U.S. Army War College

Terrorism currently presents a wide range of issues in the international arena. These are discussed both in educational institutes and shape government policy. The terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001, and the subsequent terror attacks in different parts of the world, have ignited wide concern. Saudi Arabia has suffered a series of terrorist attacks in recent decades of different types and magnitudes. Responding to the most recent attack of 12 May 2003, which was well organized and synchronized, the Saudi Government mobilized its resources to combat this threat for the security of the country, and to participate in cooperative efforts with the world community. Significant efforts have been made in this regard. These include economic/financial, educational, and media efforts, to halt and eradicate terrorism in all possible ways. Direct domestic security operations are primarily focused on the dismantling of existing terrorist cells. Assisting these efforts will lead to a desirable end-state that is beneficial not only for the security of Saudi Arabia, but for the security of the whole world as well. The purpose of this paper is to examine the efforts that have been put in effect by Saudi Arabia in fighting terrorism, and to recommend actions in assisting and improving these efforts

Since the beginning of human history, violence has existed as a means to achieve political, social or economic goals. The use of violence is related to religion. The followers of new religious movements have been persecuted by the followers of established religious movements. Today, there are many religious groups accused of terrorist acts in the world. One of these religions is Islam. The western media for a long period of time has tried to mark theIslamic faith as a religion promoting hostility, violence, and terrorism, all carried out in the name of God. This got worse after the tragic attack on the United States that took place on September 11, 2001 by Islamic militants. A detailed examination of Islam, its history and tenets, will reveal that the religion is not the cause of terrorism, but a victim of terrorism.

The War on Drugs has been waged for decades with little net effect on the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. High profit potential, poverty, and corruption within source countries coupled with steady US demand and porous borders have created what seems to have become a lasting condition. To-date, the immutable law of supply and demand has provena more potent factor in governing the flow of illicit drugs than all the instruments of US national power combined. Current US strategy focuses a majority of effort on existential causes and on lower-level actors, expending resources without significantly affecting the drug trade itself. A shift in focus to profit, as the financial center of gravity, and to internal demand may have much greater impact on curtailing the drug trade and better serve long-term US national security interests. What is the nature of this war? What drives national policy? How do second and third order effects impact US interests and the way the United States is perceived? Is there a better alternative? This book explores these issues in view of the current threat and in consideration of a future environment in which resources may be further constrained.

Seismic cultural and political shifts are under way in the Arab Gulf monarchies. The political upheavals and transitions that have swept through the Arab world over the last 2 years have not toppled the Arab Gulf rulers, but did not leave them untouched either. Rulers of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states face heightened internal and external challenges and uncertainties. Pro-democracy protests and calls are extending from Bahrain to other oil-rich countries of the Arabian Peninsula. The expectations of GCC citizens, particularly the educated youth, are increasingly moving from socio-economic demands to political ones. They are now not only asking for jobs or wage increases, but also for more political participationand accountability. Chief among internal challenges is the resurgence in several GCC countries, particularly Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, of a decades-long sectarian rift between the Sunni regimes and their Shia subjects. The Gulf regimes' already tense relations with Iran have worsened on the basis of alleged Iranian interference inflaming sectarian tensions in Bahrain and across the broader region.

Nigeria's continuation as a cohesive functioning state is important to the United States due to the bilateral economic relationship, Nigeria's influence in the international community, and its pivotal role for U. S. interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. Despite the importance of Nigeria to the United States, the centrifugal forces that tear at the country's unity and the centripetal forces which have kept Nigeria whole are not well understood and are rarely examined. Those who make or execute U. S. policy will find it difficult to advance U. S. interests in Africa without an understanding of the pressures that bind and tear Nigeria. This monograph examines why Nigeria is important to the United States, and the historic, religious, cultural, political, physical, demographic, and economic factors that will determine if Nigeria remains whole. It identifies Nigeria's major fault lines and makes policy recommendations for the United States to support Nigerians in their efforts to maintain a functioning and integrated state and, by so doing, advance U. S. interests

Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has intervened in the affairs of sovereign states on several occasions by using military force. A combination of humanitarian sentiments and practical policy considerations motivated both Democratic and Republican presidents to become involved in civil wars and humanitarian crises. These interventions met with mixed results, and even the most successful missions encountered serious problems. Improving the conduct of such interventions requires understanding these past operations as well as considering conflicts in which the United States chose not to intervene. This Letort Paper covers U. S. military interventions in civil conflicts since the end of the Cold War. It defines intervention as the use of military force to achieve a specific objective (i.e., deliver humanitarian aid, support revolutionaries or insurgents, protect a threatened population, etc.) and focuses on the phase of the intervention in which kinetic operations occurred. The Paper considers five conflicts in which the United States intervened: Somalia (1992-93), Haiti (1994), Bosnia (1995), Kosovo (1999), and Libya (2011). It also reviews two crises in which Washington might have intervened but chose not to: Rwanda (1994) and Syria (2011-12). The author examines each case using five broad analytical questions: 1. Could the intervention have achieved its objective at an acceptable cost in blood and treasure? 2. What policy considerations prompted the intervention? 3. How did the United States intervene? 4. Was the intervention followed by a Phase 4 stability operation? 5. Did Washington have a viable exit strategy? Answering these questions reveals distinct patterns in U. S. interventions. Despite their frequent reference to American values, Presidents have rarely intervened on purely humanitarian grounds. Some strategic interest usually underlay even the most seemingly altruistic missions. Although they had the means to intervene unilaterally, every administration sought international approval for intervention and usually entered a threatened state as part of a coalition, often one made up of North Atlantic Treaty Organization allies. Whenever possible, the United States sought to intervene with airpower alone. It avoided deploying ground troops, and when it did so, made sure that those forces operated under robust rules of engagement with rigorous force protection pursuing limited objectives unlikely to cause casualties. A United Nations Peacekeeping Mission usually followed American interventions, and the Pentagon always insisted that developing a viable exit strategy be part of the planning process for each mission, although this requirement was not always met. From the patterns evident in past campaigns lessons to inform the conduct of future missions can be derived. The United States should only intervene when doing so has a reasonable chance of success. When intervention becomes necessary, the White House should seek international approval and operate as part of a coalition or alliance with airpower being its primary contribution. If it must deploy ground troops, it should keep the American footprint small and withdraw forces as soon as possible.

This book analyzes Brazilian grand strategy under President Luiz In cio Lula da Silva. During Lula's nearly 8 years in office, he has pursued a multipronged grand strategy aimed at hastening the transition from unipolarity and Western economic hegemony to a multipolar order in which international rules, norms, and institutions are more favorable to Brazilian interests. Lula has done so by emphasizing three diplomatic strategies: soft balancing against the United States, building coalitions to magnify Brazilian negotiating power, and seeking to position Brazil as the leader of a more united South America. This strategy has successfully raised Brazil's profile and increased its diplomatic flexibility, but it has also exposed the country to four potent strategic dilemmas that could complicate or undermine its ascent. First, issues like poor infrastructure, rampant crime, and excessive taxation and regulation of the economy may impede Brazil from attaining the strong economic growth and social cohesion necessary to sustain such an ambitious strategic project. Second, in dealing with South America, the Brazilian political class has not reconciled its desire for regional leadership with its unwillingness to share power or economic benefits with its neighbors. As a result, many of these countries perceive Brazil's diplomacy to be domineering and its trade policies to be narrowly self-interested, and they have thus refused to support Lula's bid for regional preeminence. Third, at the global level, the long-termcohesion and effectiveness of Lula's various diplomatic partnerships is open to question. Fourth, while Lula has maintained good relations with Washington, his grand strategy unavoidably entails a growing risk of conflict over issues like Iran, trade policy, and the U. S. diplomatic and military role in Latin America. Looking ahead, the efficacy of Brazilian grand strategy- and its consequences for U. S. interests-will be contingent on how Lula's successors address these dilemmas.

In the four decades since President Nixon first declared war on drugs the U. S.counterdrug strategy has remained virtually unchanged - favoring supply-reduction, law enforcement and criminal sanctions over demand-reduction, treatment and education. While the annual counterdrug budget has ballooned from $100 million to $25 billion, drug availability of most illicit drugs remains at an all-time high. The human cost is staggering - nearly 40,000 drug-related deaths in the U. S. annually. The societal impact, in purely economic terms, is now estimated to be approximately $200 billion per year. And the global illicit drug industry now accounts for 1 percent of all commerce on the planet - approximately $320 billion annually. Legalization is almost certainly not theanswer; however, an objective analysis of available data confirms that: 1) the U. S. has pursued essentially the same flawed supply-reduction strategy for forty years; and 2) simply increasing the amount of money invested each year in this strategy will not make it successful. Faced with impending budget cuts and a future of budget austerity, policymakers must replace the longstanding U. S. counterdrug strategy with a pragmatic, science-based, demand-reduction strategy that offers some prospect of reducing the economic and societal impacts of illicit drugs on American society

Americans cannot envision a day when the U. S. is not a superpower. Although it is impossible to know how long America will be able to sustain its status as the world's sole superpower, many historical and quantitative trends can be examined to predict potential future outcomes. Historian Paul Kennedy's seminal work The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers provides a context for discussion of former empires by focusing on the economic power of nations. Based on this analysis of previous world powers, Kennedy argues that a nation's economy is central to its overall power, fueling its military strength and foreign enterprises. Modern U. S. national security strategy is based on four elements of national power: Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic (DIME). This paper analyzes the U. S. strengths and weaknesses in the DIME formula, while contrasting the U. S. strategic position with those budding world powers identified by former U. S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in his 1994 book Diplomacy. He states that the 21st Century "will contain at least six major power centers - the U. S., Europe, China, Japan, Russia, and probably India." Subsequently, statistical indicators will be used for each area of the DIME construct from which to evaluate the present day strategic situation and project potential outcomes. This paper analyzes the strategic position of each nation-state competitor. It makes recommendations for U. S. policy changes to improve national security strategy implementation and preserve America's place as a world power.

Through the prism of operations in Afghanistan, this monograph examines how the U. S. Government's Strategic Communication (SC) and, in particular, the Department of Defense's (DoD) Information Operations (IO) and Military Information Support to Operations (MISO) programs, have contributed to U. S. strategic and foreign policy objectives. It will assess whether current practice is fit for purpose in possible future operations and will argue that the U. S. Government has for many years been encouraged by large contractors to approach communications objectives through techniques heavily influenced by advertising and marketing. These techniques attempt to change hostile attitudes to the United States and its foreign policy in the belief that this will subsequently reduce hostile behavior. The author will argue that while an attitudinal approach may work in convincing U. S. citizens to buy consumer products, it does not easily translate to the conflict- and crisis-riven societies to which it has been applied. In these cases, the United States would have been far better advised to work directly to mitigate undesired behaviors, and forego attempts to change the underlying attitudes. The author argues that the United States must now actively operationalize the significant body of social and behavioral science research which has become available, in order to mitigate specific undesired behaviors on the ground: either in advance, as a tool of strategic deterrence in Phase 0 operations or in Phase 1, 2, 3, and 4 operations as a component coupled to conventional military and diplomatic responses. The monograph closes with a brief examination of Chinese and Russian developments in this highly specialized area.

In March 2012, the government of Mali, one of the most touted symbols of Africa's democratic potential fell in a military-executed coup. At the same time, a 4-decade-old rebellion among Tuaregs seeking autonomy or independence reached new heights, fueled by weapons from Muammar Gadaffi's fallen government and perhaps the belief that the Arab Spring could extend to northern Mali. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and their allies were quick to capitalize on the increasing chaos in a territory characterized by lack of government control and poverty and seized the major cities in the north. The imposition of a severe form of Islamic law and a growing food crisis sent the population fleeing south across Mali's international borders. The French-led military intervention, Operation SERVAL, ousted the militants from the main cities in the north, but did not address the crisis' underlying issues including the grievances that feed the Tuareg nationalist movement, the establishment of a civilianled government in Mali, and the near- and long-term threats to food security. The eruption of this crisis also demands a critical look at the Sahel's regional security framework, and the U. S. role in it. In Part I, Background to the Crisis, the author explores the deeper background to the crisis and sets it within Mali's historical and geographical context. Though it was a major world power in the Middle Ages the former Malian Empire had long lost its economic strength by the time the European countries colonized Africa. To control their territory, the French used military means to try to bring the pastoralists in the Sahel, such as the Tuareg, under control. Independent since 1960, Mali struggled to develop political institutions and achieve economic growth. After years of dictatorial rule, Mali transitioned to democracy in 1992. Despite considerable economic aid from the United States, it remained one of the poorest countries in the region. Indeed, the neighborhood, the Sahel zone that runs east to west through the continent, is a zone of poor, ungoverned spaces, sometimes referred to as the "arc of instability." In Part II: The Crisis Unfolds, the author examines the recent events that created the volatile conditions leading to the crisis. The Tuareg nationalist movement has existed for over 40 years; there have been at least four periods of rebellion, and military force has been the primary response from the central government. Gadaffi had long been a supporter of the Tuareg, employing them in trusted positions within his military. The fall of his regime sent many Tuaregs home, laden with heavy weaponry, escalating the rebellion to new heights. Due to a steady expansion into the Sahel zone over the last decade, AQIM was well poised to capitalize on the anarchy and seize the north's major cities. The fall of Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal to AQIM illustrates the need for a critical examination of the U. S.- led regional security framework, which is the focus of Part III: The Regional Security Framework in the Sahel. Numerous factors hindered the effectiveness of this framework, including the newness of the military partnerships with regional governments, their differing strategic level interests, and the wide range of capabilities among their armed forces. Building partner counterterrorism capability to meet the transnational al-Qaeda threat was the primary focus of the security framework through programs such as the Pan Sahel Initiative (PSI) and the Trans Sahel Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). However, it was ill-prepared for a complex crisis that included a largely secular nationalist rebellion, the overthrow of a civilian government by U. S.-trained soldiers, and a large-scale humanitarian crisis.

The Marshall Plan has been heralded as one of the most important and successful foreign policies of this century. Historians generally agree that it was precisely the right medicine needed to heal wounds and restore confidence on both sides of the Atlantic following the destructive Second World War. It has also been credited with helping contain the spread of communism and providing the foundation for an enduring alliance that has produced years of peace in Europe. The Marshall Plan, however, has also been criticized as a selfish U. S. endeavor and a program that divided Europe. The purpose of this essay is to investigate the role of this widely acclaimed plan in U. S. post-war interests in Europe. It includes analyses of the plan's origins, goals, mechanics, and overall effectiveness. It also examines both the short and long-term economic, political and military significance of the Marshall Plan, including its relationship to the Truman Doctrine and containment policy. Finally, it focuses on how this historic plan helped further U. S. interests by forging a collective security mechanism and a strong economic political and military alliance network that has shaped Western Europe as it is known today.