U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

This monograph analyzes the events that led to South Carolinas' uncommon democratic unification following the bitter partisan fighting of the American Revolution. From the study, the author identified common threads in events, or ideals that fostered the birth of a united nation following guerilla warfare within. The focus did not center on a model for construction of a Constitutional Republic, but instead the focus was on gleaning the basis for popular unity following irregular conflict. In today's era of persistent conflict and uncertainty, the measure of victory has shifted from those used in past wars. The capitulation of a massed enemy army is no longer the measure of mission accomplishment. Now, the establishment of popular unity towards a common good is the goal for successful extended peace following conflict. From the unique experience the Americans faced following the American Revolution, this work draws links between how Britain chose to fight the American Revolutionary War, the violent partisan warfighting of the separate American factions, and their resultant motivations in the rebuilding. The study follows a broad range of secondary sources covering the American Revolution for insight into the arrogant nature of the British parliament leading to conflict, the brutal nature of the war, and the commonality of thought and action between the two Colonial factions post conflict.

This study investigates the American Civil War role and contributions of MajorGeneral John Buford. Buford, a 1848 graduate of the United States MilitaryAcademy, began his Army career on America's frontier with the First UnitedStates Dragoons. With the outbreak of the Civil War, Buford was selected tocommand a cavalry brigade in John Pope's Army of Virginia, and participatedin the Second Manassas Campaign. Buford went on to make significantcontributions to the Union efforts in the Eastern Theater; however, historyhas generally portrayed Buford as a one-dimensional character based on hisstand along McPherson and Seminary Ridges on the first day of the Battle ofGettysburg. Several historians have presumed that the dismounted cavalry (orDragoon) tactics used by Buford at Gettysburg were the culmination of amethod of fighting which he helped develop and propagate within the Unioncavalry. However, this thesis shows that contrary to this Dragoon image, Buford was infact a remarkable cavalry officer. His battlefield tactics were fairlytraditional, but it was not in pitched battles that Buford excelled. Hissignificant contributions were in the established roles of cavalry; performingreconnaissance and providing security for the army he was supporting.

Characterized by some authors as a rehearsal for the First World War, the Russo- Japanese War was arguably the world's first modern war. During this war, the lethality of weapons on the 20th Century battlefield was clearly demonstrated. Recording the events of the Russo-Japanese War were military and civilian observers from every major power of the time. These observers wrote voluminous accounts of the war that clearly illustrated this new battlefield destructiveness. The research question of this thesis is what tactical lessons were available to the observer nations of the Russo-Japanese War that were not used in their preparations for World War I. This paper will look at both observer accounts of the war and professional journal articles written soon after the war to consider this question. To answer this question, the stationary Siege of Port Arthur and the maneuver Battle of Mukden are used as representative battles of this war. Reports from these two battles clearly demonstrate the lethality of modern warfare andforeshadow the combined effects of hand grenades mortars, machineguns, and field artillery in World War I.

The primary question this thesis aims to answer is--did the Studies and Observation Group (SOG) covert and clandestine operations contribute significantly to the Vietnam War effort? The scope of research is an examination of SOG operations throughout the war. To determine SOG's contributions, research will answer the following secondary and tertiary questions: (1) What were the US strategic, operational, and tactical goals for Vietnam and how did they develop? (2) Did SOG contribute to the accomplishment of strategic, operational, and tactical goals in the Vietnam War? and (3) How did SOG missions affect enemy forces and their operations? By answering the primary, secondary, and tertiary questions, a conclusion may be drawn concerning the contributions of SOG in Vietnam as the primary headquarters for carrying out the unconventional war effort against the North Vietnamese. Lessons learned may apply to the use of similar unconventional warfare assets in the Global War on Terrorism.

1863 was the third year of the American Civil War. When the year began, the warwas still largely unsettled. This was the case in the western theater, where the Union Armyof the Cumberland faced the Confederate Army of Tennessee, vying for control ofTennessee and its valuable resources and strategic rail interchanges. In the early months of1863 the Army of the Cumberland was resting and reorganizing. General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, resisted pressure fromWashington to commence his spring offensive against General Braxton Bragg, commanderof the Army of Tennessee. The strategic importance of Tennessee at that point in the warwas three-fold. First, many Union loyalists lived in East Tennessee. President Lincolnwanted to liberate the state and bring those citizens back under the umbrella of Unioncontrol. Secondly, Confederate rail lines connecting the resources of the western theater toVirginia ran through Tennessee. Those rail lines served as lines of communication andlines of supplying the Confederate armies not only in Tennessee but throughout the EasternTheater as well. Third, Tennessee was rich in supplies needed to sustain the Confederatewar effort. Food items such as pork, corn and mineral resources such as copper andsaltpeter, two ingredients of gunpowder, were mined in Tennessee.

Terrorism and democracy make an interesting dichotomy. Political rhetoric from recent and present world leaders link the spread of a strong democracy with a decline in the number of areas that are capable of producing and harboring terrorists. George W. Bush stated in his inaugural address that "The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands. The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of freedom in all the world. . . . So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world" (Bush 2005). Totalitarian regimes are often characterized by their lack of terrorism, and if they do encounter terrorist acts their laws and system of government often allow them to expend great resources without needing to consider the rule of law, or basic human rights to seek out the perpetrators. The Nazi regime, the KGB, Iraqi secret police, and more recently the military junta in Burma have all been successful in finding, publicly punishing, and suppressing terrorist acts within their borders (Lutz and Lutz 2010). Terrorism is not a new phenomenon but for many people it was only recognized when the two airplanes crashed into the World Trade Center in New York on 11 September 2001. This act of terrorism, committed by the terror group Al Qaeda, saw the beginning of the Global War on Terror. Al Qaeda is based in the Islamic religion, and when coupled with the subsequent wars in the Islamic countries of Iraq and Afghanistan, lead many people to identify terrorism with the Islamic faith. Recent history, expeditionary conflicts, and friendly military deaths have kept the public focused on Islamic religion based terrorism. While populations and governments of Western democracies have been focused on fighting terrorists in other countries and building security measures around their own countries, to prevent the people they are fighting from committing another 11 September style attack, there have been incidents of birth right or homegrown citizens adopting terrorist tactics to attempt to influence, change, or collapse the government from within the state. This study will present three case studies to highlight the threat from citizens adopting terrorist tactics within the state, and how some of the rights of the citizens within that state can assist a homegrown terrorist in hiding their true aims and objectives, while preventing law enforcement from detecting possible threats until it is too late. The first case study will be that of the little known cult, Aum Shinrikyo and its leader Shoko Asahara. In 1995 it announced itself by killing 12 people and injuring thousands by releasing Sarin nerve agent into the Tokyo subway system. This organization was not based on Islam, nor did it arise in the Middle East. It did, however, use terror as a method of spreading its message. While much of the focus is on the organization itself, its actions and the associated consequences, its leader, like Osama Bin Laden, Aymen Al-Zawahiri, and Muqtada al-Sadr, is portrayed as the primary driver behind the terrorist act. Asahara "spent much of his pre-adult life in a state-run boarding school for the blind. His feelings of abandonment by his family, discrimination because of his blindness, and later failure to enter a university left him with permanent feelings of rejection, frustration, and resentment" (Bromley and Melton 2002, 192).

This book examines Operation SEALORDS, the capstone campaign conducted by the Brown-Water Navy in Vietnam. Specifically, this paper addresses the primary question: Was the SEALORDS campaign successful, and if so, what lessons, can be learned from SEALORDS and how might we employ brown-water forces in the future? This book breaks down the SEALORDS campaign into three areas of study. First, the study examines the barrier interdiction portion of the campaign designed to stem the flow of enemy infiltration of men and material from Cambodia into the Mekong Delta. Second, this study analyzes the Denial of Sanctuary Operations and Pacification portion of the SEALORDS operations. Lastly, the Accelerated Turnover to the Vietnamese Program known as "ACTOV" is examined to determine its effectiveness. The Findings of this book suggest that by concentrating naval forces athwart the major infiltration routes along the Cambodian border, SEALORDS effectively cut enemy lines of communication into South Vietnam and severly restricted enemy attempts at infiltration. Additionally, the findings suggest that SEALORDS contributed significantly to pacification efforts in the southern part of III Corps and all of the TV Corps Tactical Zone. Finally, the ACTOV Program is evaluated as successful and put the navy out ahead of the other services with respect to Vietnamization of the war effort.

In a surprise move during the summer of 1955 the Secretary of the Navy selected Rear Admiral Arleigh Burke over 92 more senior admirals to become the Navy's next Chief of Naval Operations. The junior admiral went on to serve an unprecedented three terms as the Navy's principal leader, a record yet to be broken. With no formal leadership instruction aside from his Naval Academy days and abbreviated experience at the senior operational level, Burke nonetheless became a prolific strategic level leader. At the height of the Cold War Burke led the Navy through a transition in technology, moving from an era of bullets and propellers to one of guided missiles and jets. Under his watch nuclear propulsion became the standard for all US submarines while the Navy greatly enhanced its contribution to the nation's strategic nuclear capability with nuclear missile submarines. In driving these transitions Burke left his mark on Navy culture and morale, shaking the service out of the doldrums and reinvigorating it. Today's military leaders arerequired to deal with a large degree of ambiguity. Understanding how previous leaders dealt with complex issues may help current and future leaders understand how to deal with difficult issues effectively. It may also help leaders understand circumstances as they exist today by examining the visions and decisions of strategic leaders in the past.

On the night of Monday, 23 February, 1942, Imperial Japanese Navy Commander Kozo Nishino, in command of I-17, brought the boat to a halt in the Santa Barbara channel and ordered his crew to prepare for gun action. At 7:07 p.m., Nishino ordered his gun crew to open fire. Explosions went off on shore as 140mm shells hit the oil field. After a few minutes, Nishino had his gunners shift targets and continue the bombardment. At approximately 7:45 p.m., Nishino ordered cease-fire and the I-17 started to transit to the south towards Los Angeles. The city of Ellwood, California had just become the site of the first attack on the United States mainland in World War II. I-17, a large, fast, ocean-going submarine, fired approximately 25 shells into two oil refineries and destroyed a derrick and a pump house. There was also damage to the Bankline pier and some private property.1 CDR Nishino had finished providing fireworks in celebration of Washington's Birthday.2 Much richer targets waited to the south. Based on the ultimate result of World War II in the Pacific for Japan, and the lack of discussion of the Japanese submarine force in print, it would be very easy to say that the Japanese submarine force was ineffective in creating a significant impact on a strategic or operational level. This would do a great disservice to a proud and capable part of the Imperial Japanese Navy. Japanese submarines capable of ranging to the American....

Historians have examined the tactical aspects of the Vicksburg campaign in great detail. Since hundreds of articles have already been written on the tactical conduct of the campaign, not much new information can be added to the body of knowledge that already exists. What is lacking in the analysis of the Vicksburg campaign is how it was logistically supported. This thesis analyzes how General Ulysses S. Grant supported the Army of the Tennessee during the campaign. This thesis also reviews the supply organization of the North, since it was this structure that kept Grant's army provisioned for nearly five months in Confederate territory. The conclusion of this thesis differs from the widely held belief that Grant cut loose from his base of supplies right after he landed on the east bank of the Mississippi River. This thesis concludes that Grant was supplied throughout the campaign from supplies drawn from his bases at Milliken'sBend, Young's Point, and Grand Gulf. Finally, this thesis provides supply tables for the Army of the Tennessee. These tables are provided for two reasons: first, to show the amount of supplies the Union army is believed to have required; and second, to illustrate the sheer size of the logistics effort of the Vicksburg campaign. No analysis of the campaign is complete without an understanding of this last point.

Over the past two decades, China's rapid military expansion has raised concern among U. S. policy makers and defense officials. While it publicly claims a policy of "peaceful development," China continues to develop high technology weapons systems and force projection platforms that are widening its military advantage over its neighbors and could possible deny American military access to the region in the event of conflict. China's true ambitions and long-term strategy are difficult to discern, as it is intentionally secretive about its military development and foreign policy. Despite its military buildup and secretive nature, China has not yet shown any intention of conducting strategic military aggression against other nations. However, could China's non-aggressive posture change? And if so, what emerging conditions might indicate that such a change is taking place? This study uses a case study of interwar Germany to determine the factors that led to Germany's strategic aggression, and assesses modern-day China against those factors. Interwar Germany embarked on a rearmament program that produced the massive military force Hitler used to initiate World War II. In comparison, there are clearly substantial differences between Germany and China, but there are also some parallels and areas for concern. Emerging domestic problems could manifest themselves in China over the next two decades - possibly leading to instability - and China is not content with America's military presence in the Western Pacific. If China is unable to maintain its current high levels of economic growth, potential domestic and international problems could destabilize the Chinese Communist Party and provide more aggressive leaders the credibility needed to seize power. The United States can no longer afford to train, and maintain an expensive, Cold War-style military force for an unlikely war. Therefore, it must monitor the military doctrine, domestic climate, international relations, and political conditions within China for negative trends. Provided the United States maintains its advantage in military technology, research, and development, it will likely have enough time to react to changing conditions and prepare its military forces for the right conflict.

Over the past two decades, China's rapid military expansion has raised concern among U. S. policy makers and defense officials. While it publicly claims a policy of "peaceful development," China continues to develop high technology weapons systems and force projection platforms that are widening its military advantage over its neighbors and could possible deny American military access to the region in the event of conflict. China's true ambitions and long-term strategy are difficult to discern, as it is intentionally secretive about its military development and foreign policy. Despite its military buildup and secretive nature, China has not yet shown any intention of conducting strategic military aggression against other nations. However, could China's non-aggressive posture change? And if so, what emerging conditions might indicate that such a change is taking place? This study uses a case study of interwar Germany to determine the factors that led to Germany's strategic aggression, and assesses modern-day China against those factors. Interwar Germany embarked on a rearmament program that produced the massive military force Hitler used to initiate World War II. In comparison, there are clearly substantial differences between Germany and China, but there are also some parallels and areas for concern. Emerging domestic problems could manifest themselves in China over the next two decades - possibly leading to instability - and China is not content with America's military presence in the Western Pacific. If China is unable to maintain its current high levels of economic growth, potential domestic and international problems could destabilize the Chinese Communist Party and provide more aggressive leaders the credibility needed to seize power. The United States can no longer afford to train, and maintain an expensive, Cold War-style military force for an unlikely war. Therefore, it must monitor the military doctrine, domestic climate, international relations, and political conditions within China for negative trends. Provided the United States maintains its advantage in military technology, research, and development, it will likely have enough time to react to changing conditions and prepare its military forces for the right conflict.