Naval Postgraduate School

Disaster responders are exposed to continuous periods of intense stress, and as a consequence, some suffer mental or emotional adverse effects. In recognition of critical stress as a valid concern, many emergency service providers have attempted, organizationally, to provide their responders with access to traditional critical stressinterventions. But when a catastrophic event occurs and mutual aid is invoked, disaster workers and volunteers will respond from diverse jurisdictions, frequently without immediate access to the psychosocial assistance provided by their home agencies. It is incumbent upon incident commanders to be accountable for the psychosocial well-being of the disaster responders, just as it is their duty to ensure the physical safety of the responders under their command. However, our uniform organizational structure for disaster response, the National Incident Management System (NIMS), does not speak directly to the mental/emotional well-being of disaster responders. This book proposes interpreting NIMS and its supporting training modules so as to require a component toaddress disaster responder psychosocial resources. It further suggests that by leveragingprecepts of social identity theory and concepts of swift trust, emergency operational team leaders may prime multi-jurisdictional responders to informal exchanges, fostering peer social support, and enhancing responder resiliency to critical stress.

The Joint Interagency Task Force South (JIATF South) serves as the center for counter-illicit trafficking operations against Central and South American drug cartels. JIATF South has jurisdiction over an enormous area and has alimited number of search and interdiction assets. Thus, mathematical models and tools to improve the search planning process could provide an immense benefit. This book contributes to a multi-institution effort to develop these modelsand tools. The goal is to provide enhanced situational awareness to operators about the likely location of smuggling targets and recommend search plans. This book combines a probability model and an optimization model into a user-friendly tool that operators and researchers can easily use. We also develop methods to convert the output of the probability model into inputs to the optimization model. This could be especially important if environmental factors play a significant role in the routes taken by drug smugglers. We examine how accurately this conversion algorithm reproduces the actual paths taken by smugglers. More importantly, we evaluate how well the search plan generated by the conversion algorithm performs. We find, in most cases, that the conversion algorithm provides excellent results; however, there are some situations where the conversion algorithm performs poorly.

The United States (U. S.) national strategy countering violent extremism (CVE) has yet tobe updated and currently does not provide the necessary national framework to best combat self-radicalization and violent extremism (VE) in the United States. If people subscribe that the need for an updated strategy is evident, then the question is "What are the necessary and effective components of the national U. S. CVE strategy that best prevent self-radicalization and VE in the United States?" This research examined the concepts and strategies surrounding extremism and self-radicalization in the U. S., the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. Through this analysis, multiple findings and recommendations were made. One such finding was the identification of overarching elements that, if implemented, would increasethe effectiveness and applicability of the U. S. CVE strategy. These elements include:1) identifying the federal agency in charge of administering the U. S. CVE strategy,2) developing a more robust and actionable national CVE framework, 3) refocusing the federal government on support and not local engagement of CVE, 4) requiring all CVE related terms be defined in every document, and 5) requiring regular evaluations and updates of the U. S. CVE strategy. The details of these and other findings are contained in this book.

Laying the foundation for the reestablishment of the Salt Lake City Fire Department's intelligence program requires several steps: Establishing a need; identifying the stakeholders; developing an implementation and sustainment plan based on the key constructs of successful collaboration; and providing a continued mechanism for evaluation and adjustment. Distilling the constructs of collaboration into a key component of success will provide additional focus to the development and implementation process. The questions this book answers are, can trust be identified as a significant factor in successful, collaborative working relationships? And if so, how can focusing on developing trust add value and sustainment potential to the SLCFD intelligence gathering use and dissemination program? The research uses appreciative inquiry in combinationwith multiple case studies, examining elements of successful and unsuccessful collaborative efforts in the arena of the fire service and national security. This book investigates the rise and fall of the Salt Lake City Fire Department's national security effort for the time period spanning pre-2002 Olympics to 2014. Components responsible for the diminished involvement since the Olympics are examined, evaluating each based on the role of trust. The nexus between those constructs and trust is the foundation for the recommendations for rebuilding the Salt Lake City Fire Department intelligence program. Developing strong, trusting relationships and addressing the concerns of all stakeholders are identified as key components in the successful case studies. Trust has been identified as the underpinning to the recommendations for the redevelopment of an intelligence program in the Salt Lake City Fire Department.

The use of aviation in wildfire management is essential to combating a growing hazard across the United States, but the modern organizational framework employed by the federal government is faulty. Chief among the problems is thecontract-based approach; with rampant inefficiencies, unsafe practices, and stagnant culture that resists innovation, the contracted structure has wasted billions of dollars and cost firefighters their lives. This book looks at three options to take over the aviation wildfire responsibilities-the active duty military, the National Guard, and a new DHS agency-in terms of the legal, societal, fiscal, and organizational implications of each alternative. The active dutyoption would sacrifice traditional military readiness for a wildfire mission; the new DHS agency would require far too great an expense in political capital and funding to get started, in the absence of a focusing event. The National Guard option offers the most practical and acceptable solution for politicians and the public to provide an improved aviation service. With unique flexibility to operate under state or federal control, the National Guard would bring professional military capabilities to their existing role in wildfire management.

As the pace of technology increases, so does the potential development of disruptive technology-related threats. However, by enacting proactive safety and security measures during the window of opportunity, a government cancost-effectively protect an unsuspecting and ill-prepared society before an emerging disruptive technology is widely adopted without stifling its future development. The basis for the threat mitigation approach described herein is to inject the protective measures into the innovation cycle prior to a technology being adopted by the early majority in Everett Rogers's technology adoption cycle. This period of time (the window of opportunity) occurs when the Gartner Group's hype cycle's trough ofdisillusionment aligns with Geoffrey Moore's chasm. This book explores two possible courses of action for mitigating domestic security and safety threats once a new technology's window of opportunity is identified. First, domestic law enforcement can use this information to mitigate future security and safety concerns. Second, the state could design a flexible regulatory framework aroundthe window in order to provide innovators and producers of an emerging disruptive technology with information highlighting its potential for illicit appropriation.

This book examines the main decisions taken in the 1994, 2001, and 2010 Nuclear Posture Reviews regarding U. S. nuclear capabilities and declaratory strategy, and the policy debates that followed the publication of each NPR, focusing on deterrence and other objectives of U. S. national security strategy. It analyzes and compares the post-Cold War NPRs to understand how each administration attempted to shape and direct policy, and how key issues were framed and addressed by policy makers and commentators. The concluding chapter identifies continuities anddiscontinuities in the NPRs, and considers how the roles of nuclear weapons, deterrence theory, and force structure have been addressed since the end of the Cold War. Continuities across the NPRs include the reduced role of the U. S. nuclear arsenal, deterrence objectives keyed to contemporary threats, nuclear arms control with Russia, and a force structure that emphasizes diverse capabilities, including non-nuclear offensive and defensive assets. Fundamentalissues concerning nuclear deterrence requirements for U. S. national security nonetheless remain unresolved, owing in part to fundamentally different policy views and priorities. U. S. deterrence objectives have remained fairly stable; definitions of deterrence requirements have changed markedly in each post-Cold War administration, with increasingly lower nuclear force levels.

Industrial control systems (ICS) face daily cyber security threats, can have a significant impact to the security of our nation, and present a difficult challenge to defend. Critical infrastructures, including military systems like the machinery control systems (MCS) found on board modern U. S. warships, are affected because of their use of commercial automation solutions. The increase of automated control systems within the U. S. Navysaves in manpower costs but increases the need for cyber security research and defense. Research is needed to assess and contribute solutions to ICS security problems. This book describes the MCS security testbed, which supports research in the security of shipboard machinery control systems. The testbed has been conceptualized, designed and implemented with the vision of supporting research and experimentation on the defense of ICS and MCS systems. The testbed provides the ability to analyze vulnerabilities, test defenses and replicate attacks on authentic physical industrial controlequipment. The MCS security testbed is a tool that may help counter cyber security threats facing the defense industrial base today. Future solutions to attacks on control systems in the nation's critical infrastructure begin with experimentation using authentic test environments.