United States Army Command and General S

This book is about theory and the use of theory to develop doctrine. In light of the dramatic capabilities envisioned for the "Objective Force," the organized U. S. military mechanism of physical coercion, and the dynamic operational environment that characterizes the world of 2002, land and naval theory is examined, investigated and analyzed. A common perception is that maritime strategy and land strategy exist in discrete and separate spheres of knowledge. However, closer analysis demonstrates that they do not exist as independent areas of study, rather, they are merely divisions in the overall art of war. To develop and illustrate this concept, a general overview of the future threat/operational environment and the proposed characteristics and capabilities of the U. S. Army's Objective Force are presented. Manifest from this description of the Objective Force and the future threat, an apparent analogy between the Objective Force and a naval force becomes evident, even while it is increasingly apparent that technological advances are blurring the traditional distinctions between the divisions in the art of war - between land, sea and air warfare. The functional divisions are becoming less distinct, increasingly interrelated and integrated. Through this analogy to maritime operations, the following two constructs or paradigms are proposed to help guide the development of doctrine in the theoretical employment of the U. S. Army's Objective Force.1. The "object" or goal of Objective Force warfare is command of the white space, in other words, "freedom of action." Objective Force commanders must act to retain and preserve freedom of action. This must be the theoretical basis for all doctrine.2. The corollary of this is to preserve the "force in being." Objective Force commanders must employ maritime concepts to understand and govern the reasoned concentration and dispersal of forces. In combination, the concepts are related thusly, the core object or goal of Objective Force warfare is to control, that is, to exercise and retain ones freedom of action... this is the essence of the maritime concept "fleet in being." The arguments presented throughout are based on the demonstration of analogy between naval and Objective Force land warfare. The line of logic to the conclusion reached is that maneuver warfare was developed broadly to counter and defeat the inherent strength of the defense on land. Operational maneuver concepts were the ultimate expression of maneuver and the solution to industrialized, mass attrition warfare between nation-states. Objective Force maneuver is the embodiment and realization of operational maneuver, the basis of which is the exploitation and retention of "freedom of action." Freedom of action is therefore the essential, core criteria in any concept or theory that applies to or governs Objective Force employment. Evidence has substantiated the analogy between the characteristics of naval forces and Objective Forces. Theoretical and conceptual reasoning and arguments have demonstrated that freedom of action, that is, control of maritime communications or command of the sea has been the central construct in maritime strategy as well. The analogous core criteria, freedom of action, demonstrate that maritime concepts may be applied confidently to Objective Force employment. Assuming the inherent capabilities of the Objective Force are achieved; given the projected characteristics of the future operating environment... If maritime concepts were applied to Objective Force employment, the resulting operational actions would be consistent, as envisioned, to address and counter effectively the future threats in the future operating environment.

Dogs have competently served military ventures for over 2500 years. At onetime during WWII, there were nearly 15,000 trained military working dogs in the U. S.inventory serving a broad range of duties from patrolling to delivering messages. Todaythe U. S. military maintains fewer than 1,400 dogs.1 Although historic declines in dogutilization are apparent, today's operational environment clearly begs for an enhancedmilitary working dog capability-particularly with U. S. Special Operations forces. Technology preempted the decline of military working dog usage. During theCold War, the Warsaw Pact's numerical equipment superiority encouraged thedevelopment of equipment and doctrine designed to intercept and kill the enemy indepth in a high intensity conflict. Accordingly, the U. S. military focused on sophisticatedtechnological solutions. The dog as a low-technology system saw little developmentduring this period. As a result, military working dogs had limited use in an era of bipolarsuperpowers and nuclear brinkmanship

This study examines how the U. S. Army's recent changes in organization, doctrine, and technology have directly impacted the role of the cavalry in today's operating environment. Given the recent changes in the Army's doctrine, organization, and advance in technology, does the United States Cavalry still perform a unique and necessary function in today's Army? Section One focuses on the "unique and necessary" function of the U. S. Cavalry. Section Two focuses on the two main conflicts that led to the most dramatic changes to the cavalry, World War II and Operation Desert Storm. Section Three analyzes the changes that have occurred over the years to bring the cavalry's role into question. Finally, concluding that the cavalry no longer performs a unique and necessary function, this monograph recommends how the Army should approach the employment of the cavalry in future conflicts.