U. S. Department of Homeland Security

Many people think of a house of worship as a safe area where violence and emergencies cannot affect them. However, violence in houses of worship is not a new phenomenon. In addition to violent acts, fires, tornados, floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, and arson also affect houses of worship. With many incidents occurring with little to no warning, many houses of worship are developing and updating plans and procedures to ensure the safety and security of their congregations, staff, and facilities. In collaboration with other houses of worship and community partners (i.e., governmental entities that have a responsibility in the plan, including first responders, public health officials, and mental health officials), houses of worship can take steps to plan for these potential emergencies through the creation of an emergency operations plan (EOP). Additionally, community organizations and private sector entities may have a role in the plan. Houses of worship are distinctive settings in that congregants share a common bond and have a predisposition to volunteer. The demographics of a congregation often mean that children and the elderly are present and may need assistance. This guide provides houses of worship with information regarding emergency operations planning for the spectrum of threats and hazards they may face. It discusses actions that may be taken before, during, and after an incident in order to reduce the impact on property and any loss of life and it encourages every house of worship to develop an EOP. The Departments issuing this guidance are providing examples of good practices and matters to consider for planning and implementation purposes. The guidance does not create any requirements beyond those included in applicable law and regulations, or create any additional rights for any person, entity, or organization. Moreover, the Departments fully understand that congregations may approach some of these issues differently than government and other community organizations. At the same time, the Departments would like to assist congregations that are interested in emergency operations planning, and this guidance is offered in that spirit. The information presented in this document generally constitutes informal guidance and provides examples that may be helpful. The inclusion of certain references does not imply any endorsement of any documents, products, or approaches. Other resources may be equally helpful. It is recommended that planning teams responsible for developing and revising a house of worship's EOP use this document to guide their efforts. To gain the most from this guide, users should read the entire document prior to initiating their planning efforts and refer back to it throughout the planning process.1 The guide is organized in four sections: The principles of emergency operations planning A process for developing, implementing, and continually refining a house of worship's EOP with community partners A discussion of the form and function of a house of worship's EOP A closer look that discusses house of worship emergency planning in the event of an active shooter situation. This guide is designed to be scalable for use by small to large-sized houses of worship in order to help navigate the planning process. Used in its entirety, this guide provides information on the fundamentals of planning and their application. At a minimum, houses of worship are encouraged to complete the planning process and develop a basic plan. This guide does not impose any new Federal requirements. While some Federal requirements may apply to houses of worship that receive Federal funding, they are not addressed in this document. For houses of worship that also operate a school, please see the Guide for Developing High-quality School Emergency Operations Plans for planning considerations specific to the school environment.

The purpose of this preparation guide is to help you prepare to take the Special Agent Entrance Exam (SAEE). This guide will familiarize you with the sections of the SAEE and provide you with sample test questions and explanations for the correct answers to these questions. The preparation guide is organized into three chapters. The first chapter provides an introduction to the test, to include summary information about the five sections of the test. The second chapter provides detailed instructions of each test section and sample test questions with explanations. The final chapter provides information on test preparation including test taking tips.

Industrial control systems are an integral part of critical infrastructure, helping facilitate operations in vital sectors such as electricity, oil and gas, water, transportation, and chemical. A growing issue with cybersecurity and its impact on industrial control systems have highlighted some fundamental risks to critical infrastructures. To address cybersecurity issues for industrial control systems, a clear understanding of the security challenges and specific defensive countermeasures is required. A holistic approach, one that uses specific countermeasures to create an aggregated security posture, can help defend against cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities that affect an industrial control system. This approach, often referred to as "defense-in-depth," can be applied to industrial control systems and can provide for a flexible and useable framework for improving cybersecurity defenses. Concerns in regard to cybersecurity and control systems are related to both the legacy nature of some of the systems as well as the growing trend to connect industrial control systems to other networks. These concerns have lead to a number of identified vulnerabilities and have introduced new categories of threats that have not been seen before in the industrial control systems domain. Many of the legacy systems may not have appropriate security capabilities that can defend against modern day threats, and the requirements for availability can preclude using contemporary cybersecurity solutions. An industrial control system's connectivity to a corporate, vendor, or peer network can exacerbate this problem. This book provides insight into some of the more prominent cyber risk issues and presents them in the context of industrial control systems. It provides commentary on how mitigations strategies can be developed for specific problems and provides direction on how to create a defense-in-depth security program for control system environments. The goal is to provide guidance regarding cyber mitigation strategies and how to apply them specifically to an industrial control systems environment.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Privacy Office (DHS Privacy Office or Office) is providing this report to Congress pursuant to Section 804 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act), entitled the Federal Agency Data Mining Reporting Act of 2007 (Data Mining Reporting Act or the Act). This report discusses activities currently deployed or under development in the Department that meet the Data Mining Reporting Act's definition of data mining, and provides the information set out in the Act's reporting requirements for data mining activities. In the 2011 DHS Data Mining Report, the DHS Privacy Office discussed the following Department programs that engage in data mining, as defined by the Data Mining Reporting Act: (1) The Automated Targeting System (ATS), which is administered by U. S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and includes modules for inbound (ATS-N) and outbound (ATS-AT) cargo, land border crossings (ATS-L), and passengers (ATS-P); and(2) The Data Analysis and Research for Trade Transparency System (DARTTS), which is administered by U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). This year's report, covering the period December 2011 through December 2012, presents the complete descriptions of ATS-N, ATS-AT, ATS-L, ATS-P, and DARTTS provided in the 2011 DHS Data Mining Report, with updates on modifications, additions, and other developments that have occurred in the current reporting year, including use of ATS by DHS components other than CBP. In addition, the DHS Privacy Office has identified two new uses of ATS that are discussed below: the vetting of non-immigrant and immigrant visa applications in ATS-P for the U. S. Department of State; and the United States Coast Guard's Interagency Operations Center ATS-Enhanced Watchkeeper System. The 2011 Report included a brief summary of CBP's Analytical Framework for Intelligence (AFI), which was then in development. This year's report includes a detailed description of AFI as an operational system. Additional information on DARTTS and on the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Secure Flight Program's use of ATS is being provided separately to Congress in two annexes to this report that contain Law Enforcement Sensitive Information and Sensitive Security Information, respectively. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended (Homeland Security Act), expressly authorizes the Department to use data mining, among other analytical tools, in furtherance of its mission. DHS exercises its authority to engage in data mining in the programs discussed in this report, all of which the DHS Chief Privacy Officer has reviewed for potential impact on privacy. The Chief Privacy Officer's authority for reviewing DHS data mining activities stems from three principal sources: the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended (Privacy Act); the E-Government Act of 2002 (E-Government Act); and Section 222 of the Homeland Security Act, which states that the Chief Privacy Officer is responsible for "assuring that the Department's] use of technologies sustains, and does not erode, privacy protections relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of personal information.