United States Army Command and General S

This study investigates the methods by which President John F. Kennedy arrived atdecisions to deploy the military in the conduct of foreign policy. Specifically, the events covered are the Bay of Pigs, which represents the nadir of Kennedy's foreign policy experience, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, regarded as his high watermark as a world leader. Further, this study examines how effectively Kennedy employed the military once he arrived at the decision to deploy them in pursuit of his policies. President Kennedy served during a period of extraordinary turbulence. His preferred instrument of choice in foreign policy matters was the military. This study explores the maturation of Kennedy's decision-making process and how its evolution most affected the military. The study focuses on Kennedy's personalityand the Cold War political realities to arrive at an understanding of the decision making mindset of the era. From this point of reference, the measure of effectiveness of Kennedy's "flexible response" strategy is validated and his employment of the military can be judged a qualified success.

This book argues that the various images and representations used to describe the "new navy" in the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were indicative of a shift in how the American people viewed themselves, and how they viewed their proper role in the world. Specifically, this thesis provides a narrative of American social, economic, political, and foreign policy in the fin de si cle period, a narrative of the American naval rebuilding program in the same period, an analysis of popular and elite discourse about the navy between 1889 and 1917, and an analysis of professional naval discourse between 1888 and 1917. The book closes with a comparison of how the "new navy" sold itself to the American people and how the U. S. Navy sells itself to the American people today. It concludes that the modern U. S. Navy was born in the fin de si cle period from a cultural standpoint, and that this represented the origins of American global power.

This book investigates whether heavy divisions should employ mounted raids to support tactical deep operations. It proposes that current doctrine and practice focus on aviation and artillery as the means for conducting lethal deep operationsbecause deep ground maneuver operations require extensive logistics "tails" to support them. By focusing on aviation and artillery as their lethal deep operations assets. division commandeers reduce their flexibility. By employing mounted raids. commandeers eliminate the need for a logistics "tall" to follow the ground force, and they gain the flexibility to use the force which can best accomplish the mission. The book first examines the theoretical basis for deep operations using the works of Carl von Clausewitz. J. F. C. Fuller. and B. H. Liddell-Hart. The second section, using criteria developed from the Huba Wass de Czege combat power mode 1, investigates the advantages and disadvantages of raids based upon three historical examples: the raid on Magdhaba in WWI. the raid on Hammelb. Jrg during WWII. and Israel 's Operation Raviv conducted in 1969. Finally, the monograph analyzes current U. S. Army capabilities by comparing and contrasting the combat power potential of the organic artillery, aviation, and ground maneuver assets a division can employ in deep operations.

Iran in the 1950s was in the cross hairs of the Cold War power struggle between the US and USSR. Strategically located, Iran became critical in the foreign policy endeavors of the Eisenhower Administration in the Middle East. After the decision to force Mohammed Mossadeq to retire as the Prime Minister, the United States gave more than $700 million in mutual security assistance to the Shah of Iran from 1953-1959. In addition to the money, the US faced the challenge of transitioning the Iranian Armed Forces from an organization used by Iranian monarchs toquell unrest in the major population centers into a collective security partner with a trained and equipped military that could fight a delaying defensive campaign against a possible Soviet invasion. A Military Assistance AdvisoryGroup was created and advisory efforts began. Iranian history, international rivalries, and the strategic constraints by continuous interference from policy makers in Washington and the Shah's embellished interests for Iran weighedheavily on the effort. This monograph discusses the strategic context of Iran in the 1950s, the national level deliberations regarding the importance of Iran and the amount of assistance required, and analysis of whether or notthe USSR was deterred from intervening in Iran due to the US demonstrable commitment there. This case study parallels future decisions for policy makers as to the future roles and organizations necessary to conduct foreign internal defense and advising the militaries of allied nations. Success or failure at advisory operations has strategicconsequences.

This study examines what effect unit culture has on leadership practices in the 75th Ranger Regiment. The study investigates how the unit culture of the 75th Ranger Regiment developed; and through a survey questionnaire administered to selected leaders in the 75th Ranger Regiment, it explores prevailing views on the effect unit culture has on leadership practices. This study reveals that, first, executive leaders are more likely than mid-level leaders to delegate actions to lower levels of the unit. Secondly, mid-level leaders are likely to identify and eliminate soldiers who cannot meet established standards. Finally, mid-level leaders are likely to risk new methods to achieve mission accomplishment. These leadership practices demonstrate characteristics of an adaptive or learningorganization. First, leaders are willing to decentralize control in order to increase motivation and initiative. Second, leaders feel a sense of personal mastery that drives them to uphold shared values. Finally, leaders are not risk adverse and believe in being proactive problem solvers.

Shaka Zulu was successful in establishing Zulu dominance in southern Africa because he was a great strategist and military innovator. His politicalobjective was to expand his territory with the unification of neighboring clans and war was the primary means used to achieve this. His employmentoftactics to achieve strategic objectives is reminiscent of operational art as it relates to the arrangement of military forces in time, space, andpurpose. In order to achieve his political objectives, Shaka reorganized his clan, developed an intelligence network, and employed new tactics andstrategies in his quest to form a new system of war thus allowing him to change the society and the nature of warfare in southern Africa. Shakabecame the military architect of southern Africa unification. Through the application of his innovative tactical actions and weapons, Shakaexpanded his territory from a local district of a few hundred square miles to thousands of square miles. This was achieved by his unique ability totransform a small volunteer army of approximately 400 men to a standing army of 70,000 highly trained and disciplined soldiers. His victoriousmilitary campaigns against other clans culminated with the creation of the Zulu empire in just ten years.

The author's personal experience during one Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) will be examined in this thesis. One unit's pre deployment planning and training will be examined then compared to the actual operationsconducted. Incumbent on the conclusions drawn from the results of the comparisons, recommendations will be made in the thesis on how to improve the training. and preparations of one unit. Doctrine is examined to establish a base of understanding in the fundamental approach to conducting MOOTW. Current studies relating to MOOTW will be reviewed to determine trends in opinions and recommendations. The result of historical examples and current doctrine combined with current professional opinion leads to futher recommendations in how to train units for MOOTW.

This unclassified study evaluates the intelligence support the Army received from national intelligence agencies during JUST CAUSE and the Gulf War by using the seven characteristics of intelligence quality found in Joint Pub 2-0. The new national military strategy anticipates a lessdefined threat than during the Cold War. Also, downsizing pressures will proportionately reduce national and service intelligence support to the combatant CINCs and the services. This situation will require the Army to rely more than ever on national reconnaissance to support its warfighting intelligence needs. A review of the Gulf War and JUST CAUSE indicates that although national intelligence has the capability to answer many tactical and operational reconnaissance questions, it generally fails to do so. The reasons are that national intelligence is focused to serve senior government policy makers not warfighters. National intelligence products are often caveated by differing analytic assessments that in effect are either ill-suited or cause confusion for tactical commanders. Finally, joint doctrine did not clearly set out coordination procedures or the process by which national reconnaissance is transmitted to tactical users in a timely manner.