U. S. Army War College Press

The U. S. Army has always touted itself as a capstone developmental experience and still does so today- You made them strong-we'll make them Army Strong. The Army is almost universally acknowledged as an organization that powerfully develops talent in areas such as leadership, teamwork behavior, work ethics, adaptability, fitness, and many others. Yet despite thiswell-earned reputation, the Army must remain vigilant. Authorized strength and inventory mismatches, aninverse relationship between responsibility and formal developmental time, and sparse non-operational development opportunities are serious challenges that the Army must address. Developing talent is important in all high performing organizations, but it is particularly critical to the Army for several reasons. First, the mission of fighting and winning wars requires truly championship-level talent-America's national security depends on it. Second, Americans entrust the very lives of their sons and daughters to the Army-they deserve to be led by superstars. And third, limited lateral entry into midcareer and senior level officer positions means the Army cannot rely upon poaching talent from outside organizations as corporate America does. Instead, the Army must retain and continuously develop its entry leveltalent to meet present and future demands.

Accessing Talent: The Foundation of a U. S. Army Officer Corps Strategy, is the fourth of six books focused upon officer talent management in the U. S. Army. In it, Colonel Casey Wardynski, Major David S. Lyle, and Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Michael J. Colarusso continue their examination of how the U. S. Army accesses, develops, retains, and employs officer talent. In particular, they focus upon the ways in which dynamic labor market conditions and generational preferences have shaped service propensity among potential officer prospects. As in the previous volumes of this series, the authors first articulate a theoretical framework for improvement and then demonstrate how the appli-cation of those theories can yield desired results. In sum, they explain why a proper talent accessions strategy can create a "positive sum game" for the Army as perhaps nothing else can. Since the officer accessions process presents the Army with a dramatic opportunity to leverage talent investments made by others, the theories and programs discussed in this book merit thoughtful consideration.

U. S. military leaders, planners, and decision makers face a new security environment in the 21st century, characterized by its complex networked nature, which has emerged as a result of globalization accompanied by the ever increasing speed of technological advancements. This in turn has created a new set of security dynamics that is increasingly spawning a varietyof asymmetric threats, changing the very natureof conflict. The result is a complex and untidy security environment, where even attempting to define the nature of the threat has become difficult. Historically, adversaries were well-defined, allowing a relatively clear course of action to be chosen against them. This is no longer the case, as nonstate actors forming a global network of terrorist organizations, associated criminal groups, corrupt governments, and indifferent or uninformed individuals or corporations, increasingly take center stage. The state now faces an enemy whose asymmetry is such that concepts such as "civilian" and "military" or even "legality" have become obsolete. The consequence is that the traditional approach ofattempting to find a solution for a particular security problem has become ineffective. In fact, it is no longer appropriate to look for a single solution as such. In the new networked world, most problems are multidimensional in nature making them difficult or impossible to solve due to their incomplete, contradictory, and constantly evolving nature. These are generally referred to as "wicked" problems, characterized by their complex interdependencies where action takento address one aspect of the problem may reveal or create additional problems. This must be avoided at all costs. This book therefore provides recommendations for addressing a specific area where the capability of the United States and allied militaries can be augmented for the purpose of targeted action against adversaries: that of threat finance, and effective counter threat finance strategies.

According to most political observers, the globalpolitical architecture is undergoing a transformation with power increasingly shifting from the West to the East, in what has been called the Asian Century. The two most populous nations on the earth, China and India, are on their way to becoming economic powerhouses and are shedding their reticence in asserting their global profiles, all of which makes their relationshipof still greater importance for the internationalsystem. The future of this Asian Century will, to alarge extent, depend upon the relationship between these two regional giants, and the bilateral relationship between them will define the contours of the new international political architecture in Asia and the world at large. This book examines the evolution of Sino-Indian ties over the last few decades and the constraints that continue to inhibit this relationship from achieving its full potential before delineating the implications of this for the United States and the wider international system.

This book is the second in a series of six that analyze the development of an Officer Corps Strategy. Of course, talent management is a means to an end, not an end in itself. An officer strategy focused upon talent has but one purpose: to help the Army achieve its overall objectives. It does this by mitigating the greatest risks: the cost of a mismatch between numbers of officers and requirements; and the cost of losing talented officers to the civilian labor market. Whether it likes it or not, the Army is competing with the private sector for the best talent America hasto offer. The domestic labor market is dynamic, and in the last 25 years it has increasingly demanded employees who can create information, provide service, or add knowledge. The Army cannot insulate itself from these market forces. It must change the relationship between its officers and their strength managers from one that is relatively closed, information-starved, low-moving, and inefficient, to one that is increasingly open, rich in information, faster moving, and thus far more efficient.

In the current age of economic austerity, there is increasing pressure for the military in the United States and the United Kingdom (UK) to be streamlined, so as to be able to deliver more for less cost. This requires a whole new approach to warfare supported by additional skill sets, many of which are not currently readily or widely available within the military. These skills have become even more vital in the current security environment of networked global insecurities. As such, there is a need for the military not only tore-establish lost skills, but to develop new skills to enhance its ability to tackle the emerging security threats of the 21st century. One way in which such skills shortages can be addressed is by accessing existing skill sets within the civilian workforce, which can be achieved through the recruitment of reservists. Reservists have been utilized not only by the U. S. Army, but also by numerous armies around the world, including the UK, where the reliance on Reservists has increased significantly in recent years. However, recent reviews carried out by the UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) identified a range of deficiencies highlighting the need for UK Reserve Forces to be modernized so that they can be utilized in a manner that is efficient, cost effective, and sustainable. Consequently, this book explores the various types of reservist roles and deployment options, as well as factors that are both detrimental and beneficial to the recruitment, retention, and use of Reservists, highlighting areas where the UK experience is of potential relevance to the U. S. Army's future options.

Disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeatingal-Qaeda-based, affiliated, and inspired terrorismis the declared policy of the U. S. Government (USG). Despite noteworthy success in attacking the al-Qaeda (AQ) terrorist network and securing the homeland from terrorist attack, the United States has yet to execute an effective methodology for countering radicalizationand recruitment to AQ. This book proposes a distinct War of Deeds methodology for accomplishing this. A War of Deeds is to be fought on two interrelated fronts: changing deeds and challenging deeds. Changing deeds requires a frank examination and possible reorienting of those present-day USG foreign, military, and diplomatic policies that diminish USG credibilityand potentially enhance the resonance of AQ's terrorist propaganda in the Muslim world. It also requires a frank examination of existing USG information operations that in the opinion of the present writer fail to adequately address the present U. S. credibility deficit and whose proposals too often amount to unpersuasivemarketing endeavors pitched to a highly selectiveWesternized audience.

The context for this book lies in the trust relationships that American military professions must retain with the society they serve if they are to remain professions. Of course, the alternative without such trust is for the Services simply to revert to the character and behavior of a government occupation, a big bureaucracy like the Internal Revenue Service or the Department of Agriculture. But to remain professions, one of the constant challenges the Stewards of the Professions must address is "how different and how separate" they are to be from the society they serve. Stated differently, as the values and mores of American society change, the ethics of its military professions must also evolve, but never so much that such evolution diminishes their military effectiveness-their raison-d' tre and the source of the trust relationship in the first place. As noted in the Foreword, as the values of American society have changed in the past, in most cases, e.g., racial integration, abortion, smoking as a health issue, the service of gays in the military, gender roles, etc., those changes have eventually had a strong influence on the culture of the military professions and, in particular, on the core of those cultures-theServices' Ethics.

As part of the radical political changes that haveaffected a number of Arab countries over the past 4 years, the toppling of regimes and the organization of the first fair and free elections in several Arab states have allowed Islamist parties to rise to power. This highly visible political trend has caused mixed reactions, both within these countries and internationally. Prior to the Arab Spring, most countries in the region banned Islamist movements from forming politicalparties. For decades, members of such movementswere jailed, tortured, and exiled from their homecountries. Even in those states where Islamist political parties were allowed, they had limited freedom and were under the scrutiny of the regimes, as was, for example, the Moroccan Justice and Development Party. The varied experiences of Islamist political partiesin power over the last 2 years in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt offer a mixed picture. The debacle of Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt captured a great deal of international attention, but it did not resemble the trajectory of other governing Islamist parties in the region. Electorates have been disappointed by the performance of Islamist-led governments, which turned outto be unprepared to govern. Their poor performance is not only due to a lack of capability; it is also due to the fact that integration into the existing political system has not been smooth and free of obstruction. Islamist parties have faced fierce resistance both from secular parties and other forces in their respective societies and from abroad, as is evident from the opposition of rich Arab Gulf Monarchies.

The President of the United States and nearly all his critics agree that the spread of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their seizure and potential use is the greatest danger facing the United States and the world. Looking at the way government and industry officials downplay the risks of civilian nuclear technology and materials being diverted to make bombs, though, a person would get almost the opposite impression. In fact, most governments have made the promotion of nuclear power's growth and global development a top priority. Throughout, they have insisted that the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation are manageable either by making future nuclear plants more "proliferation-resistant" or by strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and acquiring more timely intelligence on proliferators. How sound is this view, though? How useful might civilian nuclear programs be for states that want to get nuclear weapons quickly? Are current IAEA nuclear safeguards sufficient to block military nuclear diversions from civilian programs? Are there easy fixes to upgrade these controls? How much can we count on more timely intelligence on proliferators to stem the further spread of nuclear weapons? This volume taps the insights and analyses of 13 top security and nuclear experts to get the answers. What emerges is a comprehensive counternarrative to the prevailing wisdom and a series of innovative reforms to tighten existing nuclear nonproliferation controls. For any official, analyst, or party concerned about the spread of nuclear technology, this book is essential reading.

In recent years, debates over American grand strategy have often focused on the question of whether the United States should retrench geopolitically or seek to renew its international leadership. This collection of essays puts this pressing question in its proper historical and theoretical context. The authors examine past episodes in which American presidents were confronted with similar choices, and they probe theoretical and policy debates over retrenchment, renewal, and their consequences. The result is a volume that enriches our understanding of how American leaders have, can, and should respond to the challenges and opportunities that characterize international relations. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this collection as a contribution to the ongoing debate on American grand strategy.

The United States and its allies are in general agreement on the legal status of conflict in cyberspace. Although key principles remain unresolved, such as what precisely constitutes an armed attack or use of force in cyberspace, overall there is a broad legal consensus among Euro-Atlantic nations that existing international law and international commitments are sufficient to regulate cyber conflict. This principle is described in multiple authoritative legal commentaries. But these can imply misleadingly that this consensus is global and unchallenged. In fact, China, Russia, and a number of like-minded nations have an entirely different concept of the applicability of international law to cyberspace as a whole, including to the nature of conflict within it. These nations could therefore potentially operate in cyberspace according to entirely different understandings of what is permissible under international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, and other legal baskets governing conduct during hostilities. U. S. policymakers cannot afford to underestimate the extent to which Russian concepts and approaches differ from what they may take for granted. This includes the specific question of when, or whether, hostile action in cyberspace constitutes an act or state of war. Recent Russian academic and military commentary stresses the blurring of the distinction between war and peace, and asks to what extent this distinction still exists. This suggestion of a shifting boundary between war and peace is directly relevant to consideration of at what point Russia considers itself to be at war and therefore subject to specific legal constraints on actions in cyberspace. This book explores the Russian approach to legal constraints governing actions in cyberspace within the broader framework of the Russian understanding of the nature of international law and commitments, with the aim of informing U. S. military and civilian policymakers of views held by a potential adversary in cyberspace. Using a Russian perspective to examine the legal status of various activities in cyberspace, including what constitutes hostile activity, demonstrates that assumptions commonly held in the United States may need to be adjusted to counter effectively-or engage with-Russian cyber initiatives.

The purpose of this book is to explore and examine the challenge to America's defense planners of needing to make purposeful and prudent choices in military preparation for the future. The problem for defense planning that is beyond resolution is the scientifically certain fact that we have no data from the future about the future. Moreover, this will always be a fact. No matter the scholarly discipline and tradition to which a defense planner owes or feels most allegiance, he or she needs to recognize and attempt to understand fully a personal and institutional condition of awesome ignorance of detail about the future. Further study, more cunning analytical methodology, even more powerful computers-none of these can reveal with any certainty what the future will bring. Fortunately, this does not mean that we are ignorant about the future; but it does mean that defense planning is guesswork and can only be such. Understandably, both senior policymakers and soldiers tend to be reluctant, even to the point of appearing to be evasive, when legislators question the plausibility of the answers given in congressional hearings. After all, it can be troubling to the conscience of honest and competent people to be obliged to affirm the integrity of choices made in defense preparation for national security in years to come, when there is and can be no certain way to know that one is sufficiently correct.

On November 23, 2013, China's Ministry of National Defense spokesman announced that a new air defense intercept zone (ADIZ) will be established by the government to include the Diaoyu, or Senkaku Islands. Sovereignty over these islands is disputed by Japan, China, and Taiwan. Pundits and policy analysts quickly engaged in a broad debate about whether China's expanded ADIZ is designed to create tension in Asia, or is part of a broader plan to impose a new definition of China's territorial space in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, to deal with cyber penetrations attributed to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), the U. S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State are devising new means to protect intellectual property and secrets from the PLA's computer network operations. This book explains how the PLA is revising its operational doctrine to meet what it sees as the new mode of "integrated, joint operations" for the 21st century. An understanding of the PLA's new concepts is important for U. S. and allied military leaders and planners.

Since 1983, the mission of the U. S. Army Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) has been to provide a sound basis for policy and planning for the Army of the future. Founded by General Maxwell Thurman, this Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) asset is nested within the U. S. Military Academy's Department of Social Sciences. The intellectual freedom and community-of-practice provided by this academic setting promotes out-of-the-box thinking, allowing OEMA analysts to devise solutions to strategic challenges facing not just the Army and the Department of Defense (DoD), but other government agencies as well. In the last 4 years, OEMA has devoted a significant amount of its research to officer "talent management," systematic planning for the right number and type of officers to meet the Army's needs at all levels and at all times so that the majority of them are employed optimally. Despite a commissioned officer focus, many of OEMA's talent management principles generalize to any labor force, to include the other services, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, andDoD civilians

La Familia Michoacana, also known as La Familia, is one of the most bizarre and deadly cartels in the world. Its Bible-pounding leaders recruit young people from rehabilitation centers, insist that they throw off their dependence on alcohol, drugs, and other addictive substances, and, once clean, apply to join their organization. The novitiates must submit themselves to 2 months of brainwashing that includes scripture readings, exposure to motivational speakers, and long periods of silence and meditation. Upon completing their "instruction," they may become couriers, lookouts, or drivers. Those who show an aptitude for violence are taken in groups of 40 to a wilderness area known as the Jes s del Monte. There, they are directed to shoot, butcher, and cook 15 victims to demonstrate that they are neither squeamish about killing innocents nor repulsed by handling bloody body parts. The leaders of La Familia-known as "El Chango" (Jos de Jes s M ndez Vargas) and "El Chayo" (Nazario Moreno Gonz lez) assure those who successfully complete this exercise that they are prepared to do the Lord's work-that is, safeguarding women, combatting competing cartels, and preventing the local sale of drugs.