Congressional Research Service

This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, provides an overview with analysis of the major issues in U. S. policy on Taiwan. Taiwan formally calls itself the Republic of China (ROC), tracing its political lineage to the ROC set up after the revolution in 1911 in China. The ROC government retreated to Taipei in 1949. The United States recognized the ROC until the end of 1978 and has maintained a non-diplomatic relationship with Taiwan after recognition of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1979. The State Department claims an "unofficial" U. S. relationship with Taiwan, despite official contacts that include arms sales. The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P. L. 96-8, has governed policy in the absence of a diplomatic relationship or a defense treaty. Other key statements of policy are the three U. S.-PRC Joint Communiqu s of 1972, 1979, and 1982; and the "Six Assurances" of 1982. (CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy-Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei.) For decades, Taiwan has been of significant security, economic, and political interest to the United States. In 2013, Taiwan was the 12th-largest U. S. trading partner. Taiwan is a major innovator and producer of information technology (IT) products, many of which are assembled in the PRC by Taiwan-invested firms there. Ties or tension across the Taiwan Strait affect international security (with potential U. S. intervention). While the United States does not diplomatically recognize Taiwan, it is an important autonomous actor. Today, 22 countries have diplomatic relations with Taiwan as the ROC. Taiwan's 23 million people enjoy self-governance with democratic elections. Democracy has offered Taiwan's people a greater say in their status, given competing politics about Taiwan's national identity and priorities. Taiwan held presidential and legislative elections in January 2012. Belonging to the Kuomintang (KMT), or Nationalist Party, President Ma Ying-jeou won re-election against the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP's) candidate. The KMT also has a majority of the seats in the Legislative Yuan (LY). Since Taiwan and the PRC resumed their quasi-official dialogue in 2008 under President Ma and cross-strait tension decreased, some have stressed the need to take steps by the United States and by Taiwan to strengthen cooperation to advance U. S. interests. Another approach has viewed closer cross-strait engagement as allowing U. S. attention to shift to expand cooperation with a rising China, which opposes U. S. arms sales to and other dealings with Taiwan. In any case, Washington and Taipei have put more efforts into their respective relations with Beijing, while contending that they have pursued positive, parallel U. S.-Taiwan cooperation.

This list of about 200 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. In each case, the information was supplied by the agency itself and is current as of the date of publication. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions. Specific telephone numbers for correspondence, publications, and fax transmissions have been provided for each applicable agency. When using fax, it is important to include the entire mailing address on a cover sheet, as many of the listed fax machines are not directly located in the liaison offices. A number of agency listings include an email address. When emailing agencies please remember to include your name, affiliation, phone number, and return address, to ensure a speedy response. Users should be aware that email is not a confidential means of transmission.

The uprising against Bahrain's Al Khalifa royal family that began on February 14, 2011, has not achieved the goals of the mostly Shiite opposition to establish a constitutional monarchy but has defied government efforts to end the unrest. Demonstrations continue, although they have become smaller and less frequent over the past few years, as Bahrain's Shiites seek to pressure the Sunnidominated government to increase Shiite political influence and rights. The government has enacted those reforms that do not fundamentally dilute its authority, and has continued to prosecute and intimidate opposition leaders. The crisis has demonstrated that the grievances of the Shiite majority over the distribution of power and economic opportunities have not been satisfied by modest reforms. And, since 2012, violent factions of oppositionists have emerged and become more organized, claiming responsibility for increasingly frequent bombings and other violent attacks primarily against security officials. The government and opposition have attempted to resolve the unrest through two "national dialogues" (July 2011 and February to December 2013), but neither reached a comprehensive solution. A November 2011 report by a government-appointed "Independent Commission of Inquiry" (BICI) criticized the government's actions against the unrest, but outside human rights groups assessed that overall implementation of the 26 BICI recommendations has been modest. Still, both sides have left the door open to further dialogue and engagement, and the government appears to be trying to persuade mainstream opposition groups to compete in the next parliamentary elections to be held on November 22, 2014. The unrest in Bahrain has presented a policy dilemma for the Obama Administration because Bahrain is a pivotal ally. It has hosted the U. S. naval headquarters for the Gulf since 1946. The United States has had a formal Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA) with Bahrain since 1991 and has designated it a "major non-NATO ally." There are about 7,000 U. S. forces in Bahrain, mostly located at the naval headquarters site. Apparently to pressure the government to reduce its use of force against protesters, the Administration has held up some sales to Bahrain of arms that could be used for internal security purposes. The Administration has continued sales of equipment that are exclusively for external defense. Bahrain's opposition asserts that the United States is downplaying regime abuses in order to protect this extensive security relationship. A sign that the defense relationship has been unaffected by differences over Bahrain's handling of the unrest, in September 2014 Bahrain joined the U. S.-led coalition against the Islamic State organization by conducting air strikes against Islamic State positions in Syria.