U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

Discussion begins with an overview of Union logistic operations in the war focusing on the logistics functions of supply, transportation, and combat health support. Next it proceeds to examine the role of logistics during the campaign by first discussing the impact logistics operations had on General Sherman's preparations prior to initiating the campaign. It then further discusses logistics operations carried out during the conduct ofthe campaign in the Carolinas. Finally, it examines logistics operations in the Carolina Campaign in terms of today's logistics doctrine. Logistics played a critical role in the success of the campaign. The logisticians in support of Sherman's Army overcame difficulties at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels to provide effective support. There were significant problems with the support concept, especially in the areas of casualty evacuation and uniform resupply. This thesis investigates these problems as well as the logistics successes that helped make Sherman's Carolina Campaign the triumphant it is remembered as.

There are literally hundreds of factions in various countries all over the world that support or have religious ideologies that are considered extreme. They are extreme because they conduct or sponsor violent acts and because they seek to undermine the legitimacy of a nation's government while instilling fear in thehearts and minds of the population. These factions or groups have often used a distorted view of religion to propagate their agenda. At the top of the agenda for some and one of the greatest concerns for America is transnational terrorism and those that use extremist religious ideologies to export it. It is important formilitary planners to know why extremist religious ideologies exist and why the ideology behind the threat resonates among its supporters. However, the problem is one that has already saturated the contemporary operational environment (COE). Military planners must consider every implication pertaining to extremist ideologies, including extremist religious ideologies in order to develop better strategies that enable successful operations with the COE.

The events of 11 September 2001 have thrust the United States to the forefront ofthe international struggle against terrorism. Terror is no longer a retail business; al-Qaedahas taken it to the wholesale level. In the past, as in the earlier history of the IrishRepublican Army (IRA), the purpose of terrorists was indeed to create fear, but also toachieve political aims of a limited nature. Even when they were at their most murderous, the IRA remained politicians, albeit criminal ones. They had their political objective, aunited Ireland, and they had political constituencies to maintain, among Irish RomanCatholics, and among Irish Americans who misguidedly donated their dollars intoNoraid's collecting boxes. These constituencies were willing to condone attacks onsoldiers, policemen, or politicians. They were even willing to condone the murder ofunconnected civilians, as long as it was in penny numbers. But they balked at thebombing in Omagh, which killed scores of innocents. Al-Qaeda does not use terror as apolitical weapon, but as a new type of total war. They do not seek to persuade, but todestroy. President Bush has been criticized for describing the situation after 11September 2001 as the war on terrorism. Yet that is a fair description. When people killby the thousands they change the nature of the crime. This is the hallmark of al-Qaeda;whether in New York, Bali, or Madrid, it believes in death (Rees-Mogg 2004)

There have been many changes to the national security strategy since the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. One of the most important changes has been the role that the democratic peace theory plays in achieving global peace and prosperity. As a result of this change, U. S. strategies stopped trying to contain communism and sought ways toenlarge the community of democratic states. These new strategies included the objectives of stabilizing and rebuilding failed states, more commonly known as "nation building" and "democratization." As a result of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001, national leaders reemphasized the importance of nation building and democratization, and linked the success of these missions directly to the national security of the United States. However, recent U. S. experiences with democratization in failed states demonstrate the complex nature of these missions. Democratization strategies in these countries have been complicated by the existence of strongly armed factions and politically charged leaders known as "warlords." These warlords control many instruments of power and play a critical role in the ultimate objective of creating stable democratic government. This research book studies warlords from a theoretical perspective and recommends that interventions adopt a strong approach with respect to warlords. Democratization strategies for a failed state should only proceed with the warlords and their violent factions removed from power. This book then describes democratic transitions and the changeover from a realist strategy to an idealist strategy in order to consolidate democratic reforms.

By 1807, Napoleon's victories over his European adversaries were legendary. His Grand Army had defeated the greatest European armies of the period. Each army, in succession, from the Hapsburg Empire to Russia, had been soundly beaten and had not been able to come to grips with how to deal with his lightning style of warfare. Yet, over a six year period from 1807 to 1813, in the backwater Iberian Peninsula, Napoleon lost both his prestige and more troops than he lost in the infamous wintry campaign in Russia. How did an army of bandits, priests, and commoners along with a small expeditionary force achieve victory over the most powerful armies on the continent? The answer lies in that Napoleon did not only fight a band of insurgents and a small British led coalition army, but he also suffered from a combination of poor morale, weak leadership and a refusal to fully recognize the enemy situation. His overextended lines of communications covered an area that was bleak and poor in resources and he could no longer rely on foraging to feed and supply his troops, many of them suffering from starvation. The Iberian Campaign cost Napoleon over 250,000 casualties and drained the French of manpower and resources that could have been used elsewhere. The campaign bankrupt Napoleon's image of invincibility and sapped his armies' leadership and experience. Therefore, Napoleon would have to rely on more conscripts and an ever-increasing number of foreign troops to fill his depleted ranks. Napoleon's generals were entangled in a politico-military quagmire for which they were never prepared and for which they received little guidance. The Peninsular Campaign sucked the lifeblood of Napoleon's armies and they were never able to fully recover from it.

Ethical perception is not the only part of legitimacy. Security is also a major factor. Insurgent forces typically target security in order to delegitimize the government by showing it as inept and incapable of protecting its people. The difficulty for the counterinsurgent lies in finding the proper balance satisfying ethical perception and providing security. With enough force and coercion, security can be maximized, yet in so doing the ethical perceptions of a society may not be sufficiently addressed. Without satisfying these perceptions to the appropriate level, a lasting peace cannot be attained. If the government is deligitimized in the view of the public, the insurgency gains strength and support. If the government is deligitimized through lack of security, the insurgent gains strength and support. Three main conclusions result from these observations:1) Any success by the counterinsurgent in winning some form of lasting peace is not possible without addressing the ethical perceptions of the populace as they relate to legitimacy.2) The factor of ethical perception alone is not sufficient for guaranteeing success in counterinsurgency.3) Ethical perception alone is sufficient to guarantee failure.

While hundreds of volumes exist on the Gettysburg Campaign, most examine the battle's tactical framework and focus on the activities of brigades and regiments. However, of more interest to the serving military professional may be an analysis of the degree to which the Confederacy's design and execution exemplify attributes of what is now known as the operational art. This monograph provides just such a study. The importance of the operational level of war and its supporting art cannot be overstated. Only with a recognition of this level between those of strategy and tactics and a mastery of its art can commanders have the appropriate frame of reference to link strategic goals assigned by national authorities with the tactical activities of their subordinate commanders. Although U. S. Army doctrine may have been late in formally recognizing the existence and significance of the operational level of war and its supporting art, it may have appeared very early in our military history. Indeed, without being named as such, the concept may have been placed into effect as early as the American Civil War. Providing a brief background of the Campaign's plan and events, these same are then analyzed against seven characteristics of the operational level of war. Among these characteristics are the degree to which the Confederacy's plan for the campaign (and its subsequent execution) evidenced operational vision, planned and executed distributed operations in the framework of a distributed campaign, and was supported and enabled by continuous logistics and instantaneous command and control. Application of the criteria to the planning and execution of the Gettysburg Campaign reveals that the Gettysburg Campaign does not provide an earlier birth date of the operational art. The following issues prove most significant. First, while Lee's operational vision resulted in a distributed operation, it was not part of a distributed campaign. While Lee could (and did) plantruly distributed operations, he did not have the authority to order other Army Commanders to design and conduct other such operations. Therefore, the Gettysburg operation was not combined with other operations to result in a distributed campaign. Next, within the operation itself, systemic failures in logistics and command and control led to an inability to sustain andcoordinate the operation and limit the durability of the Army of Northern Virginia's corps. These shortcomings (combined with others addressed at a later point) lead to the conclusion that the Army of Northern Virginia executed a major operation (vice campaign) that was modeled on the new possibilities of distributed maneuver but was not supported by the critical enablers ofadvanced communications and transportation technologies.

The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) remains one of the most publicized, yet least understood, concepts among contemporary defense analysts. Too often, professional academic evaluation of military revolution is forcecentric, neglecting the inherent association with the social, political, and economic dimensions within which all warfare is conducted. Historian Michael Roberts, who first postulated the presence of a revolution in military affairs in earlymodern Europe, envisioned a broad theoretical construct that encompassed these dimensions within a framework remarkably similar to Carl von Clausewitzs paradoxical trinity, conjoining the military with the sociopolitical facets of war. Nevertheless, the modern RMA debate largely neglects this model in the pursuit of a panacea for the future. Returning to the fundamental traditions that once defined the RMA debate, this monograph introduces aparadigm that melds the essence of Roberts' holistic approach with the theory of punctuated equilibrium, a biological model for evolutionary development hypothesized by Niles Eldredge and Steven Gould in 1972. Their model, which countered the very soul of Darwinian evolution, proved both accurate and versatile and was quickly adapted in the fields of finance, business, and organizational theory. In the pages that follow, the author redefines the history of military revolutions within the context of Punctuated Revolutions in Military Affairs, in which military revolution occurs in bursts of rapid change punctuated by relatively long periods of equilibrium, or international symmetry. The utility of this new paradigm is twofold: first, punctuated equilibrium presents an analytical model for the examination of historical military revolutions consistent with Michael Roberts' original thesis; second, punctuated equilibriumdefines history within the context of patterns of change and is, therefore, predictive in nature. Ultimately, this monograph posits the present state of military affairs within the continuum of Punctuated Revolutions in Military Affairs, offering a glimpse into the future of what may come to be.

This book examines the use of artillery by the Union Army of the Cumberland during the Battle of Chickamauga on 19 and 20 September, 1863. The book methodology is an analysis of the terrain, technology, tactics, organization for combat, and leadership during the battle. This book shows that the Union did not employ artillery effectively due to poor organization for combat and failure of leaders to use the weapons systems in accordance with their strengths. The failure to plan for artillery use on 20 September directly led to weakness on the left flank, which the Confederates exploited. The ensuing havoc led Union leaders to attempt to reorganize their artillery structure while in contactwith the enemy, leading to predictable failure. This book shows the failure of artillery, a branch that was nearing the end of its relevance during the American Civil War due to technological change. As military thinkers today go through the process of redesigning the force, they can use the lessons of the artillery at Chickamauga as an example of the wrong way to employ a force at the end of its life cycle.

China's INEW doctrine combining network attack with electronic warfare supports the use of cyber warfare in future conflict. The IW militia unit organization provides each Chinese military region commander with unique network attack, exploitation, and defense capabilities. IW unit training focuses on improving network attack skills during military exercises. The integration of the IW militia units with commercial technology companies provides infrastructure and technical support enabling the units to conduct operations. The IW units gather intelligence on an adversary's networks identifying critical nodes and security weaknesses. Armed with this intelligence, theseunits are capable of conducting network attack to disrupt or destroy the identified critical nodes of an enemy's C4ISR assets allowing China to use military force in a local war. In an effort to regain its former status, China pursues the strategic goal of reunification of its claimed sovereign territories and lands using economic influence as the primary means but will resort to military force if necessary. Recent cyber activities attributed to China suggest that network exploitation is currently underway and providing military, political, and economic information to the CCP. Domestically and internationally, China views Taiwan and the United States respectively as the major threats to the CCP.

The operations tempo of the Army has increased over 300 percent since the Gulf war. In that same period the size of the Army has decreasedby one-third. Many of the capabilities from the active Army have been shifted to the reserve components. This has led to an increasedutilization of the Army's reserve components to meet the needs of the Army. Today, soldiers from the active Army, US Army Reserve, andthe Army National Guard are fully integrated across the full spectrum of operations to accomplish the Army's missions. However, thisincrease in workload for a part-time force structure must come at a cost. This thesis attempts to define the impacts of the increased utilization of the reserves and to determine how they might affect the ability to mobilize for a major war. It demonstrates that the increase has positive effects at the macro (or Army) level, as training and experience increase while aggregate operations tempo decreases; and negative effects at the micro (or soldier) level as increased reserve obligations put stress on soldiers, families, and employers. This project also examines the rolethat the reserve components play in the execution of the national military strategy.

failure was due to four factors: (1) a false British assumption of loyalist support among the local populace, (2) British application of self-defeating political and military policies, (3) the British failure to deploy sufficient forces to control the territory, and (4) patriot General Nathanael Greene's campaign against British forces. The chapters that follow examine each of these factors in detail. In March 1778, King George III was eager to find a solution to what had become a political and military quagmire with the war in America. He established the Carlisle Peace Commission and dispatched the body to New York City with a proposal to cease hostilities. The American government insisted that the king and the British government agree to recognize American independence. The commission refused to make this concession and both parties recognized that they had arrived at an impasse.