U. S. Army War College Press

This research was completed in the fall of 2013, which was obviously prior to the recent crisis in Crimea and Ukraine. In 1999, after Boris Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin Prime Minister, the former Russian Secret Service (KGB) agent pledged to create a powerful state at home capable of projecting Russia's influence abroad. He spoke favorably about democracy but soon indicated by his actions that political authority would be concentrated in his hands alone, although he surrounded himself with a medley of supporters: members of the security services and military-collectively known as the Siloviki-business tycoons, high-level government officials, and members of criminal organizations. The state's resurrection-what became known as the Power Vertical-was made possible largely through surging gas and oil revenues and Putin's tight hold over the reins of power. The revenues that they produced, in turn, expanded the urban middle class, and provided jobs for those working in Soviet-era enterprises and entitlements for retirees. In return, Putin enjoyed unprecedented approval in the eyes of most Russians, therefore, after serving two terms as president, he felt comfortable passing the job off to his young assistant-Dmitry Medvedev.

The depth and scale of change that the Russian military has undergone during the last 5 years of transformation is impossible to overstate. This book reviews the overall direction and intention of Russia's military transformation, with particular reference to the specific range of threats-real and hypothetical- against which it is intended to ensure. Stated aspirations for transformation will be measured against known challenges facing the defense establishment and Russia as a whole, with the conclusion that several specific goals are unlikely to be met. Fundamental organizational changes that finallybroke the Russian armed forces away from theSoviet model in 2008-09 are now irreversible. It has been clear for some time that Russia no longer sees its military as a counter to a massive land incursion by a conventional enemy. While the idea of vulnerability to U. S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization hostile intentions remains strong, this vulnerability finally is no longer seen in Cold War-era conventional military terms: instead, it is missile defense and precisionstrike capabilities that have come to the fore, evenwhile lingering suspicions over a limited Libya-styleintervention still provide a driving force for militarymodernization.

The time has come for a reappraisal of the U. S. Army's forward presence in East Asia, given the significantly changed strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U. S. Army forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. For economic, political, diplomatic, and military reasons, the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater continues to grow in importance to the United States. As part of a broad, interagency, multifaceted approach, the U. S. military plays a critical role in the rebalancing effort now underway. The U. S. Army in particular has a special role to play in bolstering the defense of allies and the deterrence of aggression, promoting regional security and stability, and ameliorating the growing U. S.-China security dilemma. In particular, military security cooperation programs are becoming increasingly important for achieving U. S. security goals. These military-to-military programs and activities are designed to shape the security environment; prevent conflict through deterrence, assurance, and transparency; and build operational and tactical interoperability. As wartime requirements decrease in the coming year following the end of extensive American involvement in Afghanistan and as the U. S. military undergoes a dramatic yet historically typical post-war drawdown, security cooperation activities will comprise the primary way in which a leaner U. S. military contributes to broad Americannational security objectives in the next decade.

This book first seeks to provide an historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico. In doing so, it provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns that plagued Colombia, primarily between 1988 and 1993. It then discusses the initial cartel car bombings that took place in Mexico in the early 1990s-car bombings that most researchers have overlooked-before highlighting indications and warnings (I&W) events identified in the years prior to the resumption of Mexican cartel car bombings in mid-2010. Contemporary car bombings in Mexico from mid-2010 through much of 2012 will then be discussed and analyzed. Second, this book capitalizes on the historical overview andanalysis provided-from both the Mexican and earlier Colombian experiences-in order to generate insights into future cartel car bombing potentials in Mexico. The identification of such potentials, in one sense, offers us a glimpse into cartel "enemy intent"-a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence.

The withdrawal of U. S. combat forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 left behind a set of unresolved problems in the relationship between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the Federal Government in Baghdad-notably relating to the disputed boundaries of the KRG, and the extent of its autonomy. Tensions have since been compounded by the discovery of significant quantities of oil and gas in the KRG area, and Erbil's pursuit of an energy policy independent of and in opposition to Baghdad. Turkey, uneasy with the increasingly sectarian and authoritarian flavor of the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, has since moved closer to the KRG, not least with respect to energy issues. This has deepened Turkish-Iraqi tensions still further. Added to the mix is the increasingly sectarian stand-off in the region as a whole, in large measure as a consequence of Syrian developments, which has further pitted Ankara against Baghdad and its ally, Iran; and the emergence of a bid for autonomy by Syria's Kurds, which has complicated the stance of both Ankara and Erbil towards Syria and towards each other. Washington is in danger of being left behind by the fast-paced events in the region, while the ethnic Kurds of the region may be approaching a decisive moment in their long struggle for self-determination.

Nations democratize at a different pace: Some achieve high governance standards, lasting political stability, and robust economies; others are lingering in their desires to look and act like their democratic counterparts. While no country strictly follows similar patterns of democratic institutionalization, there is a variable that defines the rate of success of their efforts: their political culture. The empirical study by Dr. Robert Nalbandov unveils this "democratization puzzle" of incongruence between the levels of democracy, internal peace, and economic prosperity between the newly independent states of Ukraine, Georgia, and Belarus. By investigating the political cultures of the three post-Soviet countries, Dr. Nalbandov concludes that it was the distinct political cultures of these states (flexible in Georgia, rigid in Belarus, and bifurcate in Ukraine) that produced diverse outcomes in each specific case.