Grant Gillett

The authors provide a richer and more robust account of the soul, or mind, than other accounts by framing it in neuroscientific and philosophical terms that do not explain it away but explain it as something that is shaped by how it responds to the natural and social environment in enabling flexible and adaptive behavior.

This book is an analysis and discussion of the soul as a psychophysical process and its role in mental representation, meaning, understanding and agency. Grant Gillett and Walter Glannon combine contemporary neuroscience and philosophy to address fundamental issues about human existence and living and acting in the world. Based in part on Aristotle's hylomorphism and model of the psyche, their approach is informed by a neuroscientific model of the brain as a dynamic organ in which patterns of neural oscillation and synchronization are shaped by biological, social and cultural factors inside and outside of it. The authors provide a richer and more robust account of the soul, or mind, than other accounts by framing it in neuroscientific and philosophical terms that do not explain it away but explain it as something that is shaped by how it responds to the natural and social environment in enabling flexible and adaptive behavior.

This open access book is a systematic update of the philosophical and scientific foundations of the biopsychosocial model of health, disease and healthcare. First proposed by George Engel 40 years ago, the Biopsychosocial Model is much cited in healthcare settings worldwide, but has been increasingly criticised for being vague, lacking in content, and in need of reworking in the light of recent developments. The book confronts the rapid changes to psychological science, neuroscience, healthcare, and philosophy that have occurred since the model was first proposed and addresses key issues such as the model’s scientific basis, clinical utility, and philosophical coherence. The authors conceptualise biology and the psychosocial as in the same ontological space, interlinked by systems of communication-based regulatory control which constitute a new kind of causation. These are distinguished from physical and chemical laws, most clearly because they can break down, thus providing the basis for difference between health and disease. This work offers an urgent update to the model’s scientific and philosophical foundations, providing a new and coherent account of causal interactions between the biological, the psychological and social.

From Aristotle to Cognitive Neuroscience identifies the strong philosophical tradition that runs from Aristotle, through phenomenology, to the current analytical philosophy of mind and consciousness. In a fascinating account, the author integrates the history of philosophy of mind and phenomenology with recent discoveries on the neuroscience of conscious states. The reader can trace the development of a neuro-philosophical synthesis through the work of Aristotle, Kant, Wittgenstein, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Brentano and Hughlings-Jackson, among others, and so explore contemporary philosophical puzzles surrounding consciousness and its relation to cerebral synchrony and connectedness. Of interest to students and scholars of neuroethics, neurophilosophy and philosophy of mind, as well as philosophy of psychiatry, From Aristotle to Neuroscience demonstrates the real essence of consciousness as it increasingly connects with philosophy, law, morality, aesthetics, and spirituality.

The first edition of The Mind and its Discontents was a powerful analysis of how, as a society, we view mental illness. In the ten years since the first edition, there has been growing interest in the philosophy of psychiatry, and a new edition of this text is more timely and important than ever. In The Mind and its Discontents, Grant Gillett argues that an understanding of mental illness requires more than just a study of biological models of mental processes and pathologies. As intensely social animals, he argues, we need to look for the causes of human mental disorders in our interactions with others; in social rule-following and its role in the organization of mental content; in the power relations embedded within social structures and cultural norms; in the way that our mental life is inscribed by a cumulative life of encounters with others. Drawing upon work from within the philosophy of mind, epistemology, post-modern continental philosophy, and philosophy of language, he tries to elucidate the nature of psychiatric phenomena involving disorders of thought, perception, emotion, moral sense, and action. Within this framework, a series of chapters analyse important psychiatric disorders such as depression, attention deficiency, autism, schizophrenia, and anorexia. Along the way, Gillett explores the nature of memory and identity; of hysteria and what constitutes rational behaviour; and of what causes us to label someone a psychopath or deviant. Updated, available in paperback, and more accessible than before, the new edition of this fascinating book will provide readers with important insights into the causes and nature of psychosis. In addition, Gillett's arguments have considerable implications for the way in which we understand and treat people suffering from psychiatric disorders. The Mind and its Discontents will be read by researchers and postgraduate students in a range of academic areas, including psychiatry, bioethics, philosophy of mind, social theory, and clinical psychology. It will also be of considerable interest to practising psychiatrists.

This book uses a neo-Aristotelian framework to examine human subjectivity as an embodied being. It examines the varieties of reductionism that affect philosophical writing about human origins and identity, and explores the nature of rational subjectivity as emergent from our neurobiological constitution. This allows a consideration of the effect of neurological interventions such as psychosurgery, neuroimplantation, and the promise of cyborgs on the image of the human. It then examines multiple personality disorder and its implications for narrative theories of the self, and explores the idea of human spirituality as an essential aspect of embodied human subjectivity.

This book uses a neo-Aristotelian framework to examine human subjectivity as an embodied being. It examines the varieties of reductionism that affect philosophical writing about human origins and identity, and explores the nature of rational subjectivity as emergent from our neurobiological constitution. This allows a consideration of the effect of neurological interventions such as psychosurgery, neuroimplantation, and the promise of cyborgs on the image of the human. It then examines multiple personality disorder and its implications for narrative theories of the self, and explores the idea of human spirituality as an essential aspect of embodied human subjectivity.

Grant Gillett argues that to understand mental illness fully requires more than a study of biological models of mental processes and pathologies. As intensely social animals, he argues, we need to look for the causes of human mental disorders in our interactions with others; in social rule-following and its role in the organization of mental content; in the power relations embedded within social structures and cultural norms; in the way that our mental life is inscribed by a cumulative life of encounters with others. Gillett uses material arising in the study of philosophy of mind, epistemology, post-modern continental philosophy, and philosophy of language to try to elucidate the nature of psychiatric phenomena involving disorders of thought, perception, emotion, moral sense, and action. Within this framework, a series of chapters analyse important psychiatric disorders such as depression, attention deficiency, autism, schizophrenia, and anorexia. Along the way, Gillett explores the nature of memory and identity; of hysteria and what constitutes rational behaviour; and of what causes us to label someone a psychopath or deviant. This fascinating book will provide readers with important insights into the causes and nature of psychosis. In addition, Gillett's arguments have considerable implications for the way in which we understand and treat people suffering from psychiatric disorders. The Mind and its Discontents will be read by researchers and postgraduate students in a range of academic areas, including psychiatry, bioethics, philosophy of mind, social theory, and clinical psychology. It will also be of considerable interest to practising psychiatrists.

I was delighted that the shortcomings of a causal approach to psychology were so eloquently argued. The authors are adamant that psychological properties (thoughts, feelings, beliefs) are not straightforwardly causal and, although language is socially acquired, our personal applications of meanings are not socially determined. --Self and Society "This fascinating book is an attempt to articulate the principal doctrines of a 'new paradigm' for psychological inquiry, a paradigm focusing on discourse and discourse analysis. . . . [Chapter] titles can only hint at the novelty of the approach and the richness and depth of the discussions. . . . Upper-division undergraduate through faculty." --Choice "Harré has launched a fertile field of inquiry, one that will receive substantial attention and acclaim from scholars of several disciplines over the next few years." --Clyde Hendrick, Dean, Texas Tech University "This is a bold effort. It aims at no less than a new paradigm for human psychology (a 'second cognitive revolution'). For a work so ambitious, The Discursive Mind is written in a style that is both clear and succinct. Rom Harré and Grant Gillett have a remarkable ability to get to the heart of an issue with a minimum of distraction." --James R. Averill, University of Massachusetts at Amherst "This book provides the best introduction to 'New Paradigm' psychology. The authors present a masterful outline of the philosophical roots and scientific applications of the emerging field of discursive psychology." --Kurt Danziger, York University "I am impressed with the book's unusual sweep, erudition, and breadth of scope tying as it does strands from diverse philosophical traditions to the history of contemporary psychology across a wide range of topics. It represents a useful statement of the discursive position and its implications for different psychological issues." --Arie W. Kruglanski, University of Maryland The Discursive Mind presents an exhilarating tour of the key philosophical revolutions that are shaping contemporary psychology. Harré and Gillett herald a new paradigm in psychology, dissolving the Cartesian distinction between mind and body in favor of the discursive turn in psychological theory. This grand, interdisciplinary overview places its emphasis on discourse: the discursive origins of the self, the problem of agency, and a thoroughly social understanding of personality. In the process, the authors elevate the emotions to a far more significant place in our understanding of mind, action, and being. The Discursive Mind is an elegant and lucidly argued book, whose theoretical breadth is matched by its treatment of a remarkable range of subjects including consciousness, the brain, perception, thought, personality, and the emotions. Scholars, professionals, and students in psychology, communication, and sociology will find this volume provocative, insightful, delightful to read, and intellectually challenging.

This study examines the relationship between thought and language by considering the views of Kant and the later Wittgenstein alongside many strands of contemporary debate in the area of mental content. Building on an analysis of the nature of concepts and conceptions of objects, Dr Gillett develops an account of psychological explanation and the subject of experience. He offers a novel perspective on mental representation and linguistic meaning which accommodates the vexed topics of cognitive roles and singular thought. He concludes by outlining certain considerations relevant to sceptical arguments and the nature of perception. Gillett's analysis produces interesting correlations with current work in cognitive and developmental psychology, and is directly relevant to continuing work in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophical psychology.