Congressional Research Service

Since the 2011 U. S. military withdrawal from Iraq, sectarian and ethnic divisions have widened, fueling a major challenge to Iraq's stability and to Iraq's non-Muslim minority communities. Iraq's Sunni Arabs have sided with radical Sunni Islamist insurgents as a means to reduce Shiite political domination. Iraq's Kurds have been separately embroiled in political disputes with Baghdad over territorial, political, and economic issues, particularly their intent to separately export large volumes of oil produced in the Kurdish region. The political rifts-which were contained by the U. S. military presence but have been escalating since late 2011-erupted into a sustained uprising beginning in December 2013 led by the radical extremist group Islamic State, formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The group and its allies took control of several cities in Anbar Province in early 2014 and captured Mosul and several other mostly Sunni cities in June 2014, aided by a partial collapse of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). The ISF collapse enabled the Kurds to seize control of the long-coveted city of Kirkuk. The Islamic State's gains prompted a U. S. military response in Iraq and formulation of a broader strategy, articulated by President Obama on September 10, to try to defeat the group in both Iraq and Syria. The President's speech came as a new government headed by Shiite Prime Minister Haydar al-Abbadi was inaugurated in Iraq-a government widely expected to be more inclusive of Sunnis than was the government of ex-Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki. President Obama states that he has ruled out any reintroduction of U. S. combat troops to Iraq (or Syria), but since the crisis began in June has deployed about 1,600 U. S. military personnel to assess the ISF, gain intelligence on ISIL, and protect American personnel and facilities. Since early August, U. S. forces have been conducting air strikes against Islamic State positions to assist efforts by Baghdad and the Kurds to reverse Islamic State gains and relieve IS pressure on Iraq's religious minorities. To help the beleaguered ISF cope with the Islamic State's challenge, the United States has expanded and accelerated delivery of HELLFIRE missiles and surveillance systems, and has begun to deliver F-16 combat aircraft and attack helicopters that were ordered long before the crisis began. The Islamic State crisis in Iraq has upended what had been a relatively stable situation at the time U. S. forces left in December 2011. The last U. S. troops departed then in keeping with a November 2008 bilateral U. S.-Iraq Security Agreement (SA). At the time of the U. S. departure, the United States and Iraq had agreed to continue a number of security cooperation programs, including U. S. training for the ISF through an Office of Security Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I) and a State Department police development program. However, those programs languished as Iraqi leaders sought to end U. S. political and military tutelage, and Iraqi leaders instead sought U. S. sales of sophisticated arms to Iraq. The ISIL offensive has caused Iran to increase aid to the Iraqi government, potentially increasing Tehran's influence in Iraq. The Administration has held discussions with Iran diplomatically on restoring stability to Iraq, but has repeatedly ruled out any direct cooperation with Tehran in Iraq. Please see CRS Report R43612, The "Islamic State" Crisis and U. S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman et al.

This list of about 200 congressional liaison offices is intended to help congressional offices in placing telephone calls and addressing correspondence to government agencies. In each case, the information was supplied by the agency itself and is current as of the date of publication. Entries are arranged alphabetically in four sections: legislative branch; judicial branch; executive branch; and agencies, boards, and commissions. Specific telephone numbers for correspondence, publications, and fax transmissions have been provided for each applicable agency. When using fax, it is important to include the entire mailing address on a cover sheet, as many of the listed fax machines are not directly located in the liaison offices. A number of agency listings include an email address. When emailing agencies please remember to include your name, affiliation, phone number, and return address, to ensure a speedy response. Users should be aware that email is not a confidential means of transmission.

The Internet is often described as a "network of networks" because it is not a single physical entity, but hundreds of thousands of interconnected networks linking hundreds of millions of computers around the world. As such, the Internet is international, decentralized, and comprised of networks and infrastructure largely owned and operated by private sector entities. As the Internet grows and becomes more pervasive in all aspects of modern society, the question of how it should be governed becomes more pressing. Currently, an important aspect of the Internet is governed by a private sector, international organization called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), which manages and oversees some of the critical technical underpinnings of the Internet such as the domain name system and Internet Protocol (IP) addressing. ICANN makes its policy decisions using a multistakeholder model of governance, in which a "bottom-up" collaborative process is open to all constituencies of Internet stakeholders. National governments have recognized an increasing stake in ICANN policy decisions, especially in cases where Internet policy intersects with national laws addressing such issues as intellectual property, privacy, law enforcement, and cybersecurity. Some governments around the world are advocating increased intergovernmental influence over the way the Internet is governed. For example, specific proposals have been advanced that would create an Internet governance entity within the United Nations (U. N.). Other governments (including the United States), as well as many other Internet stakeholders, oppose these proposals and argue that ICANN's multistakeholder model is the most appropriate way to govern the Internet. On May 14, 2013, H. R. 1580, which states that "it is the policy of the United States to preserve and advance the successful multistakeholder model that governs the Internet," was passed unanimously by the House. Currently, the U. S. government, through the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) at the Department of Commerce, holds a "stewardship" role over the domain name system by virtue of a contractual relationship with ICANN. On March 14, 2014, NTIA announced its intention to transition its stewardship role and procedural authority over key domain name functions to the global Internet multistakeholder community. If a satisfactory transition can be achieved, NTIA will let its contract with ICANN expire on September 30, 2015. NTIA has stated that it will not accept any transition proposal that would replace the NTIA role with a government-led or an intergovernmental organization solution.

The release of all Burma's political prisoners is one of the fundamental goals of U. S. policy. Several of the laws imposing sanctions on Burma-including the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 (P. L. 108-61) and the Tom Lantos Block Burmese JADE (Junta's Anti- Democratic Efforts) Act of 2008 (P. L. 110-286)-require the release of all political prisoners before the sanctions can be terminated. The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2014 (P. L. 113- 76) requires the Department of State and the U. S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to "support programs for former political prisoners" in Burma, as well as "monitor the number of political prisoners in Burma." Burma's President Thein Sein pledged during a July 2013 trip to the United Kingdom to release all "prisoners of conscience" in his country by the end of the year. Since his announcement, he granted amnesties or pardons on seven occasions. While President Thein Sein has asserted that all political prisoners have been freed, several Burmese organizations maintain that dozens of political prisoners remain in jail and that new political prisoners continue to be arrested andsentenced. Hopes for a democratic government and national reconciliation in Burma depend on the release of prisoners, including those associated with the country's ethnic groups. Several ethnic-based political parties have stated they will not participate in parliamentary elections until their members are released. Also, prospects for stable ceasefires and lasting peace with various ethnicbased militias may depend on the release of their members currently in detention. Estimates of how many political prisoners are being detained in Burma vary. According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (Burma), or AAPP(B), a nonprofit organization dedicated to identifying and locating political prisoners in Burma, the Burmese government was incarcerating 84 political prisoners as of the end of August.

This report provides references to analytical reports on cybersecurity from CRS, other government agencies, trade associations, and interest groups. The reports and related websites are grouped under the following cybersecurity topics: policy overviewNational Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC)cloud computing and FedRAMPcritical infrastructurecybercrime, data breaches, and data securitynational security, cyber espionage, and cyberwar (including Stuxnet)international effortseducation/training/workforceresearch and development (R&D)In addition, the report lists selected cybersecurity-related websites for congressional and government agencies, news, international organizations, and organizations or institutions.

The individual states have been the primary regulators of insurance since 1868. Following the 1945 McCarran-Ferguson Act, this system has operated with the explicit blessing of Congress, but has also been subject to periodic scrutiny and suggestions that the time may have come for Congress to reclaim the regulatory authority that it granted to the states. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, congressional scrutiny was largely driven by the increasing complexities of the insurance business and concern over whether the states were up to the task of ensuring consumer protections, particularly insurer solvency. Immediately prior to the recent financial crisis, congressional attention to insurance regulation focused on the inefficiencies in the state regulatory system. A major catalyst was the aftermath of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA), which overhauled the regulatory structure for banks and securities firms, but left the insurance sector largely untouched. Many larger insurers, and their trade associations, had previously defended state regulation but considered themselves at a competitive disadvantage in the post-GLBA regulatory structure. Some advocated for an optional federal charter similar to that available to banks. Various pieces of insurance regulatory reform legislation were introduced, including bills establishing a broad federal charter for insurance as well as narrower, more targeted bills. The states, particularly working through the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), were not idle following congressional attention. They reacted quickly to GLBA requirements that related to insurance agent licensing and have since embarked on a widerranging project to modernize insurance regulation. This has included both regulatory aspects, such as streamlining the process for rate and form filing, and more basic legal aspects, such as the creation of an interstate compact to provide uniformity across states for some life insurance products. Because enactment by the state legislature is necessary before the legal changes suggested by the NAIC can take effect in that state, the process typically does not move rapidly. The recent financial crisis refocused the debate surrounding insurance regulatory reform. Unlike many financial crises in the past, insurers played a large role in this crisis. In particular, the failure of the large insurer American International Group (AIG) spotlighted sources of risk that had gone unrecognized. The need for a systemic risk regulator for the entire financial system was a common thread in many of the post-crisis financial regulatory reform proposals. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P. L. 111-203), enacted following the crisis, gave enhanced systemic risk regulatory authority to the Federal Reserve and to a new Financial Services Oversight Council (FSOC), including some oversight authority over insurers. The Dodd- Frank Act also included measures affecting the states' oversight of surplus lines insurance and reinsurance and the creation of a new Federal Insurance Office (FIO) within the Treasury Department.

The 2014 farm bill (P. L. 113-79), which was signed into law on February 7, 2014, makes significant changes to the structure of U. S. dairy support programs, including the elimination of several major price and income support programs from the 2008 farm bill (P. L. 110-246), the extension of several smaller dairy programs, and the addition of two new programs. Three of the principal dairy support programs under the 2008 farm bill-the Dairy Product Price Support Program (DPPSP), the Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program, and the Dairy Export Incentives Program (DEIP)-are eliminated. These programs are replaced by two new support programs that are authorized for the five-year period of the 2014 farm bill, FY2014- FY2018-the Margin Protection Program (MPP) and the Dairy Product Donation Program (DPDP). The MPP is a voluntary program that makes a payment to participating farmers when a formula based national margin-referred to as the Actual Dairy Production Margin (ADPM) and calculated as the national average farm price for all milk minus a national-average feed cost ration-falls below a producer-selected insured margin that can range from $4.00 per hundredweight (cwt.) to $8.00/cwt. in $0.50/cwt. increments. According to USDA final rules (released August 29, 2014), MPP payments are based on a farm-level production history and a producer-selected coverage level that ranges from 25% to 90%-the product of these two items yields the covered production history (CPH). Producers must pay an annual administrative fee of $100 for each participating dairy operation, and a premium that rises steadily for higher margin protection levels starting at the $4.50/cwt. margin level. The minimum $4.00/cwt. margin is fully subsidized and has no farmer-paid premium. The premium structure is further divided based on the volume of CPH-lower premiums are charged for the first 4 million pounds (lbs.) of CPH, higher premiums are charged on CPH above 4 million lbs. As an incentive to encourage participation by smaller dairy operations (with CPH under 4 million lbs.), premiums will be reduced by 25% across the board for all margin protection levels except the $8.00/cwt. Level during calendar 2014 and 2015. The DPDP requires USDA to procure and distribute certain dairy products when the ADPM falls below $4.00/cwt. for two consecutive months. DPDP dairy product distribution is required to target individuals from low-income groups and not be allowed for resale into commercial markets. Purchases and distribution under the DPDP end after three months or if the U. S. price for certain dairy products is significantly above world prices. Several programs from the 2008 farm bill were extended through FY2018 including the Dairy Forward Pricing Program, the Dairy Indemnity Program, and certain provisions to augment the development of export markets under the National Dairy Promotion and Research Program (i.e., the dairy check off program). In addition, the final bill adopted a provision that requires USDA to adhere to standard rulemaking procedures. Separately, federal milk marketing orders have permanent statutory authority and continue intact, as does the Livestock Gross Margin for Dairy Cattle program (LGM-D) and the suite of Dairy Import Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) that limit access to the U. S. domestic market by lower-priced foreign dairy products. The permanent Dairy Price Support Program contained in the Agricultural Act of 1949 (P. L. 81-439) is suspended but would be reactivated should MPP expire at the end of FY2018 without replacement or extension.

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the War on Poverty, but poverty remains a difficult policychallenge. The Obama Administration and some in Congress have offered proposals that seek to address poverty, with the proposals differing considerably in their focus and content. However, the themes reflected in these proposals echo prior efforts to address the issue of poverty. The terms "poverty" and "welfare" (commonly thought of as cash assistance for the poor) are often intertwined, but federal policies affecting poverty are broader than a single program or set of programs. In fact, the social insurance program of Social Security may be the nation's most important antipoverty program. The incidence and character of poverty is affected by many facets of public life. Over the last century, several watershed events have affected federal policies for the poor. These include the enactment of the Social Security Act in 1935, creating the first federal social insurance and federal-state public assistance programs; President Johnson's War on Poverty launched in 1964 that sought to address the "causes, not just the consequences of poverty" and began a period of expansion of services and noncash benefits for the poor; the "welfare reform" debates that began in 1969 and lasted until the mid-1990s, as societal expectations for single mothers shifted from staying home with children to work; and the culmination of these debates in the mid-1990s with the twin policies of requiring parents receiving assistance to work and "making work pay" for low wage-earning parents. Most recently, the Affordable Care Act expanded health care coverage, particularly for lower-income persons.

China is building a modern and regionally powerful Navy with a modest but growing capability for conducting operations beyond China's near-seas region. The question of how the United States should respond to China's military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is a key issue in U. S. defense planning. The question is of particular importance to the U. S. Navy, because many U. S. military programs for countering improved Chinese military forces would fall within the Navy's budget. As a part of the U. S. strategic rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region announced in January 2012, Department of Defense (DOD) planning is placing an increased emphasis on the Asia- Pacific region. Observers expect that, as a result, there will be a stronger emphasis in DOD planning on U. S. naval and air forces. Administration officials have stated that notwithstanding constraints on U. S. defense spending, DOD will seek to protect initiatives relating to the U. S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U. S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military capabilities could affect the likelihood or possible outcome of a potential U. S.-Chinese military conflict in the Pacific over Taiwan or some other issue. Some observers consider such a conflict to be very unlikely, in part because of significant U. S.-Chinese economic linkages and the tremendous damage that such a conflict could cause on both sides. In the absence of such a conflict, however, the U. S.-Chinese military balance in the Pacific could nevertheless influence day-to-day choices made by other Pacific countries, including choices on whether to align their policies more closely with China or the United States. In this sense, decisions that Congress and the executive branch make regarding U. S. Navy programs for countering improved Chinese maritime military forces could influence the political evolution of the Pacific, which in turn could affect the ability of the United States to pursue goals relating to various policy issues, both in the Pacific and elsewhere. China's naval modernization effort encompasses a broad array of weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs), anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, and supporting C4ISR (command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) systems. China's naval modernization effort also includes reforms and improvements in maintenance and logistics, naval doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.

The summer 2014 offensive in neighboring Iraq by the insurgent terrorist group known as the Islamic State (IS, aka the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL/ISIS) has reshaped longstanding debates over U. S. policy toward the three-year old conflict in Syria. The Islamic State controls large areas of northeastern Syria, where it continues to clash with forces opposed to and aligned with the government of Bashar al Asad. Meanwhile, fighting continues in other parts of Syria, pitting government forces and their foreign allies against a range of anti-government insurgents, many of whom also are engaged in battles with IS forces. Since March 2011, the conflict has driven more than 3 million Syrians into neighboring countries as refugees (out of a total population of more than 22 million). Millions more Syrians are internally displaced and in need of humanitarian assistance, of which the United States remains the largest bilateral provider, with more than $2.4 billion in funding identified to date. The United States also has allocated a total of $287 million to date for nonlethal assistance to select opposition groups. Prior to the Islamic State's mid-2014 advances in Iraq, the Administration had requested $2.75 billion in funding for the Syria crisis for FY2015. Neither pro-Asad forces nor their opponents appear capable of achieving outright victory in the short term. However, the prospect of international intervention to degrade the capabilities of the Islamic State appears to be driving speculation among many parties to the conflict that dramatic changes in the dynamics of what has remained a grinding war of attrition could soon be possible. Some opposition forces seek to cast themselves as potential allies to outsiders who are opposed to both the Islamic State and the Syrian government, while others reject the idea of foreign intervention outright or demand that foreigners focus solely on toppling President Asad. Syrian officials have stated their conditional willingness to serve as partners with the international community in counterterrorism operations in Syria, a position that reflects their desire to create an image and role for the Asad government as a bulwark against Sunni Islamist extremism. For the United States and others examining options for weakening the Islamic State, these conditions raise questions about how best to pursue new counterterrorism and regional security goals without strengthening the Syrian government relative to the opposition groups and civilians it has brutalized during the conflict. Similar questions arise in relation to options for countering the Islamic State without bolstering other anti-U. S. Islamist groups. At present, anti-Asad armed forces and their activist counterparts remain divided over tactics, strategy, and their long-term political goals for Syria, with some powerful Islamist forces seeking outcomes that are contrary in significant ways to stated U. S. preferences for Syria's political future. The United Nations Security Council also seeks continued Syrian government cooperation with efforts to verifiably end Syria's chemical weapons program. As of September 2014, all declared chemical weapons had been removed from Syria, and all declared materials of priority concern had been destroyed. Related facilities are set for destruction by March 2015.

U. S.-China economic ties have expanded substantially over the past three decades. Total U. S.- China trade rose from $2 billion in 1979 to $562 billion in 2013. China is currently the United States' second-largest trading partner, its third-largest export market, and its biggest source of imports. China is estimated to be a $300 billion market for U. S. firms (based on U. S. exports to China and sales by U. S.-invested firms in China). Many U. S. firms view participation in China's market as critical to staying globally competitive. General Motors (GM), for example, which has invested heavily in China, sold more cars in China than in the United States each year from 2010 to 2013. In addition, U. S. imports of low-cost goods from China greatly benefit U. S. consumers, and U. S. firms that use China as the final point of assembly for their products, or use Chinese made inputs for production in the United States, are able to lower costs. China is the largest foreign holder of U. S. Treasury securities (nearly $1.3 trillion as of June 2014). China's purchases of U. S. government debt help keep U. S. interest rates low. Despite growing commercial ties, the bilateral economic relationship has become increasingly complex and often fraught with tension. From the U. S. perspective, many trade tensions stem from China's incomplete transition to a free market economy. While China has significantly liberalized it's economic and trade regimes over the past three decades, it continues to maintain (or has recently imposed) a number of state-directed policies that appear to distort trade and investment flows. Major areas of concern expressed by U. S. policy makers and stakeholders include China's relatively poor record of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement and alleged widespread cyber economic espionage against U. S. firms by Chinese government entities; its mixed record on implementing its World Trade Organization (WTO) obligations; its extensive use of industrial policies (such as financial support of state-owned firms, trade and investment barriers, and pressure on foreign-invested firms in China to transfer technology in exchange for market access) in order to promote the development of industries favored by the government and protect them from foreign competition; and its policies to maintain an undervalued currency. Many U. S. policy makers argue that such policies negatively impact U. S. economic interests and have contributed to U. S. job losses.

The capacity, transparency, legitimacy, and cohesiveness of Afghan governance are crucial to Afghan stability as U. S.-led NATO forces exit Afghanistan by 2016. The size and capability of the Afghan governing structure has increased significantly since the Taliban regime fell in late 2001. But, the government remains rife with corruption and ethnic and political tensions among its major factions are ever present. Hamid Karzai has served as president since late 2001; he is constitutionally term-limited and will leave office after a new president takes office. The first round of presidential elections took place on April 5, 2014, and the results required a June 14 runoff between Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and former Finance Minister Ashraf Ghani. The runoff increased ethnic tensions between Pashtuns, Afghanistan's largest group represented by Ghani, and the second-largest group, the Tajiks, with whom Abdullah is identified. Amid accusations by Abdullah of a fraud-inspired large increase in turnout between the two rounds, preliminary results released July 7 showed Ghani ahead 56% to 44%. Secretary of State John Kerry has visited Afghanistan twice, brokering agreement by the two candidates to a recount all 23,000 ballot boxes and formation of a post-election unity government. The recount reportedly did not change the runoff vote outcome, but announcement has been delayed to enable completion of negotiations on the power-sharing agreement. The long delays in new leadership being inaugurated has complicating U. S. and NATO planning for a post- 2014 international mission to train Afghan forces and conduct counterterrorism operations. The election outcome is consequential because the constitution concentrates substantial power in the presidency, in large part through powers of appointment at all levels. The apparent winner of the runoff, Ghani, apparently does not want his powers as president diluted. At the same time, any Afghan leader's actual authority is constrained by an informal power structure consisting of regional and ethnic leaders that has always been at least as significant a factor in governance as the formal power structure. The faction leaders lead or can recruit armed fighters, and several are reviving their militias in concert with the ongoing drawdown of international forces. The enhanced influence of faction leaders is increasing instances of arbitrary administration of justice and human rights abuses. In addition, there has been scant progress in reducing widespread nepotism and other forms of corruption. The United States has helped establish anti-corruption institutions, but these bodies have faltered from lack of support from senior Afghan leaders who oppose prosecuting political allies. International observers assert that there have been significant gains in civil society, women's rights, and media freedoms since 2001. Those gains have come despite the persistence of traditional attitudes and Islamic conservatism in many parts of Afghanistan-attitudes that cause the judicial and political system to tolerate child marriages and imprisonment of women who flee domestic violence. Islamist influence and tradition has also frequently led to persecution of converts from Islam to Christianity, and to curbs on the sale of alcohol and on Western-oriented media programs. Afghan civil society activists, particularly women's groups, assert that many of these gains are at risk as international forces depart and as faction leaders and insurgents assert themselves.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, the Bureau) is the lead federal law enforcement agency charged with counterterrorism investigations. Since the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, the FBI has implemented a series of reforms intended to transform itself from a largely reactive law enforcement agency focused on investigations of criminal activity into a more proactive, agile, flexible, and intelligence-driven agency that can prevent acts of terrorism. This report provides background information on key elements of the FBI terrorism investigative process based on publicly available information. It discussesseveral enhanced investigative tools, authorities, and capabilities provided to the FBI through post-9/11 legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001; the 2008 revision to the Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Mukasey Guidelines); and the expansion of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF) throughout the country;intelligence reform within the FBI and concerns about the progress of those reform initiatives;the FBI's proactive, intelligence-driven posture in its terrorism investigations using preventative policing techniques such as the "Al Capone" approach and the use of agent provocateurs; andthe implications for privacy and civil liberties inherent in the use of preventative policing techniques to combat terrorism. This report sets forth possible considerations for Congress as it executes its oversight role. These issues include the extent to which intelligence has been integrated into FBI operations to support its counterterrorism mission and the progress the Bureau has made on its intelligence reform initiatives.

The primary mission of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS, the Department) is to "prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism, and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery from terrorist attacks that do occur in the United States. Since its inception in 2003, DHS has had an intelligence component to support this mission and has been a member of the U. S. Intelligence Community (IC). Following a major reorganization of the DHS (called the Second Stage Review or "2SR") in July 2005, former Secretary of Homeland Security, Michael Chertoff established a strengthened Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) and made the Assistant Secretary for Information Analysis (now Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis) the Chief Intelligence Officer for the Department. He also tasked I&A with ensuring that intelligence is coordinated, fused, and analyzed within the Department to provide a common operational picture; provide a primary connection between DHS and the IC as a whole; and to act as a primary source of information for state, local and private sector partners. Today, the DHS Intelligence Enterprise (DHS IE) consists of I&A, two headquarters elements supported by I&A, and the intelligence elements of six DHS operational components: U. S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). U. S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U. S. Coast Guard (USCG), and U. S. Secret Service (USSS). Congress made information sharing a top priority of the Department's intelligence component in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and underscored its importance through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004. Since the 2SR reorganization, Congress imposed additional requirements for intelligence analysis; information sharing; department-wide intelligence integration; and support to state, local, tribal governments, and the private sector through the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. On February 11, 2010, the Senate confirmed President Obama's selection of Caryn Wagner to serve as Under Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis. As she assumes responsibility for the DHS IE, Congress will likely be interested in the progress of integration of the Department's intelligence components and the quality and relevance of the intelligence DHS IE produces for front line law enforcement and security officials who are responsible for protecting America and its people. In February, DHS produced its first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), a comprehensive assessment outlining its long-term strategy and priorities for homeland security and guidance on the Department's programs, assets, capabilities, budget, policies, and authorities. The next step in the Department's QHSR process is to conduct a "bottom-up review" to systematically link strategy to program to budget. The results of that review will be particularly important as Congress considers an authorization bill for DHS. This report provides an overview of the DHS IE both at headquarters and within the components. It examines how DHS IE is organized and supports key departmental activities to include homeland security analysis and threat warning; border security; critical infrastructure protection; support to, and the sharing of information with, state, local, tribal, and private sector partners. It also discusses several oversight challenges and options for Congress to consider on these issues.

Hydraulic fracturing is a technique used to recover oil and natural gas from underground low permeability rock formations. Hydraulic fracturing involves pumping fluids (primarily water and a small portion of chemicals, along with sand or other proppant) under high pressure into rock formations to crack them and allow the resources inside to flow to a production well. The technique has been the subject of controversy because of the potential effects that hydraulic fracturing and related oil and gas production activities may have on the environment and health. This report focuses on selected legal issues related to the use of hydraulic fracturing. It examines some of the requirements for hydraulic fracturing contained in major federal environmental laws. It also provides an overview of issues involving state preemption of local zoning authority, as well as state tort law.

China's actions for asserting and defending its maritime territorial and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) claims in the East China (ECS) and South China Sea (SCS), particularly since late 2013, have heightened concerns among observers that ongoing disputes over these waters and some of the islands within them could lead to a crisis or conflict between China and a neighboring country such as Japan, the Philippines, or Vietnam, and that the United States could be drawn into such a crisis or conflict as a result of obligations the United States has under bilateral security treaties with Japan and the Philippines. More broadly, China's actions for asserting and defending its maritime territorial and EEZ claims have led to increasing concerns among some observers that China may be seeking to dominate or gain control of its near-seas region, meaning the ECS, the SCS, and the Yellow Sea. Chinese domination over or control of this region, or Chinese actions that are perceived as being aimed at achieving such domination or control, could have major implications for the United States, including implications for U. S.-China relations, for interpreting China's rise as a major world power, for the security structure of the Asia-Pacific region, for the long-standing U. S. strategic goal of preventing the emergence of a regional hegemon in one part of Eurasia or another, and for two key elements of the U. S.-led international order that has operated since World War II-the non-use of force or coercion as a means of settling disputes between countries, and freedom of the seas. The situation concerning maritime territorial and EEZ disputes involving China raises several potential policy and oversight issues for Congress. Decisions that Congress makes on these issues could substantially affect U. S. political and economic interests in the Asia-Pacific region and U. S. military operations in both the Asia-Pacific region and elsewhere.