Strategic Studies Institute

After nearly 13 years, over 2,200 lives lost, and over U. S.$650 billion spent since the United States began its air campaign against Afghanistan's Taliban in October 2001, the end of the long American military campaign in Afghanistan appears to be in sight. Despite the cost and challenges, the reality that Afghanistan still ranks consistently in the bottom 10 countries for human development and corruption, and the uneven but clear progress that the country has made in many areas, the United States will soon scale down its involvement in Afghanistan, and quite possibly pull all uniformed military forces out of Afghanistan quite rapidly. Additionally, the widely reported corruption that exists throughout the Afghan government, the resilient Taliban-led insurgency, and a litany of Western blunders, mishaps, and tragedies have all helped to undermine Western interest in the Afghan War. Recent surveys suggest that public support for the war is dwindling in Western and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member countries, with 75 percent of European respondents and 68 percent of U. S. respondents supporting either withdrawal or immediate troop reductions according to the German Marshall Fund Annual Transatlantic Trends Survey. Alternatively, perhaps the declining interest in Afghanistan is connected to a widespread popular and policymaker belief, especially since the 2011 Abbottabad raid (Operation NEPTUNE SPEAR) that killed Osama bin Laden, that U. S. and NATO war aims in Afghanistan have been achieved, or at least achieved to a sufficient degree given the current fiscal and political climate. This monograph answers six key questions about U. S. policy and strategy for Afghanistan:1. Did the United States have or develop critical national interests in Afghanistan and its immediate neighborhood on or because of the events of September 11, 2001?2. Was overall U. S. strategy to pursue those interests successful and appropriate?3. What outside conditions shaping U. S. involvement in Afghanistan exist now?4. Do new vital and/or important national interests not met by our earlier strategies exist in this region?5. What strategy(s) should the United States adopt or emphasize to achieve any vital and/or important national interests in/around Afghanistan?6. What risks and challenges are associated with new policies and/or strategies?

The current international security environment is characterized by unprecedented uncertainty. In the Asia-Pacific, our allies adjust to China's rise and hedge against instability coming from North Korea. In the greater Middle East, the Syrian civil war draws in powerful state and nonstate actors, Iran's weapons program worries its neighbors, the Arab Spring continues its uncertain course, and we see a growing Sunni-Shia split throughout the region. In Europe, the need for a strong North Atlantic Treaty Organization alliance has become clear as nations along Russia's periphery reevaluate their strategic alignments in the wake of the situation in Crimea. In Africa, weak states with ethnic and religious tensions set conditions for terrorist groups to operate with near impunity. It is in this uncertain and unstable world that U. S. military forces will operate for the foreseeable future. These security challenges require us to remain the most highly-trained and professional All-Volunteer land force in the world, uniquely organized with the capability and capacity to provide expeditionary, decisive Landpower to the Joint Force, and ready to perform the range of military operations in support of combatant commanders to defend the Nation and its interests at home and abroad, both today and against emerging threats.

The United States has diplomatic relations with 194 independent nations. Of these, none is more important to America than Mexico in terms of trade, investment, tourism, natural resources, migration, energy, and security. In recent years, narco-violence has afflicted our neighbor to the south-with more than 50,000 drug-related murders since 2007 and some 26,000 men, women, and children missing. President Enrique Pe a Nieto has tried to divert national attention from the bloodshed through reforms in energy, education, anti-hunger, health care, and other areas. Even though the death rate has declined since the chief executive took office on December 1, 2012, other crimes continue to plague his nation. Members of the business community report continual extortion demands; national oil company Petr leos Mexicanos (PEMEX) suffers widespread theft of oil, gas, explosives, and solvents (with which to prepare methamphetamines); hundreds of Central American migrants have shown up in mass graves; and the public identifies the police with corruption and villainy. A common fear of the elite and growing middle class is kidnapping. In 2012, Mexico recorded 105,000 cases; in 2013, the country led the world in abductions, surpassing such volatile nations as Afghanistan, Colombia, and Iraq.

Outside the United States, the United Kingdom (UK) has led the way in seeking to transform its military forces to meet the new strategic context in which it finds itself. Like so many of its counterparts, it has sought to do this within a defense budget that has continued to decline as a percentage of gross domestic product. This has meant a series of changes to the traditional approach to defense that have gone much further than the United States and many of its European counterparts. In essence, for good or ill, the UK has pushed ahead with changes to areas such as the use of contractors, both at home and on the battlefield; acquisition reform involving leasing and Public- Private Partnerships; the disposal of surplus defense real estate; and the role of sponsored reserves. As the same time, a considerable amount of attention has been given to how operations are conducted. As part of this process, the UK's Ministry of Defence and Armed Forces have officially sought to adopt an effects-based approach to operations within the context of an overall "comprehensive approach" that brings together the various organs of government. For the United States, the UK's approach to military operations is important for a number of reasons. First, the UK frequently engages in a variety of similar type operations from which there are lessons that may be applicable to the United States either now or in the future, such as counterinsurgency in Northern Ireland or nation-building in Sierra Leone. Moreover, a number of authors have argued that there is a distinctly "British way in warfare" which is particularly suited to such unconventional operations. Second, since the United Kingdom is one of the United States' closest allies, the UK armed forces are frequently engaged in operations in partnership with the United States. These have ranged recently from the Balkans to Afghanistan to Iraq. In fact, the only noticeable time the British were not involved in a U. S.-led operation since the end of the Cold War was in Somalia. The vast majority of these operations have involved sizable British commitments and a close integration of the British military in all the stages from planning through to nation-building. Interest in future British policy was most recently evident in the debate surrounding the transition of power from Prime Minister Tony Blair to Prime Minister Gordon Brown. Third, the UK is a member of various military alliances, coalitions, and partnerships which place it in a strong position to influence how others conduct operations. These include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the European Union (EU); America, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (ABCA); the Five Power Pact in the Pacific; and the Commonwealth. In the case of NATO, it was General David Richards, the commander of the largely British Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) headquarters, who deployed to Afghanistan in 2006 and oversaw the expansion of NATO's role, including, for the first time since the end of World War II, leading a significant U. S. contingent. This study therefore seeks to examine the extent to which the UK has transitioned to effects-based operations to ascertain (1) areas where the U. S. Army could draw lessons from UK policies; (2) areas where the U. S. Army and the British Ministry of Defense could develop integrated or complementary approaches and doctrines towards transformation for future alliance/ coalition operations; and (3) implications for the U. S. Army for working with the UK.

For over a decade, SSI has published the annual Key Strategic Issues List (KSIL) to inform students, faculty, and external research associates of strategic topics requiring research and analysis. Part I of the Academic Year (AY) 2014-15 KSIL, referred to as the Army Priorities for Strategic Analysis (APSA), has been developed by SSI in coordination with Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA). The APSA will help prioritize strategic research and analysis conducted by USAWC students and faculty, USAWCFellows, and external researchers, to link their research efforts and results more effectively to the Army's highest priority topics.

Profound changes in regional geopolitical dynamicsin the Arabian Gulf since the early-2000s renderthe region a highly challenging environment for U. S. foreign policy and military engagement. At a time of continuing domestic instability in Iraq and an increasingly isolated Iran, the geopolitical weight of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states has risen dramatically over the past 10 years; the GCC states' enormous economic power, coupled to some of the most stable political systems in the entire Middle East and NorthAfrica region, call for continuously close U. S.-GCC relations in the security sphere as an important element in U. S. foreign policy. But these fundamental shifts in the political environment coincide with changes in the regional perception of the United States as a security partner. The conflict in Iraq, resulting in yet another unstable state at the heart of the Middle East and in immediate proximity to the GCC, has left many former supporters of U. S. engagement in the region disappointed and cynical. Furthermore, ongoing U. S. defense budget adjustments have raised concerns among GCC leaders about the future of U. S. military capabilities and U. S. willingness and ability to engage in the region. In addition, U. S. responses to the Arab Spring sent important signals to the GCC about the potential durability of U. S. political and military support in the event of popular demand for more democratic rights and access to their countries' economic resources.

For 7 years now, the border area between Israel and Lebanon has witnessed calm and stability. At first sight, this has all the appearances of a paradox. The 2006 war between the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the Lebanese organization, Hezbollah, was followed neither by a peace agreement nor by a mere diplomatic process. Both sides prepared their forces to wage the next war and additionally have been confronted in past years to major changes in the distribution of power in the Middle East in the midst of the so-called "Arab Spring." Against all odds, the area comprising north Israel and south Lebanon remained very quiet these last months. This book argues that the key to understand this paradox is the game of deterrence played by both Israel and Hezbollah. Specifically, an informal deterrence dialogue has been developing between Israel and Hezbollah and that strategic stability prevailed because of this indirect exchange. Because both sides understood that a next round would be devastating and that each could not entirely eliminate the threat of retaliation in a first wave the solution has been to bargain deterrence, meaning to deter the other party from attacking its homeland by pledging a full-scale retaliation.

This research was completed in the fall of 2013, which was obviously prior to the recent crisis in Crimea and Ukraine. In 1999, after Boris Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin Prime Minister, the former Russian Secret Service (KGB) agent pledged to create a powerful state at home capable of projecting Russia's influence abroad. He spoke favorably about democracy but soon indicated by his actions that political authority would be concentrated in his hands alone, although he surrounded himself with a medley of supporters: members of the security services and military-collectively known as the Siloviki-business tycoons, high-level government officials, and members of criminal organizations. The state's resurrection-what became known as the Power Vertical-was made possible largely through surging gas and oil revenues and Putin's tight hold over the reins of power. The revenues that they produced, in turn, expanded the urban middle class, and provided jobs for those working in Soviet-era enterprises and entitlements for retirees. In return, Putin enjoyed unprecedented approval in the eyes of most Russians, therefore, after serving two terms as president, he felt comfortable passing the job off to his young assistant-Dmitry Medvedev.

The depth and scale of change that the Russian military has undergone during the last 5 years of transformation is impossible to overstate. This book reviews the overall direction and intention of Russia's military transformation, with particular reference to the specific range of threats-real and hypothetical- against which it is intended to ensure. Stated aspirations for transformation will be measured against known challenges facing the defense establishment and Russia as a whole, with the conclusion that several specific goals are unlikely to be met. Fundamental organizational changes that finallybroke the Russian armed forces away from theSoviet model in 2008-09 are now irreversible. It has been clear for some time that Russia no longer sees its military as a counter to a massive land incursion by a conventional enemy. While the idea of vulnerability to U. S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization hostile intentions remains strong, this vulnerability finally is no longer seen in Cold War-era conventional military terms: instead, it is missile defense and precisionstrike capabilities that have come to the fore, evenwhile lingering suspicions over a limited Libya-styleintervention still provide a driving force for militarymodernization.

The time has come for a reappraisal of the U. S. Army's forward presence in East Asia, given the significantly changed strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U. S. Army forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. For economic, political, diplomatic, and military reasons, the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater continues to grow in importance to the United States. As part of a broad, interagency, multifaceted approach, the U. S. military plays a critical role in the rebalancing effort now underway. The U. S. Army in particular has a special role to play in bolstering the defense of allies and the deterrence of aggression, promoting regional security and stability, and ameliorating the growing U. S.-China security dilemma. In particular, military security cooperation programs are becoming increasingly important for achieving U. S. security goals. These military-to-military programs and activities are designed to shape the security environment; prevent conflict through deterrence, assurance, and transparency; and build operational and tactical interoperability. As wartime requirements decrease in the coming year following the end of extensive American involvement in Afghanistan and as the U. S. military undergoes a dramatic yet historically typical post-war drawdown, security cooperation activities will comprise the primary way in which a leaner U. S. military contributes to broad Americannational security objectives in the next decade.

This book first seeks to provide an historical overview and analysis of cartel car bomb use in Mexico. In doing so, it provides context, insights, and lessons learned stemming from the Medellin and Cali cartel car bombing campaigns that plagued Colombia, primarily between 1988 and 1993. It then discusses the initial cartel car bombings that took place in Mexico in the early 1990s-car bombings that most researchers have overlooked-before highlighting indications and warnings (I&W) events identified in the years prior to the resumption of Mexican cartel car bombings in mid-2010. Contemporary car bombings in Mexico from mid-2010 through much of 2012 will then be discussed and analyzed. Second, this book capitalizes on the historical overview andanalysis provided-from both the Mexican and earlier Colombian experiences-in order to generate insights into future cartel car bombing potentials in Mexico. The identification of such potentials, in one sense, offers us a glimpse into cartel "enemy intent"-a possible form of actionable strategic intelligence.

The withdrawal of U. S. combat forces from Iraq at the end of 2011 left behind a set of unresolved problems in the relationship between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), and the Federal Government in Baghdad-notably relating to the disputed boundaries of the KRG, and the extent of its autonomy. Tensions have since been compounded by the discovery of significant quantities of oil and gas in the KRG area, and Erbil's pursuit of an energy policy independent of and in opposition to Baghdad. Turkey, uneasy with the increasingly sectarian and authoritarian flavor of the Shia-dominated government in Baghdad, has since moved closer to the KRG, not least with respect to energy issues. This has deepened Turkish-Iraqi tensions still further. Added to the mix is the increasingly sectarian stand-off in the region as a whole, in large measure as a consequence of Syrian developments, which has further pitted Ankara against Baghdad and its ally, Iran; and the emergence of a bid for autonomy by Syria's Kurds, which has complicated the stance of both Ankara and Erbil towards Syria and towards each other. Washington is in danger of being left behind by the fast-paced events in the region, while the ethnic Kurds of the region may be approaching a decisive moment in their long struggle for self-determination.

The United States increasingly relies on unmannedaerial vehicles-better known as drones-to target insurgent and terrorist groups around the world. Drones have been used in armed conflicts in which the United States is a recognized participant, including the conflicts against insurgent groups in Afghanistan and Iraq, and against government forces in Libya. The United States has also used drones to strike at terrorist and insurgent groups outside of theaters of armed conflict. These include drone strikes that target militants inPakistan who support al-Qaeda and insurgents operating in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen, and the al-Shabaab movement in Somalia. The objectives of these campaigns of drone strikesare to punish and to deter insurgent and terrorist organizations. They punish these organizations by killing and creating fear and uncertainty among current members. They also seek to deter insurgents and terrorists from engaging in more violence, as well as to deter others from joining or supporting these movements. While drones have attracted considerable attention, we know little about how effective they are as tools of punishment and deterrence. In particular, it is not clear how, if at all, drones differ from othertechnologies of violence, what experience with broadly similar technologies in past conflicts suggests will be the likely consequences of drone strikes, and what systematic analysis of the available evidence suggests about the effects of the drone campaigns.