U.S. Army War College

After having been fueled by the events of the distant and recent past, the current wars in the former Yugoslavia finally may be grinding to a halt. An understanding of that past, and of how history and myth combine to influence the present and help to define the future in the Balkans, is no less relevant today than it was two years ago when the original version of this monograph was published. Events of the intervening years have largely validated the insights and conclusions offered in the initial report. That said, strategic conditions have evolved, and two years of additional study and analysis provide a greater understanding of the long-term roots of conflict in the Balkans, as well as afirmer grasp of the proximate historical factors that contributed to the outbreak of violence. In this revised monograph, the first four chapters that provide the historical examination of the Balkan enigma remain substantially unchanged. Details have been added, and interpretations modified attenuated or accentuated as the author s understanding of events has matured. The last chapter of theoriginal version has been expanded into three chapters. Chapter 5 first offers insights that are drawn from the first portion of the report. Because the passage of time has foreclosed some alternatives, and the changed strategic conditions have created the possibility for new options to be examined, the policy assessments that are now Chapter 6 have been substantially rewritten. Similarly, a new Chapter 7, Conclusions, containsrevised reflections on the preceding analysis. Despite the revisions, the focus of the monograph remains on the tangled history of the region, and how policy options fit into the larger historical context that has influenced, and will continue to affect, the course of events in the Balkans.

The premise of most Western thinking on counterinsurgency is that success depends on establishing a perception of legitimacy among local populations. The path to legitimacy is often seen as the improvement of governance in the form of effective and efficient administration of government and public services. However, good governance is not the only possible basis for claims to legitimacy. This monograph considers whether, in insurgencies where ethno-religious identities are politically salient, claims to legitimacy may rest more on the identity of who governs, rather than on how those people govern. Building on a synthesis of scholarship and policy regarding insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, the politics of ethnic identity, governance, and legitimacy, the author presents an analytic framework for examining these issues and then applies that framework to two detailed local case studies of American counterinsurgency operations in Iraq: Ramadi from 2004-05; and Tal Afar from 2005- 06. These case studies are based on primary research, including dozens of interviews with participants and eyewitnesses. In Ramadi, identity politics clearly trumped quality of governance in shaping the course of events. The grievances that fueled the insurgency had far more to do with a deep sense of disenfranchisement within Iraq's Sunni community and the related fear of sectarian persecution than it did with any failure in the government's performance. As a result, the evidence from this case points toward major limits to how much popular loyalty and legitimacy could be won through the improvement of governance. Other factors-namely security itself and identity-based concepts of legitimate rule (both tribal and sectarian)-appeared more decisive during the time of the case study. Moreover, the tribal "Awakening" movement that took hold in Ramadi the following year strongly supports this interpretation of events. The Awakening seems to have stemmed from two key changes in Ramadi and its surrounding Anbar province. First was the exhaustion of the population with violence and terror at the hands of Islamic extremists in their midst. Second was a new willingness of the Coalition to recognize the legitimacy of local tribal rule in spite of the sectarian tension this rule introduced between local and national sovereignty. Tal Afar's story is quite different, but suggests a similar conclusion. While the quality of governance mattered in the way both the population and the counterinsurgents perceived legitimacy, improvements in governance in Tal Afar were more a consequence than a cause of successful counterinsurgency. Without both the U. S. Army's dense presence in the city and its intensive focus on brokering compromises among the city's largely sectarian tribal conflicts, improvements in governance likely would never have taken root. Governance and political compromise between sectarian groups clearly reinforced each other there, but interviews with participants in the counterinsurgency in Tal Afar suggest that improvements in governance were of secondary importance in reducing violence inthe city. The cases examined here yield ample evidence that ethno-religious identity politics do shape counterinsurgency outcomes in important ways, and also offer qualified support for the argument that addressing identity politics may be more critical than good governance to counterinsurgent success. However, the cases do not discredit the utility to counterinsurgents of providing good governance, and they corroborate the traditional view that population security is the most important element of successful counterinsurgency strategy. Key policy implications include the importance of making strategy development as sensitive as possible to the dynamics of identity politics, and to local variations and the complexity in causal relationships among popular loyalties, grievances, and political violence.

The 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah has generated a vast amount of academic and military studies, including a number from the Strategic Studies Institute. Specifically, authors have tried to identify the new patterns of warfare through this conflict and sometimes have even called it the first illustration of "hybrid war." This new monograph by Dr. Jean-Loup Samaan does not look at the war itself but rather at its aftermath, both in Israel and Lebanon. It starts from an obvious paradox: Despite the regional turmoil and the absence of a settlement between Israel and Hezbollah, stability has prevailed since 2006. While over the same time frame the Middle East has been experiencing one of its most unpredictable periods in the last decades, the border area between Israel and Lebanon has remained quiet. Dr. Samaan explains that this paradox can be understood through the use of deterrence theories.

On November 23, 2013, China's Ministry of National Defense spokesman announced that a new air defense intercept zone (ADIZ) will be established by the government to include the Diaoyu, or Senkaku Islands. Sovereignty over these islands is disputed by Japan, China, and Taiwan. The new ADIZ also included a submerged rock that falls inside overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) claimed by China, Japan, and South Korea. Pundits and policy analysts quickly engaged in a broad debate about whether China's expanded ADIZ is designed to create tension in Asia, or is part of a broader plan to impose a new definition of China's territorial space in the Asia-Pacific region. Meanwhile, to deal with cyber penetrations attributed to the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), the U. S. Departments of Justice, Homeland Security, and State are devising new means to protect intellectual property and secrets from the PLA's computer network operations.

Los Zetas, which appeared on the scene in the late-1990s, have raised the bar for cruelty among Mexican Mafiosi. Traditionally, the country's narcotics cartels maximized earnings by working hand-in-glove with police, military officers, intelligence agencies, union leaders, and office holders affiliated with the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), which dominated the political landscape from 1929 to 2000. An informal set of rules benefited both the drug capos and their allies in government posts. On the one hand, officials raked in generous payments from the malefactors for turning a blind eye to-or employing the Federal Judicial Police and other agencies to facilitate-the growing, storage, processing, and export of marijuana, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamines. In return for this treatment, the kingpins were expected to keep their substances away from children, leave civilians (and especially Americans) alone, and limit their arsenals to weapons less powerful than those possessed by the armed forces.

By 2010, it was possible to see al-Qaeda as an organization in decline. It had lost militarily in Iraq and seemed politically irrelevant to the popular revolts during the Arab Spring. However, the Syrian civil war has allowed it to rebuild and, in the form of the local Al Nusrah Front, use a revised political and military strategy. This important monograph considers if these apparent gains can be sustained or whether al-Qaeda's ideology will again alienate other salafist groups and the wider Sunni population. Dr. Azeem Ibrahim bases his report on available evidence, interviews, and visits to Syria. At the moment, the Assad government seems to be making some gains, and the rebel forces are split into three broad groups of the Free Syrian Army, the Islamic Front (backed by the Gulf States), and two al-Qaeda groups (Al Nusrah and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS]). ISIS has alienated all the other factions and is likely to retreat to Iraq, but the Al Nusrah Front...

Since 1983, the mission of the U. S. Army Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (OEMA) has been to provide a sound basis for policy and planning for the Army of the future. Founded by General Maxwell Thurman, this Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA) asset is nested within the U. S. Military Academy's Department of Social Sciences. The intellectual freedom and community-of-practice provided by this academic setting promotes out-of-the-box thinking, allowing OEMA analysts to devise solutions to strategic challenges facing not just the Army and the Department of Defense (DoD), but other government agencies as well. In the last 4 years, OEMA has devoted a significant amount of its research to officer "talent management," systematic planning for the right number and type of officers to meet the Army's needs at all levels and at all times so that the majority of them are employed optimally. Despite a commissioned officer focus, many of OEMA's talent management principles generalize to any labor force...

The U. S. Army performs a number of critical missions across the vast Indo-Asia-Pacific region. These include underwriting deterrence, building coalition capability, strengthening institutional capacity among partner defense establishments, maintaining interoperability, promoting military professionalism, building operational access, and conducting humanitarian assistance missions. For many, it may come as a surprise to know that almost all of the many Army activities and events that support these missions outside of Northeast Asia are conducted with U. S. Army forces based in the 50 states, often Alaska and Washington State. The roughly 22,000 U. S. Army Soldiers based in South Korea and Japan are focused largely on deterring North Korea from large-scale aggression, and assuring South Korea and other countries of the steadfastness of Washington's alliance commitment.

When U. S. forces departed Iraq at the end of 2011, they left behind unresolved problems relating to that country's governance, notably concerning the relationship between the federal authority in Baghdad and the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in the north. Today, disputes over the territorial delineation of the KRG remain a source of tension, while the discovery of significant reserves of oil and gas within and straddling the borders of the KRG has raised the stakes. Tensions have been heightened still further by the determination of the KRG authorities to pursue an energy policy independent of the central government. This has involved entering into lucrative energy exploration and exploitation agreements with a number of major energy companies, among them the U. S.-based ExxonMobil and Chevron, and moving ahead with an energy partnership with neighboring Turkey involving the construction of direct pipelines across their shared border.

The evolution of communications networks into the cyber warfighting domain presents challenges across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) spectrum. The Department of Defense (DOD) created new joint and service headquarters to address these challenges and to address the cyberspace risks to national security. While these headquarters have been able to make some progress in addressing cyber challenges, the current DOD approach to cyber depends on antiquated doctrinal concepts, mission command constructs, and indefensible network architectures. No single organization in the DOD has the responsibility to build, operate and defend cyber networks. The lack of a clear cyber chain of command greatly hinders cyberspace operations. Also, the current DOD network architecture is so complex that military cyberspace is indefensible. Compounding these problems, the current service-centric cyber approach is extremely inefficient. Can a DOD enterprise approach to cyberspace correct these deficiencies, effectively support the GCCs and enable USCYBERCOM to accomplish its mission?

U. S. foreign policy toward Iran focuses on a dual-track approach, engaging in diplomacy and leveraging economic sanctions. Despite more than 30 years of pursuing this approach, the U. S. has failed to lessen Iran's threat to regional and international stability. Iran continues to pursue and come ever-closer to establishing a nuclear capability. This historical approach has only proven to be a mild distraction to Iran's goal. The U. S. should pursue an aggressive third approach - establishing red lines backed a credible and sustained threat of military action. Instruments of statecraft or "power" refer to the diplomatic, military, economic, and informational means used to achieve national military objectives - yet, efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities have not benefitted from the use of all of these instruments. Thus, U. S. policy undervalues the military instrument in changing Tehran's pursuit of nuclear weapons, support to terrorism, and threats against its neighbors. Although U. S. administration officials continue to state "all options" are on the table, Iran seemingly continues to hedge its bet that the military instrument will not be used against them in a lethal capacity. Prudently implemented, the military instrument provides a level of synergy needed to strengthen diplomatic and economic pressure against Iran.

Operation Iraqi Freedom was innovative, flexible, and achieved stunningly rapidsuccess, properly setting the stage for conflict termination and resolution. Upon announcing the transition to conflict resolution, U. S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld revealed that the U. S.-led coalition was attempting unfamiliar and unique methods to resolve the conflict. U. S. policy in Iraq created a two-track process, security and politics, under the supervision of theU. S. Department of defense (DoD). This Research Project analyzes U. S. Policy in Iraq regarding conflict resolution. As is evident with the current situation in Iraq, finishing a war is more problematic than starting one. Many who are personally involved with the process declare that U. S. policy has harvested tremendous success towards Iraq regaining sovereignty. Many others, including the U. S. installed Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), the UN, other UN Security Council members, andmembers of the U. S. Congress, however, question the legitimacy of U. S. policy and the effect that it is having on reestablishing Iraqi sovereignty. This book first examines initial U. S. policy in Iraq, and its perceived strengths and weaknesses. Then it offers a solution by looking at three current policy options on the part of the U. S., the IGC, and the French juxtapositioned against the historical example of three conflict resolution case studies involving the U. S. This proposal can improve legitimacy in all facets of the project, produce long lasting conflict resolution in Iraq, and potentially stabilize the region. In the shadows of the innovative and flexible "war" plan that rapidly terminated major combat operations, the U. S. administration has to be bold enough to design and execute a similarly designed "peace" plan. Furthermore, these considerations are relevant to future military interventions considering this nation's current Military Strategy and increased global commitments in a hostile strategic environment.

The United States national security and military strategies articulate the need to transform our forces and major defense institutions to meet the challenges of the 21st century. The defense acquisition process and its industrial base comprise a significant economic institution in need of transformation to ensure that research, development, and acquisition efforts remain relevant to current, future, and emergency national security requirements. Transformation, therefore, must include efforts to improve the defense acquisition process that would subsequently enable it to deliver products and services that provide desired capabilities. Perpetual suggestions of acquisition reform often focus on regulatory and statutory leverage and process reform. Acquisition reform, stable appropriations, spiral development, and innovative "collaboration" are valuable recommendations. However, few of them offer the significant benefits derived through market leverage, namely competition. This paper reviews the weary acquisition process, the changing industrial landscape, and an emerging government policy, then analyzes some ways the DOD should consider to leverage market conditions and improve competition as a means totransform the defense industrial base. Competition can help reduce cycle times, lower costs, and improve innovation and weapon systems performance throughout the weapon systems lifecycle, from development through sustainment. Moreover, competition will be imperative early in the R&D phases, given the growing enthusiasm for evolutionary acquisition and quicker development and production cycle times. As witnessed in both commercial and defense industries, competition not regulation, compels industry to integrate advanced technologies into producible systems and deploy them to the marketplace--in this case the warfighter--in the shortest time practicable.

As has North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union (EU) is adapting to the changing regional and global security environment in the wake of the Cold War. Almost immediately, Europe began to recognize that itcould not barricade itself from the world and live off the peace dividend while instability rampaged along its border. The existing European security organizations (Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe OSCE], Western European Union WEU]) were ill-suited to deal with the host of new challenges, and as the Balkans conflicts revealed, the European contribution to NATO had fallen woefully behind. European relevance in the security arena required the EU to develop an expeditionary force capability. After nearly a decade of evolution, the concept of a European expeditionary force developed and formed the centerpiece ofthe European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) generated during the 1999 EU Helsinki Summit. Primarily intended for the Petersberg Tasks- humanitarian and rescue, peacekeeping, and use of combat forces in crisis management including peacemaking-the expeditionary force shall comprise 50,000 to 60,000 troops, with an additional 140,000 troops in support of extended operations. A 5,000-strong police contingent shall supplement the force by providing crisis management expertise. To wean Europe from the United States, the EUwill procure sufficient air- and sealift (and sharing of airframes within the EU under the Air Transport and Air Refuelling Exchange of Services (ATARES) agreement; logistics; Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR); and combat support to provide it with the capability to deploy the force within 60 days and sustain it for a year