding program in the same period, an analysis of popular and elite discourse about the navy between 1889 and 1917, and an analysis of professional naval discourse between 1888 and 1917. The book closes with a comparison of how the "new navy" sold itself to the American people and how the U. S. Navy sells itself to the American people today. It concludes that the modern U. S. Navy was born in the fin de si cle period from a cultural standpoint, and that this represented the origins of American global power.

At the direction of Congress, all non-lethal unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) programs of the military services were consolidated into a joint Department of Defense program. A result of this legislation was the publication of a joint master plan directing the future of UAV development. The purpose of this study is to determine if the Department of Defense joint unmanned aerial vehicle program will satisfy the UAV needs of the Army to conduct tactical intelligence collection. The study compares the requirements of the Army UAV program against the specifications for the joint close-range (JUAV-CR) and joint short-range (JUAV-SR) UAV systems. The study concludes the Army has clearly defined its requirements for unmanned aerial vehicle operations. The research finds significant differences exist between the Army and joint programs. However, these differences do not impact on the essential needs ofthe Army. The joint UAV program supports the UAV needs of the Army. After a slowstart, the joint UAV program is proceeding rapidly. Barring funding constraints, theArmy, and the other services, will soon possess an operational short-range (out to150 km) UAV system capable of per forming tactical intelligence collection.

Military historical case studies provide insight for military planners. Military planners cannot afford toignore history when planning in today's complex environment. This thesis analyzes military doctrinalchanges and adaptation during Britain's Boer War and the French counterinsurgency war in Algeria. TheBoer War serves as an example of doctrinal change during a counterinsurgency campaign. The Frenchexperience demonstrates the difficult task of fighting against an ambiguous enemy who uses terrorism asits primary tactic. A counterinsurgency comparison and analysis focuses on three issues present in bothcase studies: population control measures, operational tactics, and the civil military operations. Theconclusion offers solutions to the military situation today based on the British and Frenchcounterinsurgency. This thesis argues history provides US military planners with the background to develop a successful counterinsurgency strategy for today's environment.