U. S. Army Command and General Staff Col

During the first year and a half of the War of 1812 the United States Army fought with little success against a professional British Army and Canadian Militia who lacked troops and supplies due to the ongoing Napoleonic Wars. In October 1813 Great Britain's allies had defeated Napoleon at the Battle of Leipzig. With victory in Europe behind them, the British began diverting battle proven troops and supplies to North America. The perception of this policy changed the complexion of the war to heavily favor the British in numbers of experienced and battle hardened troops. By comparing the Ninth and Tenth Military Districts the question this study will investigate is, "How did the United States Army prepare to face the Napoleonic War veteran British Army during the last year (1814) of the American War of 1812?" The two factors that were most imposing on them during this preparatory phase, besides the enemy, were support and political militaryrelationships. Critical to this study is the political--military relationship between the Secretary of War and his military district commanders. Additionally, the War of 1812 will be used as an example to help the United States understand and gain insights from history about how to initiate homeland defense today.

Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 irrevocably changed the European geopolitical framework. After 1935, Mussolini would come increasingly under Hitler's influence. Hitler would also begin to free Germany from the restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versailles and Anglo-French encirclement. Using 1935 as a point of departure, this book traces the development of the Italo-German coalition, its strategic interests, outlook, commonalities, and areas of contention. The advance of Italo-German interests during from 1935 to the beginning of the Second World War--an era characterized by the Great Depression and appeasement--also created an aura of totalitarian success and collaboration. The Spanish Civil War (1936-1939), Rhineland (1936), Austria (1937), Czechoslovakia (1938), and Albania (1939) lent credence to this perception. This period was also critical to Germany and Italy's efforts in building a coalition. Based on an examination of strategic interests and outlooks, this book analyzes Germany and Italy's mutual efforts at developing their partnership. It also examines their strategic decision-making apparatus to determine their ability to effectively implement strategic decisions. Thus, this book examines the relationship between the Axis partners, the basis of their coalition based on strategic interests, and the organizational environment in their respective countries to develop and implement strategy.

The German General Staff launched Operation Barbarossa in June 1941 assuming the eastern campaign would last only three months. However, within six months after the initiation of hostilities the Red Army blunted the Wehrmacht's attack outside the gates of Moscow, Operation Barbarossa had failed. Although a long standing and professional organization the German General Staff failed to achieve strategic success, despite significant success during the early stages of the campaign. Adolf Hitler's national goal of Russian extermination exceeded the German Army's capabilities. The war lasted nearly four years and resulted in the devastation of western Russia, millions dead and the destruction of Germany. This thesis examines how the divergence between the Wehrmacht's capabilities and Hitler's ideological national objectives affected Operation Barbarossa. Through examination of the historical role the German General Staff held during military operations, this study addresses the linkage between German political and military relations during war. It begins with an analysis of the Prussian General Staff system under Moltke the elder. It follows the staff's development through the wars of German unification, prelude to WW I and, the interwar period leading up to Hitler's rise to power. It concludes with an analysis of Operation Barbarossa and the German General Staff's efforts to achieve strategic victory on the eastern front. Finally it concludes with lessons modern military leaders should learn from the General Staff's mistakes

SS Obersturmbannf hrer Jochen Peiper was one of Germany's most colorful military leaders of World War II with an audacious reputation. The name Peiper will always be linked to the Malm dy Massacre, the death of Belgian civilians and more than seventy American soldiers, but there is still a myth around Peiper. Why was a twenty-nine year old Waffen-SS officer chosen to lead the German spearhead unit during the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944? Peiper was a special leader within the one of the most elite Waffen-SS divisions, the Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler. Peiper was charismatic and extreme loyal to his unit. His men trusted him as a leader, even under the most extreme conditions. In Germany he was a well-known war hero. It was a logical decision that Peiper became the commander of the spearhead unit, but there were other factors leading to this decision: tactical considerations, awe-know-what-to-expect-principle, and Peiper was lucky that he was still alive and serving in the Waffen-SS.

Organized religion has played a significant role in warfare throughout history. From the time Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt into the new Promised Land until 2001 and the undertaking of the Global War on Terrorism, religion in one form or fashion has impacted the individual soldier. The United States' Civil War from 1861 to 1865 was no different. The purpose of this thesis is to look at the events leading up to the Civil War and the conflict itself from the viewpoint of the Southern Baptist denomination. Specifically, the thesis focuses on the reasons for the creation of the Southern Baptist Convention, as well as examines how the denomination supported the war effort. It looksat the wide range of individual contributions of the denomination's chaplains, missionaries, evangelists and colporteurs. It also details how important the use of religious tracts were in ministering to soldiers. As we continue our Global War on Terrorism, the information contained within this paper should serve as a reminder to those men and women at the Southern Baptist Seminaries that religious service to the army is still necessary and that it comes in many forms. As far as the human dimension and the spiritual fitness of soldiers are concerned, what worked in 1863 is still applicable in 2003

George Washington as the Intelligence Chief, Spy Master, and Commander in Chief of the Continental Army. It investigates the critical role he played in shaping the American Revolution with the use of espionage, deception, and intelligence operations. It initiates with a review of the beginning of the American Revolution and establishes British and American dispositions, preparations, and intentions. It then transitions to the initial American intelligence failures between 1775 through 1776. The work then addresses how Washington established his intelligence networks in New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia. The monograph highlights the victory and contributions of Washington's spy networks culminating in a Colonial victory at Yorktown in 1781. Finally, it concludes with a comparative analysis and lessons for today's operational artists and compares Washington's intelligence operations against Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence to demonstrate his timeless contributions to the American victory. George Washington was instrumental in delivering a victory during the American Revolution through his effective management of intelligence resources, skillful leadership, and timely alliances. He entered the American Revolution having first-hand experience with costly intelligence failures, which prompted him to focus extensive resources and efforts toward intelligence. He skillfully led the Continental Army by developing timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence that allowed him to avoid battles he knew he would lose and enter battles he knew he would win.