Strategic Studies Institute

Disrupting, dismantling, and ultimately defeatingal-Qaeda-based, affiliated, and inspired terrorismis the declared policy of the U. S. Government (USG). Despite noteworthy success in attacking the al-Qaeda (AQ) terrorist network and securing the homeland from terrorist attack, the United States has yet to execute an effective methodology for countering radicalizationand recruitment to AQ. This book proposes a distinct War of Deeds methodology for accomplishing this. A War of Deeds is to be fought on two interrelated fronts: changing deeds and challenging deeds. Changing deeds requires a frank examination and possible reorienting of those present-day USG foreign, military, and diplomatic policies that diminish USG credibilityand potentially enhance the resonance of AQ's terrorist propaganda in the Muslim world. It also requires a frank examination of existing USG information operations that in the opinion of the present writer fail to adequately address the present U. S. credibility deficit and whose proposals too often amount to unpersuasivemarketing endeavors pitched to a highly selectiveWesternized audience.

The context for this book lies in the trust relationships that American military professions must retain with the society they serve if they are to remain professions. Of course, the alternative without such trust is for the Services simply to revert to the character and behavior of a government occupation, a big bureaucracy like the Internal Revenue Service or the Department of Agriculture. But to remain professions, one of the constant challenges the Stewards of the Professions must address is "how different and how separate" they are to be from the society they serve. Stated differently, as the values and mores of American society change, the ethics of its military professions must also evolve, but never so much that such evolution diminishes their military effectiveness-their raison-d' tre and the source of the trust relationship in the first place. As noted in the Foreword, as the values of American society have changed in the past, in most cases, e.g., racial integration, abortion, smoking as a health issue, the service of gays in the military, gender roles, etc., those changes have eventually had a strong influence on the culture of the military professions and, in particular, on the core of those cultures-theServices' Ethics.

As part of the radical political changes that haveaffected a number of Arab countries over the past 4 years, the toppling of regimes and the organization of the first fair and free elections in several Arab states have allowed Islamist parties to rise to power. This highly visible political trend has caused mixed reactions, both within these countries and internationally. Prior to the Arab Spring, most countries in the region banned Islamist movements from forming politicalparties. For decades, members of such movementswere jailed, tortured, and exiled from their homecountries. Even in those states where Islamist political parties were allowed, they had limited freedom and were under the scrutiny of the regimes, as was, for example, the Moroccan Justice and Development Party. The varied experiences of Islamist political partiesin power over the last 2 years in Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt offer a mixed picture. The debacle of Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt captured a great deal of international attention, but it did not resemble the trajectory of other governing Islamist parties in the region. Electorates have been disappointed by the performance of Islamist-led governments, which turned outto be unprepared to govern. Their poor performance is not only due to a lack of capability; it is also due to the fact that integration into the existing political system has not been smooth and free of obstruction. Islamist parties have faced fierce resistance both from secular parties and other forces in their respective societies and from abroad, as is evident from the opposition of rich Arab Gulf Monarchies.

The President of the United States and nearly all his critics agree that the spread of nuclear weapons and the possibility of their seizure and potential use is the greatest danger facing the United States and the world. Looking at the way government and industry officials downplay the risks of civilian nuclear technology and materials being diverted to make bombs, though, a person would get almost the opposite impression. In fact, most governments have made the promotion of nuclear power's growth and global development a top priority. Throughout, they have insisted that the dangers of nuclear weapons proliferation are manageable either by making future nuclear plants more "proliferation-resistant" or by strengthening International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and acquiring more timely intelligence on proliferators. How sound is this view, though? How useful might civilian nuclear programs be for states that want to get nuclear weapons quickly? Are current IAEA nuclear safeguards sufficient to block military nuclear diversions from civilian programs? Are there easy fixes to upgrade these controls? How much can we count on more timely intelligence on proliferators to stem the further spread of nuclear weapons? This volume taps the insights and analyses of 13 top security and nuclear experts to get the answers. What emerges is a comprehensive counternarrative to the prevailing wisdom and a series of innovative reforms to tighten existing nuclear nonproliferation controls. For any official, analyst, or party concerned about the spread of nuclear technology, this book is essential reading.

In recent years, debates over American grand strategy have often focused on the question of whether the United States should retrench geopolitically or seek to renew its international leadership. This collection of essays puts this pressing question in its proper historical and theoretical context. The authors examine past episodes in which American presidents were confronted with similar choices, and they probe theoretical and policy debates over retrenchment, renewal, and their consequences. The result is a volume that enriches our understanding of how American leaders have, can, and should respond to the challenges and opportunities that characterize international relations. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this collection as a contribution to the ongoing debate on American grand strategy.

As the Iraq and Afghanistan wars wind down, the U. S. military, like most other Western militaries, is enveloped in campaigns of reappraisal about what its role should be for the next few decades. The U. S. Navy and Air Force are developing the concepts of the Air-Sea Battle and Offshore Control, which are aimed essentially at countering the anti-access capabilities of nonstate, but especially state, adversaries. Since the unspoken focus of these concepts is on countries such as China or Iran, these are traditional military concerns and, to the extent that they facilitate the con-duct of expeditionary operations, they will necessarily involve the U. S. Army, too. But there can be little doubt about the general Western distaste for another major, land-centric conflict for the next decade or 2; nor, given the characteristics of China and Iran, would this make much strategic sense. Accordingly, the issue of what the U. S. Army's priorities should be for the next decade arises. Despite its probable institutional preference for a return to the land warfare-fighting ethos that preceded the current stress on counterterrorism operations, the Army is having to consider further engagement in irregular warfare and/or stability operations in its various guises. The so-called war on drugs will necessarily be a component of that much broader concept of future military operations, and from the U. S. Army's perspective, deserves reconsideration.1 Yet, such a focus elicits opposition, first from those who argue that the Army's greater engagement in the war on drugs would necessarily be an "exercise in futility" and, second, from the argument that this mission is already catered for sufficiently. Any further investment in times of budgetary constraint, it is argued, would undermine the Army's core warfighting capabilities. The issue evidently demands serious thought. This Book will argue, first, that the scale of the threat posed to Western security by the illicit trade in drugs is sufficiently serious to warrant both the label of a "war" (if with some reservations and caveats) and the extensive involvement of the military. It will then explore the extent, and the limitations, of the military contribution to the war on drugs. The Book will present some conclusions and a review of the implications of the war on drugs for the U. S. military of the 21st century.

The United States and its allies are in general agreement on the legal status of conflict in cyberspace. Although key principles remain unresolved, such as what precisely constitutes an armed attack or use of force in cyberspace, overall there is a broad legal consensus among Euro-Atlantic nations that existing international law and international commitments are sufficient to regulate cyber conflict. This principle is described in multiple authoritative legal commentaries. But these can imply misleadingly that this consensus is global and unchallenged. In fact, China, Russia, and a number of like-minded nations have an entirely different concept of the applicability of international law to cyberspace as a whole, including to the nature of conflict within it. These nations could therefore potentially operate in cyberspace according to entirely different understandings of what is permissible under international humanitarian law, the law of armed conflict, and other legal baskets governing conduct during hostilities. U. S. policymakers cannot afford to underestimate the extent to which Russian concepts and approaches differ from what they may take for granted. This includes the specific question of when, or whether, hostile action in cyberspace constitutes an act or state of war. Recent Russian academic and military commentary stresses the blurring of the distinction between war and peace, and asks to what extent this distinction still exists. This suggestion of a shifting boundary between war and peace is directly relevant to consideration of at what point Russia considers itself to be at war and therefore subject to specific legal constraints on actions in cyberspace. This book explores the Russian approach to legal constraints governing actions in cyberspace within the broader framework of the Russian understanding of the nature of international law and commitments, with the aim of informing U. S. military and civilian policymakers of views held by a potential adversary in cyberspace. Using a Russian perspective to examine the legal status of various activities in cyberspace, including what constitutes hostile activity, demonstrates that assumptions commonly held in the United States may need to be adjusted to counter effectively-or engage with-Russian cyber initiatives.

The purpose of this book is to explore and examine the challenge to America's defense planners of needing to make purposeful and prudent choices in military preparation for the future. The problem for defense planning that is beyond resolution is the scientifically certain fact that we have no data from the future about the future. Moreover, this will always be a fact. No matter the scholarly discipline and tradition to which a defense planner owes or feels most allegiance, he or she needs to recognize and attempt to understand fully a personal and institutional condition of awesome ignorance of detail about the future. Further study, more cunning analytical methodology, even more powerful computers-none of these can reveal with any certainty what the future will bring. Fortunately, this does not mean that we are ignorant about the future; but it does mean that defense planning is guesswork and can only be such. Understandably, both senior policymakers and soldiers tend to be reluctant, even to the point of appearing to be evasive, when legislators question the plausibility of the answers given in congressional hearings. After all, it can be troubling to the conscience of honest and competent people to be obliged to affirm the integrity of choices made in defense preparation for national security in years to come, when there is and can be no certain way to know that one is sufficiently correct.

On November 23, 2013, China's Ministry of National Defense spokesman announced that a new air defense intercept zone (ADIZ) will be established by the government to include the Diaoyu, or Senkaku Islands. Sovereignty over these islands is disputed by Japan, China, and Taiwan. Pundits and policy analysts quickly engaged in a broad debate about whether China's expanded ADIZ is designed to create tension in Asia, or is part of a broader plan to impose a new definition of China's territorial space in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, to deal with cyber penetrations attributed to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), the U. S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State are devising new means to protect intellectual property and secrets from the PLA's computer network operations. This book explains how the PLA is revising its operational doctrine to meet what it sees as the new mode of "integrated, joint operations" for the 21st century. An understanding of the PLA's new concepts is important for U. S. and allied military leaders and planners.

Since 1983, the mission of the U. S. Army Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) has been to provide a sound basis for policy and planning for the Army of the future. Founded by General Maxwell Thurman, this Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) asset is nested within the U. S. Military Academy's Department of Social Sciences. The intellectual freedom and community-of-practice provided by this academic setting promotes out-of-the-box thinking, allowing OEMA analysts to devise solutions to strategic challenges facing not just the Army and the Department of Defense (DoD), but other government agencies as well. In the last 4 years, OEMA has devoted a significant amount of its research to officer "talent management," systematic planning for the right number and type of officers to meet the Army's needs at all levels and at all times so that the majority of them are employed optimally. Despite a commissioned officer focus, many of OEMA's talent management principles generalize to any labor force, to include the other services, warrant officers, noncommissioned officers, andDoD civilians

La Familia Michoacana, also known as La Familia, is one of the most bizarre and deadly cartels in the world. Its Bible-pounding leaders recruit young people from rehabilitation centers, insist that they throw off their dependence on alcohol, drugs, and other addictive substances, and, once clean, apply to join their organization. The novitiates must submit themselves to 2 months of brainwashing that includes scripture readings, exposure to motivational speakers, and long periods of silence and meditation. Upon completing their "instruction," they may become couriers, lookouts, or drivers. Those who show an aptitude for violence are taken in groups of 40 to a wilderness area known as the Jes s del Monte. There, they are directed to shoot, butcher, and cook 15 victims to demonstrate that they are neither squeamish about killing innocents nor repulsed by handling bloody body parts. The leaders of La Familia-known as "El Chango" (Jos de Jes s M ndez Vargas) and "El Chayo" (Nazario Moreno Gonz lez) assure those who successfully complete this exercise that they are prepared to do the Lord's work-that is, safeguarding women, combatting competing cartels, and preventing the local sale of drugs.

In 2009, the President of the United States spotlighted nuclear terrorism as one of the top threats to international security and launched an international effort to identify, secure, and dispose of global stocks of weapons-usable nuclear materials-namely highly enriched uranium and weapons-grade plutonium. Since that time, three nuclear security summits have been held, along with scores of studies and workshops (official and unofficial), drawing sustained high-level attention to the threat posed by these materials. However, little attention has been given to incidences where sensitive nuclear materials actually went missing. This volume seeks to correct this deficiency, examining incidences of material unaccounted for (MUF) arising from U. S. and South African nuclear weapons programs, plutonium gone missing from Japanese and British civilian production facilities, and a theft of highly enriched uranium from a U. S. military contractor in the 1960s that was used to help fuel Israel's nuclear weapons program. This volume also questions the likelihood that the International Atomic Energy Agency would be able to detect diversions of fissile materials, whether large or small, and the likelihood that a state could or would do anything were diversion detected.

After 13 years of prolonged ground combat, a weary American public is leery of further interventions requiring land forces. Shifting geostrategic conditions, such as a revanchist Russia and a rising China, reinforce this reluctance. At the same time, technological innovation once more offers the chimera of war from a distance that does not endanger land forces. Nonetheless, at some point, a highly volatile international security environment will place U. S. national interests at risk, requiring the use of military power. Given the increasing rise of interdependence among all components of military power (air, cyberspace, land, sea, and space), a better understanding of Landpower is essential if national leaders are to have a full range of policy options for protecting and promoting those interests. Landpower, "the ability-by threat, force, or occupation-to gain, sustain, exploit control over land, resources, and people," stems from a country's geostrategic conditions, economic power, population, form of government, and national will. The military elements of Landpower include a country's ground forces, the institutions that generate and sustain those forces, and the human dimension-intelligent, highly adaptable, and innovative individuals-so vital to the successful employment of Landpower. Landpower offers policymakers tremendous utility in peace, crisis, or war, as it can defeat, deter, compel, reassure, engage, and support the nation. Within each of these roles, as well as across them, Landpower can carry out the broadest range of military operations. This versatility across the spectrum of conflict offers national leaders the greatest number of effective policy options.

The Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan mark an era of unprecedented outsourcing in contingency operations. Although significant outsourcing occurred in prior wars, never has the scale been so large for so long. Counterintuitively, as outsourcing increased, the number of government acquisition personnel decreased. This led to waste, fraud, and abuse. The Commission on Wartime Contracting made several findings and recommendations to prevent future contract administration problems in contingency operations. A principal concern is that the U. S. military needs to increase the number of acquisition experts, change its culture, and treat government contracting as a core competency. In response to outsourcing concerns, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy issued Policy Letter 11-01 on the Performance of Inherently Governmental and Critical Functions. The Letter provides strategic-level guidance to federal agencies to assess risk and accountability when outsourcing. Although the Letter provides helpful guidance, it is only a first step. More is needed to prevent the contract administration failures of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan from recurring. This Paper examines further-needed steps and ways in which the U. S. military can change its culture and make government contracting a core competency

It is important to involve the security sector agents themselves in the process to overcome institutional opposition; appealing to professional ethics and identity is equally bound to be more successful than patronizing civilian attitudes. Ultimately, security sector reform against the wishes of the sector in question will always result in mitigated success, if not to say failure. For better or for worse, Arab security sectors remain one of the pillars of Arab states. Without security, no economic development is possible in either Libya or Egypt-and economic conditions led to the 2011 events in the first place. Western governments so far have refrained from extensive security sector reform in the Arab world, preferring security sector assistance or occasional training. What 2011 has shown, however, is that reforms are not only beneficial, but at this stage mandatory. Since civilian actors are themselves challenged by ongoing transitions, the main agents in this reform will have to be the institutions themselves. Understanding their concerns and needs will certainly foster their cooperation-and in any case such understanding is crucial to delivering the efficient and legally bound security sector that citizens and institutions alike are striving for.

This book examines the underlying issues behind the continuing low-level Islamist insurgency movement in the Russian North Caucasus. It begins by analyzing the history of relations between the Russian and the North Caucasus nations, focusing specifically on the process of subjugating the region by the Russian Empire. Since the 18th century, Russia has used brutal force to expand territorially to the Caucasus. The mistreatment of the North Caucasus continued after World War I and especially during and after World War II, when entire North Caucasus nations faced persecution and forcible deportations to remote parts of the Soviet Union-in which up to 30 percent of the exiles perished. Thus, the Russians planted the seeds of resentment and hatred toward them that persist to the present time. These tragic events lie at the heart of the grudges the Chechens, the Ingush, the Circassians, and other North Caucasus nations feel against the Russians. Right after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe and the breakup of the Soviet Union, these grudges came to the surface. Chechnya tried to break free from what the Chechens considered occupation of their lands by the infidel Russians. Its attempt was suppressed in two wars so as to preserve the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation

As the world is moving rapidly into the 21st century, some might ask, why another history and analysis of World War II's European Campaign? After all, historians have continuously studied the war and the European Campaign since it ended in 1945. Why should one look back to a time and conflict from the industrial age when terrorism and insurgency are so prevalent today? These questions become increasingly relevant if contemporary military challenges are considered. In particular, during the last 2 decades, America's wars have been limited to short wars against second-rate powers, failed states and, most recently, insurgencies. Since 1945, there has not been another World War II type conflict. U. S. military forces developed war plans, trained, and designed equipment for such a situation for decades during the Cold War and continuing up to today, but we have never used them. The only wars this nation has waged since 1945 have been conflicts against regional powers that had global implications, but are nowhere near the magnitude of the events of 1941 to 1945. These recent conflicts are hardly comparable to World War II in terms of the scope, stakes, and demands placed on the U. S. military, the economy, and the population. Thus, does yet another study on World War II have any relevance, or is it merely an interesting "fun" read for history buffs or students of past military operations? The authors contend that despite the passage of time and the absence of major worldwide conflicts comparable to World War II, additional studies of this momentous war still have relevance, particularly to a student of military affairs and strategy. For example, World War II is a classic example of nations developing well-formulated goals, objectives, and strategies to achieve those objectives. More importantly, World War II illustrated how great powers adapted to a changing strategic environment. Formulating America's objectives and developing strategies to achieve them was a formidable task for a nation that had spent the interwar period wrapped in a shroud of isolation and economic desolation. Faced by multiple major power adversaries, the nation's leadership had a difficult task in preparing for war. The primary concern for American politicians was domestic politics. In this regard, World War II offers many significant insights not only for today's leaders, but for those in the future. Even evaluating World War II military strategy is a formidable task, at least without some type of analytical framework. One framework to analyze the strategy of that period is to use a simple model formulated by Colonel (Ret) Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. Lykke is a former U. S. Army War College faculty member who believed that military strategy should include three main elements: ends, ways, and means. Each element of this model affected the other two. Lykke illustrated his approach by using a three-legged stool with each leg representing an element, either the ends, ways, or means. The challenge for a strategist is to keep these three legs in equilibrium so that the stool will sit upright. The three-legged stool, like a strategy, should be balanced. Two factors influence the end or strategic objectives for a nation: ways, or courses of action; and the means or the resources like people, funds, and materials. For example, a dearth of means could alter the ways a nation could use its military and may cause the ends of the strategy to be at risk. Without the necessary balance between the elements (or legs), military strategy, like the stool in Lykke's illustration, could become unbalanced and possibly fail.